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This report, entitled “The Impact of Financial Services in EU Free Trade and Association 
Agreements on Money Laundering, Tax Evasion and Elusion”, analyses how the 
provisions on financial services that are included in EU trade and association agreements 
impact money laundering, tax evasion and tax elusion. It has been commissioned by the 
European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) for the Committee on International 
Trade (INTA) and was prepared by the T.M.C. Asser Instituut in cooperation with the 
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Topic and problem definition 
 
The European Union has pursued deep and comprehensive free trade agreements since 
the Global Europe Strategy of 2006.1 In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon overhauled the EU’s 
external action and increased the competences of the European Parliament. The Treaties 
now explicitly require that the Union’s external action, including its trade partnerships, 
contribute to the goals of rule of law promotion, the sustainable development of the EU 
and its trading partners, and the eradication of poverty in developing countries. In October 
2015, the European Commission proposed the updated EU’s external trade and investment 
strategy, entitled Trade for All.2 
 
As the world’s largest services exporter, the EU emphasises the importance of liberalising 
trade in services as a means of stimulating economic growth and foreign direct investment, 
both within the EU and on a global scale. Financial services are a crucial income-generating 
activity. However, greater domestic market access for foreign financial services providers, 
and easier cross-border banking and insurance transactions, create opportunities not only 
for business and economic prosperity, but also for abuse through money laundering and 
tax fraud. In order to counter such undesired effects through EU free trade agreements and 
association agreements (both referred to as FTAs throughout this study), and 
operationalise EU Treaty provisions on achieving the above-mentioned wider societal 
goals, liberalisation of the provision of financial services should be accompanied by 
substantive and institutional safeguards aimed at reducing illicit financial flows. Yet, while 
the new Trade for All strategy acknowledges the necessity of tackling issues wider than 
purely trade-related matters, it only recognises the significance of addressing ‘aggressive 
corporate profit shifting and tax avoidance strategies’ and ‘tax evasion’ in general.3 It 
makes no mention of action against money laundering. 
 
The present study addresses this issue by analysing the impact of the inclusion of financial 
services provisions in EU FTAs with third countries on money laundering, tax evasion and 
tax elusion. The assessment focuses on FTAs with Mexico, South Africa, Serbia, the 
Republic of Korea and Colombia/Peru. These are selected to encompass countries where 
the conclusion of such agreements might pose an elevated risk of money laundering and 
tax evasion, to include countries with different levels of economic development, and to 




1 European Commission, Global Europe: Competing with the World, COM(2006) 567. 
2  European Commission, Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment  
Policy, COM(2015) 497. 
3 Ibid., pp. 10 and 18. 
4  The EU-Central America Association Agreement, to which Panama is a party, is not 
included in this study. The FTAs were selected prior to the release of the ‘Panama Papers’. 
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Objectives and methodology 
 
The aim of this study, commissioned by the European Parliamentary Research Service 
(EPRS) for the Committee on International Trade (INTA) and carried out by the Asser 
Institute in cooperation with the University of Groningen, is threefold: 
 To analyse the legal provisions of relevance to the supply of financial services that 
have been included in the selected EU FTAs and examine the implementation of 
these provisions in national legal orders of the selected EU partner countries; 
 To assess the actual and potential impact of the liberalisation of trade in financial 
services between the EU and these partner countries in question on money 
laundering (primarily insofar as it is connected with the use of the international 
financial system to conceal the proceeds of crime) and tax evasion (notably insofar 
as it constitutes an aspect of money laundering); 
 To provide policy recommendations to the INTA Committee for consideration in 
ongoing trade negotiations with third countries on how to improve the legal and 
institutional frameworks for the liberalisation of financial services with a view to 
combating money laundering, tax evasion and elusion. 
 
In order to meet these objectives, the research team has carried out a comprehensive 
comparative legal analysis of the provisions of relevance to the supply of financial services in 
the selected EU FTAs (the texts of which are compiled in Annex 2) and the related 
implementing measures in the partner countries concerned. Building on the findings 
emerging from the comparative legal analysis, an empirical analysis has been conducted into 
whether the operation of EU FTAs has increased the threat of money laundering and tax 
evasion in these countries. For this purpose, publicly available information concerning 
illicit financial flows (defined as money illegally earned, transferred, or utilised) and their 
causes was gathered and analysed. In addition, important actors involved in combating 
money laundering and tax evasion at international, EU and national levels – such as 
financial supervisory authorities and financial intelligence units, governmental and non- 
governmental organisations, and academics were consulted. The key findings from the 
legal and empirical parts have been integrated in order to provide policy recommendations. 




 EU FTAs generally cover a broad range of financial services, including banking and 
insurance. 
 All EU FTAs contain prudential carve-outs in order to address important public 
policy concerns, such as resolving monetary and balance of payments difficulties. 
 Most EU FTAs stipulate vague commitments of third countries with respect to 
combating money laundering and tax evasion, typically taking the form of ‘best 
endeavour’ clauses. Such provisions do not foster the national efforts aimed at 
combating these practices. With the exception of the EU-Colombia/Peru 
Agreement, the degree of sophistication of the analysed FTAs is inversely 
proportional to their lifespan: the older the FTA, the weaker the obligations of the 
partner countries. 
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 Provisions on tax cooperation as a rule fall outside the scope of EU FTAs. 
 While all the partner countries concerned have committed themselves to respecting 
international and European standards on the combating of money laundering and tax 
evasion, the actual levels of their implementation and enforcement vary. 
 While precise statistical data is lacking, there is a general agreement that illicit financial 
flows originating from developing countries are substantial and on the rise. In particular, 
according to the Global Financial Integrity, Mexico and South Africa are among 
the top 10 biggest exporters of illicit money. Thus, the developing countries 
concerned face a significant threat of money laundering. 
 At present there is no conclusive statistical evidence to prove a causal link between 
the operation of EU FTAs and an increase in illicit financial flows. This was 
confirmed by all the respondents involved in the study. However, the available 
data does provide a strong indication that the liberalisation of trade between the EU 
and developing countries increases the threat of money laundering, given three key 
factors: (a) the significant degree of trade openness envisaged by EU FTAs, (b) the 
already substantial and constantly rising illicit financial flows from developing 
countries, and (c) the attractiveness of the EU as a destination for money 
launderers from such countries. 
 An increase in illicit financial flows may not only (or even primarily) be 
attributable to the liberalisation of financial services. While traditionally, illicit 
money has been laundered through the international financial system, nowadays 
trade-based money laundering – through fraudulent manipulation of the price, 
quantity and quality of goods and services in general – has become increasingly 
important as a means for illicit transfers of funds out of developing countries. 
 Illicit financial flows can have a profoundly negative impact on developing countries. 
Such an impact can be caused not only by outflows of illicit money from 
developing countries but also by inflows of illicit money into such countries. 
Substantial outflows of illicit funds severely undermine domestic resource 
mobilisation, imperilling sustainable development and economic growth. 
Significant inflows of illicit funds in turn strengthen crime and have major adverse 
socio-economic consequences. 
 The key problem faced by developing countries in combating illicit financial flows 
is a significant discrepancy between the law on the books and the law in action. The 
effectiveness of anti-money laundering (AML) systems in such countries is 
undermined by two key factors: (a) structural weaknesses caused by poor 
implementation of good governance principles and deficiencies in the enforcement 
of the rule of law (e.g. corruption, large-scale organised crime, and substantial 
informal economy); and (b) major functional weaknesses related to the insufficient 
capacity of the authorities in fighting money laundering (e.g. shortage of financial 
and human resources, insufficient knowledge and experience, and a lack of 
coordination between the competent authorities). In addition, insufficiently strict 
anti-money laundering controls in the developed world, in particular the EU, have 
exacerbated the problem. 
 The closer the ties between the EU and the partner country, the greater the potential 
for the EU to exercise direct or indirect influence on such a country. 
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 Given that the liberalisation of trade in goods and services, including financial 
services, between the EU and developing countries increases the risk of money 
laundering and tax evasion in these countries, the extent of trade liberalisation under 
EU FTAs should be made conditional on the partner country’s respect for 
international and European standards in this area. 
 Instead of producing ‘Trade Sustainability Impact Assessments’ just before the 
finalisation of negotiations or even afterwards, these assessments should be finalised 
well in advance of the end of the negotiations in order to enable the negotiators to 
take such recommendations into account. 
 In view of the rise of trade-based money laundering, in future FTAs the EU should 
consider including provisions aimed at combating the mispricing of internationally 
traded goods and services, both between two different companies and companies 
of the same group or holding. 
 In order to increase transparency and combat tax evasion, future EU FTAs should 
incorporate provisions on cooperation in tax matters. In particular, these provisions 
could address country-by-country reporting of payments made to governments by 
firms operating under the jurisdiction of one of the States Parties. 
 In line with EU Treaty obligations and the new Trade for All strategy, future FTAs 
should include provisions on the establishment of mechanisms for monitoring the 
trading partner’s compliance with the anti-money laundering and anti-tax evasion 
commitments that they undertook under these FTAs. 
 The EU should also develop means to: continuously monitor the effects of the 
liberalisation of trade in goods and services, including financial services; carry out 
evaluations; and, where necessary, develop proposals to amend FTAs to address 
any concerns that may result from these evaluations. 
 Efforts to foster international cooperation between EU partner countries and 
regional and global bodies in charge of developing international standards in the 
areas of banking, insurance, money laundering and tax evasion should be 
improved in order to provide for a greater exchange of information and best practices. 
 Increasing the effectiveness of the law on the books in developing countries requires 
the EU to widen its approach to external trade by linking it to the overarching EU 
goals of international promotion of the rule of law and sustainable development, 
as well as the fight against poverty. 
 The EU should invest more resources in studying and eliminating the causes of illicit 
financial flows from and into developing countries. 
 In light of the post-Lisbon Treaty enhancement of the prerogatives of the European 
Parliament, the European Parliament should have a stronger role in EU trade 
negotiations to enable political contestation and debate on the choices to be made 
and directions to be followed in EU external trade, as well as to ensure a more 
effective monitoring of their implementation. 
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ACITA Act for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs (Korea) 
AML Anti-Money Laundering 
AML/CFT Anti-Money Laundering/Combatting the Financing of Terrorism 
AMLD Anti-Money Laundering Directive (European Union) 
BCP Banking Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
BOK Bank of Korea 
BSD Banking Supervision Department (South Africa) 
CATF Chemical Action Task Force 
CCP Common Commercial Policy 
CDD Customer Due Diligence 
CDR Capital Requirements Directive (South Africa) 
CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
CFT Combatting the Financing of Terrorism 
CISCA Collective Investment Schemes Control Act (South Africa) 
CMLAC Counter-Money Laundering Advisory Council (South Africa) 
CNBV Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (National Banking and 
Securities Commission) (Mexico) 
CNSF Comisión Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas (Mexico) 
CONDUSEF Comisión Nacional para la Protección y Defensa de los Usuarios 
de Servicios Financieros 
DCI Development Cooperation Instrument 
DNFBPs Designated Non-Financial Business Professionals 
DTA Double Taxation Agreements 
EBA European Banking Authority 
EDFTRUA Enforcement Decree on Reporting and Use of Certain Financial 
Transaction Information (Korea) 
EP European Parliament 
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement 
EPRS European Parliamentary Research Service 
ESAAMLG Eastern and South Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
FATF Financial Action Task Force 
FETA Foreign Exchange Transactions Act (Korea) 
FIC Financial Intelligence Centre (South Africa) 
FIU Financial Intelligence Unit 
FMA Financial Markets Act (South Africa) 
FSB Financial Services Board (South Africa) 
FSC Financial Services Commission (Korea) 
FSCA Financial Sector Conduct Authority (South Africa) 
FSR Financial Sector Regulation (South Africa) 
FSRBs FATF-Style Regional Bodies 
FSS Financial Supervisory Service (Korea) 
FTA Free Trade Agreement and/or Association Agreement 
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FTRUA Act  on  Reporting  and  Use  of  Certain  Financial  Transaction 
Information (Korea) 
GAFILAT Financial Action Task Force of Latin America 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GDP Gross Domestic Income 
GFI Global Financial Integrity 
HMN Hot Money Narrow 
HR/VP High Representative/Vice-President 
ICP International Core Principles of the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors 
IOSCO International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
IFFs Illicit Financial Flows 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INTA Committee on International Trade 
INCSR International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Mexico) 
IRD International Relations Division (South Africa) 
JSE Johannesburg Stock Exchange (South Africa) 
KNTS Korean National Tax Service 
LSE London School of Economics and Political Science 
MERCOSUR Mercado Común del Sur 
MLPA Money Laundering Prevention Administration (Serbia) 
MONEYVAL Committee   of   Experts   on   the   Evaluation   of   Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism 
NBS National Bank of Serbia 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NEDLAC National  Economic  Development  and  Labour  Council  (South 
Africa) 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
RTAs Regional Trade Agreements 
SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Serbia) 
SA Council Stabilisation and Association Council SA 
Committee Stabilisation and Association Committee 
SADC Southern Africa Development Community 
SARB South African Reserve Bank 
SARS South African Revenue Service 
SBS Superintendent of Banks, Insurance and Pension Funds (Peru) 
SHCP Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Mexico) 
STRs Suspicious Transaction Reports 
SUNAT Peruvian Customs and Tax Authority 
TDCA Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (South Africa) 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TPA Trade Promotion Agreement 
TPCA Trust Property Control Act (South Africa) 
Trade SIA Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (European Commission, 
DG Trade) 
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UAC/ECA Joint  African  Union  Commission/United  Nations  Economic 
Commission for Africa 
UAIF Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero (Colombia) 
UIF Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (Peru) 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
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Part 1: Introduction 
 
This study investigates the implementation and effects of the inclusion of provisions relevant 
to financial services in the selected EU free trade and association agreements1 with third 
countries, with a particular focus on their propensity to facilitate money laundering, and to be 
misused for tax evasion and elusion reasons. 
 
1.1 Definition of Concepts 
 
For the purposes of this study, financial services are defined broadly as ‘any service of a 
financial nature offered by a financial supplier of a party to the relevant agreement’,2 and cover 
banking and insurance. Following conventional wisdom, the study has also proceeded on the 
basis of the following general definitions of the three key concepts involved therein. ‘Money 
laundering’ is the term used for a number of acts involving processing the proceeds of crime 
with a view to concealing their illegal origin and bringing them back into the legal economy. It 
should be recalled in this context that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has recommended 
that countries criminalise money laundering and ‘apply the crime of money laundering to all 
serious offences with a view to including the widest range of predicate offences’.3 ‘Tax evasion’ 
has been defined as an illegal act of evading taxes by concealing income, earned either legally 
or illegally, from detection and collection by the tax authorities. Finally, ‘tax elusion’, also often 
referred to as ‘tax avoidance’, has been understood as a legal act of using the tax regimes to 
one’s own advantage to reduce one’s tax burden. 
 
1.2 Context of the Study 
 
The study is carried out in a period in which the EU – after already setting out such a course in 
the past has committed itself in its Treaties to ensure that relations with third parties, including 
trade partnerships, contribute to the goals of promotion of the rule of law, sustainable 
development in the EU and in other countries around the world, and the fight against poverty 
in developing countries (notably in Articles 3(5) and 21(2)(d) TEU). Furthermore, the Union is 
to ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and 
its other policies (Article 21(3) TEU). Another important element of the post-Lisbon situation is 
the role that is assigned to the European Parliament in the context of the Common Commercial 
 
 
1 The authors recognise that the latter encompass more than the former, but for the sake of 
brevity the two types of agreements are together referred to as EU FTAs or FTAs. 
2 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Financial Services in EU Trade  
Agreements: Study for the ECOM Committee, EU 2014. Also see K. Sullivan, Anti–Money 
Laundering in a Nutshell: Awareness and Compliance for Financial Personnel and Business, Berkeley, 
CA: Apress, 2015; and L. Pantaleo, M. Andenas and C. Reul, The European Union as a Global Model  
for Trade and Investment, Research Paper No. 2016-02, University of Oslo, Faculty of Law, 
February 2016. 
3 FATF, International Standards of Combating Money Laundering & the Financing of Terrorism &  
Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations, February 2012 (as updated in October 2015), para. B.3. 
Ex-Post Impact Assessment 






Policy (CCP). Notably, the European Parliament now has to give its consent to trade, association 
and other  agreements, and is to  be immediately and fully  informed at all  stages of the 
negotiations procedure.4 
 
Elements of the approach regarding such ‘non-trade concerns’ date back several decades. The 
integration of human rights,5 labour rights6 and protection of the environment has been on the 
EU agenda since the end of the 1980s,7 as provisions on these topics included in recent EU trade 
agreements show. Inserting such commitments in the trade agreements does not necessarily 
mean that ‘non-trade concerns’ are effectively tackled in practice. The path from the adoption 
of law to its application in legal practice can take time. A proper policy process demands that 
after new standards are introduced, their implementation and effectiveness in realising the 
intended outcomes are assessed. In that respect, it is to be welcomed that monitoring 
implementation efforts is stressed explicitly in the new EU trade and investment strategy, 
entitled Trade for All, which was published by the European Commission in October 2015.8 The 
document also sets out that European values, such as sustainable development, human rights, 
transparency, fair and ethical trade and the fight against corruption are to be promoted around 
the world, and that this means to include anti-corruption rules in the EU FTAs. Though 
countering tax evasion is mentioned as well, neither illicit money streams nor anti-money 
laundering (AML) are referred to. 
 
In this study, five agreements concluded by the European Union with third countries or groups 
of countries were scrutinised as far as their provisions on financial services, money laundering, 
tax evasion and tax elusion are concerned. Three of the five agreements are with developing 
countries (South Africa, Mexico, and Colombia/Peru), one is with a country in transition that is 




4 See M. Armanoviča and R. Bendini, The Role of the European Parliament in Shaping the European 
 U nion’s Trad e Policy aft er th e Entry into Force of th e Treat y of Lisbon , In-Depth Analysis for Policy 
Department, DG External Policies, Brussels, 2014. 
5 Since the early 1990s, see L. Bartels, (2013) Human rights and Sustainable Development 
Obligations in EU Free Trade Agreements, in: D. Kleimann (ed.), EU Preferential Trade  
Agreements: Commerce, Foreign Policy, and Development Aspects, European University Institute, 
2013, pp. 127-139. 
6 See, for instance, the European Commission Communication Promoting Core Labour Standards  
And Improving Governance In The Context Of Globalisation, COM(2001)416. 
7 The 1987 Single European Act had already introduced the duty to integrate environmental 
concerns in all other policy areas, and the goal of promoting sustainable development was 
added in 1997 by the Treaty of Amsterdam (nowadays art. 11 TFEU). The 1998 Cardiff process 
stimulated giving effect to the integration clause in EU trade relations. See W.Th. Douma, The 
Promotion of Sustainable Development through EU Trade Instruments, in: L. Pantaleo and M. 
Andenas (eds.), The European Union as a Global Model for Trade and Investment, University of Oslo 
Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2016-02, pp. 86-103. 
8 European Commission, Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy, 
COM(2015)497. 
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of Korea). For the purposes of the study, we will refer to Serbia as a developing country given 
that, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), it currently belongs to the group of 
emerging and developing economies (which also includes South Africa, Mexico, Colombia and 
Peru)9 and that, in many respects, countries in this group face similar development problems. 
 
The number of initiatives relevant to this study is considerable. In particular, note was taken of 
the experience and outputs of the ‘Cocaine Route Programme’, a cooperation in the field of 
money laundering between the EU and GAFILAT, the Financial Action Task Force for Latin 
America which has some of the target countries of this study as members. The findings of 
several relevant studies of the European Parliament were also used as a basis. In particular, note 
was taken of the In-Depth Analysis conducted for the TAXE Special Committee of the EP 
concerning ‘Selected International Third-Country Tax-Governance Issues’ of October 2015, with 
emphasis on the part concerning the relationship between tax issues and illicit financial flows,10 
the examination carried out in ‘Tax Transparency – Openness, Disclosure and Exchange of 
Information’, inasmuch as it pointed out the direct link between lack of transparency in tax 
matters and money laundering and terrorism financing,11 and finally, the study concerning 
‘Financial Services in EU Trade Agreements’ carried out in November 2014 for the ECON 
Committee.12 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
The overall purpose of the study is to contribute to the improvement of the EU’s international 
action against illicit activities such as money laundering and tax frauds. EU institutions are 
strongly committed to streamlining their effort both domestically and internationally in the 
fight against illicit financial flows, whatever origin they have and no matter what form they 
take. 
 
More specifically, the aim of the study is threefold: 
 
 To analyse the legal provisions of relevance to the supply of financial services that have 
been included in the selected EU FTAs and examine the implementation of these 
provisions in national legal orders of the selected EU partner countries; 
 To assess the actual and potential impact of the liberalisation of trade in financial 
services between the EU and these partner countries in question on money laundering 




9 International Monetary Fund, Country Composition of WEO Groups. In May 2013, the OECD 
initiated accession negotiations with Colombia. While the IMF was followed in this respect, it 
can be noted that the EU defines the countries analysed in this study as middle-income 
countries. 
10 J. Owens, Selected International Third-Country Tax-Governance Issues, at 17 ff. 
11 C. Remeur, Tax Transparency – Openness, Disclosure and Exchange of Information, In-Depth 
Analysis of the European Parliament Research Service (EPRS), at 9 ff. 
12 A. Lang and C. Conyers, Financial Services in EU Trade Agreements, Study for the ECON 
Committee. 
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conceal the proceeds of crime) and tax evasion (notably insofar as it constitutes an 
aspect of money laundering); 
 To provide policy recommendations to the INTA Committee for consideration in 
ongoing trade negotiations with third countries on how to improve the legal and 
institutional frameworks for the liberalisation of financial services with a view to 
combating money laundering, tax evasion and elusion. 
 
1.4 Structure and Methodology of the Study 
 
The study is divided into two main parts. The first part (Chapter 2) focuses on a comparative 
legal analysis of, on the one hand, the provisions relevant to financial services included in the 
aforementioned five EU FTAs, and, on the other, the relevant domestic legislation of the six 
partner countries involved. The purpose of this part is to evaluate the legal frameworks 
governing illicit financial flows between the EU and the selected third countries. The trade 
agreements are discussed following the order of the date on which their negotiations were 
concluded: EU-Mexico (1997), EU-South-Africa (1999), Serbia (2008), EU-Korea (2009) and EU- 
Colombia/Peru (2010). For each of these agreements and legal frameworks of the partner 
countries concerned the study notably examines: 
- the extent of coverage of financial services provisions and those related to this sector, 
and as far as possible the corollary effect(s) in terms of curbing or fostering money 
laundering, tax evasion and elusion practices; 
- the effectiveness, achievements and deficiencies of any safeguards accompanying the 
inclusion of provisions related to financial services in terms of curbing – in relation to 
the originally intended results – money laundering, tax evasion and elusion; 
- the extent to which better drafting of provisions related to financial services and the 
implementation of the existing financial services provisions could contribute to 
achieving the originally intended results; 
- whether the rules are fit-for-purpose in today's environment in relation to money 
laundering, tax evasion and elusion practices, as well as the effectiveness of the existing 
mechanisms for monitoring and compliance. 
The analysis consists of five sections, each of which covers one FTA.13 Each of these sections 
starts with a short sketch of the context of the trade relationship between the country in question 
and the EU, and the institutional framework of the agreement. Subsequently, the regulatory 
framework for supplying financial services and combating illicit financial flows in the 
agreement is examined. This is followed by an assessment of the national legislation dealing 
with financial services, money laundering, tax evasion and tax elusion, where possible in light 
of the provisions of the agreement, other relevant international standards, guidelines, etc., and 
relevant developments. At the end of each section, some preliminary conclusions focused on 
the country analysed are presented. At the end of Chapter 2, some common key findings are 
outlined in order to identify the current state of affairs from a purely legal viewpoint. The 
preliminary conclusions and the key findings serve as a basis for the empirical part, in which 
the practical effects of the liberalisation of financial services between the EU and the third 




13 To this end, Colombia and Peru are discussed in a one single report. 
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The original plan to also describe in detail a number of EU legal systems was abandoned when 
it became apparent that this was not conducive to answering the main questions of this study. 
Since the study was about FTAs with non-EU countries and their effect on illicit financial flows, 
it was decided that the focus should be on the FTAs, the rules on the liberalisation of financial 
services contained in these FTAs and on the corresponding legislation and legal practice of the 
EU’s trading partners. Instead of also describing the legal systems of some of the EU member 
states, it was decided to make use of the information gathered on some of these countries where 
this was conducive to other findings throughout the study. 
 
The second part of the study (Chapter 3) carries out an empirical examination of the practical 
effects of the liberalisation of financial services between the EU and the concerned third 
countries on money laundering, tax evasion and elusion. Given that financial services are the 
focus of this study, the empirical investigation is centred on money laundering because it is 
closely linked to the use of the international financial system in order to conceal the proceeds of 
crime. Tax-related illegal practices have been considered inasmuch as they constitute an aspect 
of money laundering. The main findings of the empirical investigation are presented at the end 
of the chapter. 
 
For the purposes of the study, the research team has gathered and analysed information 
concerning the illicit financial flows affecting the selected third countries in general. More 
specifically, the team searched for evidence of (an increase in) such flows after the EU FTAs 
came into effect. To begin with, an analysis was carried out of the publicly available studies 
produced, inter alia, by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Joint 
African Union Commission/United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (AUC/ECA), the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, non- 
governmental organisations, such as Global Financial Integrity (GFI), financial intelligence 
units, as well as academics. 
 
In addition, the research team contacted key actors involved in combating money-laundering 
at international, EU and national level, with a view to: (a) receiving further data; and (b) 
verifying the information that it had gathered itself. To that effect, we prepared a questionnaire 
(see Annex 4). This questionnaire was directed to: 
 the financial supervisory authorities and/or financial intelligence units, both those 
operating in the EU (in particular major financial centres generally viewed to be 
vulnerable to illicit financial flows, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy, and Spain) and those operating in the third countries in question; 
 relevant international and national governmental and non-governmental organisations 
(in particular, the World Bank, FATF, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 
Global Financial Integrity, Transparency International, and Global Witness); and 
 leading academics specialising in the field of the study. 
 
Based on the responses to the questionnaire, the team also conducted semi-structured 
interviews with a number of respondents representing the three above-mentioned groups of 
actors. Most actors approached by the research team expressed their willingness to cooperate 
in the study. No (positive) response, however, was obtained from the representatives of relevant 
authorities in Germany and Colombia, as well as a number of international organisations and 
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academics. A complete list of all persons who have cooperated with the research team is 
included in Annex 5. 
 
Finally, Chapter 4 presents conclusions in the form of policy recommendations addressed to the 
Committee on International Trade (INTA), for whom the European Parliamentary Research 
Service (EPRS) commissioned this study. These recommendations build on the main 
deficiencies and challenges identified in the two previous parts of the study. The aim is to 
formulate suggestions for improving the way in which EU FTAs deal with the problem of illicit 
financial flows. Such recommendations can be implemented under existing trade deals, though 
that might require amending the agreements in question. Most importantly, they can be inserted 
in the trade agreements that the EU will conclude in the future, some of which are being 
negotiated at the time of writing. 
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Part  2:  Comparative  Legal  Analysis  –  Evaluating  EU  Trade 
Agreements with Third Countries 
 
2.1 EU–Mexico  Economic  Partnership,  Political  Coordination  and 
Cooperation Agreement 
 
2.1.1 Trade context 
 
2.1.1.1 Bilateral trade relations between the EU and Mexico 
 
The EU and United Mexican States (Mexico) are important trade partners. Only the USA 
receives more exports from Mexico than the EU does, and the latter represents the third largest 
importer to Mexico after the USA and China, counting both trade in goods and trade in services. 
The flow of foreign investment between the parties is also quite significant. In 2013 it generated 
a total capital flow of approximately €125 billion, €100 billion of which were EU outward stocks 
entering into the Mexican economy.14 The economic relations between the parties are governed 
by the EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement 
(hereinafter: the Global Agreement), signed on 8 December 1997 between the EU and its 
Member States of the one part, and Mexico of the other part. Article 2 of the Global Agreement 
states that this agreement aims to strengthen existing relations between the parties by means of, 
among other things, creating stronger commercial and economic relations. The Global 
Agreement laid down general principles and procedures on the basis of which a number of 
implementing decisions were adopted after its coming into force, as it will be explained below. 
To this end, Article 45 established a Joint Council vested with the power to supervise the 
implementation of this agreement. In addition, in accordance with Article 47, the Joint Council 
has also the power to make binding decisions in those cases stipulated in the Global Agreement. 
 
On the basis of these provisions the Joint Council has adopted Decision 2/2000,15 and Decision 
2/2001 (hereinafter: the Decision),16 concerning trade in goods and trade in services 
respectively.17 When read together, these decisions are essentially equivalent to a 
comprehensive free trade agreement that also covers foreign investment. Given the research 
question of the present study, the decision related to trade in goods will not be comprehensively 
analysed. The focus will be on the decision concerning trade in services, and in particular on 
the provisions relating to financial services. To this end, the governance framework laid down 
 
 
14 For more information, see the link provided below, note 19. 
15  'Decision (2000/415/EC) no. 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000', OJ 
L157/10. 
16 'Decision (2001/152/EC) no. 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council of 27 February 2001', OJ 
L70/7. 
17 The decision on trade in goods entered into force in the year 2000, while the decision on trade 
in services entered into force in 2001. Further information can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/mexico/ last visited 18 
November 2015. 
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in the Global Agreement, the relevant provisions of the Decision and the relevant Mexican 
legislation adopted or adapted to implement the  Global Agreement are examined. Some 
preliminary conclusions will be presented at the end under the heading ‘Assessment’ (2.1.4). 
 
2.1.1.2 Institutional framework of the Global Agreement 
 
The Global Agreement established two governing bodies responsible of its implementation. 
First of all, the previously mentioned Joint Council, which consists of members of the Council 
of the European Union and of the European Commission in one part, and members of the 
Mexican government, in the other. It is presided over by a member of the Council – on a rotating 
basis – and a member of the government of Mexico. It meets at regular intervals and whenever 
the circumstances require (Article 45). It examines any major issues arising within the 
framework of the Agreement and any other bilateral or international issues of mutual interest. 
However, the most remarkable function of the Joint Council is the power to issue binding 
decisions in the cases provided for in the Global Agreement, and in any other case as agreed by 
the Parties. It is on the basis of such power that the Joint Council has adopted the Decision that 
will constitute the primary focus of this section. In addition, the Joint Council is also vested with 
the power to establish special arrangements in case of trade related disputes arising out of the 
Global Agreement, provided that such arrangements are compatible with the rules of the WTO 
(Article 50). The rules concerning the settlement of disputes are laid down in Annex XVI to 
Decision 2/2000. 
 
The Joint Council is assisted by a Joint Committee, which is composed of representatives of both 
parties at the level of senior civil servant. The Joint Committee meets once a year and whenever 
else agreed by the parties (Article 48). The functioning of both bodies is regulated by Decision 
1/2001.18 According to this Decision, their meetings are not public. It is not mandatory that their 
decisions be published but the Parties can decide to publish them in their respective official 
publications.19 It is therefore difficult to know when the meetings have been held, and the 
agenda of those meetings. It is only possible to indirectly infer what was discussed in the 
meetings when the decisions made therein are published. The EU has published these decisions 
in the Official Journal on several occasions.20 
 
In addition to the two general governing bodies, the Decision has also established a Special 
Committee on Financial Services (Article 23). It is composed of representatives of each Party’s 
authority responsible for financial services as set out in Annex II of the Decision. For the EU, it 
is a representative of the DG Internal Market while the Member States have appointed a 
representative of their Ministry of Finance or equivalent. Mexico is represented by a member of 
the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (see below). The functions of the Committee include 
the general supervision of the implementation of the Chapter concerning financial services, and 
 
 
18 'Decision (2001/152/EC) no. 1/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council of 27 February 2001', OJ 
L70/1. 
19 Article 11 and Article 5 of the respective rules of procedure. 
20 For example, from the adoption of the 'Decision (2004/805/EC) no. 2/2004 of the EU-Mexico  
Joint Council of 28 April 2004', OJ L356/8, one can indirectly infer that the Joint Council has met 
to discuss preferential tariffs concerning certain products. 
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any issues regarding financial services that are referred to it by a Party. The Special Committee 
is meant to meet once a year and to report to the Joint Committee. No rules concerning the 
functioning of this body  are available, nor  are any documents produced by it  available. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that the activity of this body is subject to the same publicity regime 
applicable to the Joint Council and the Joint Committee. The fact that the activity carried out by 
the implementing bodies is not publicly available is regrettable as it would be useful to know if 
and how the implementation of the agreement is carried out and monitored in practice. 
Similarly, it is regrettable that no annual reports from the European Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council are provided for where the EU-Mexico Agreements is 
concerned. 
 
2.1.2 Assessment of the Regulatory Framework for Financial Services 
Provision and Combating Illicit Capital Flows 
 




As already pointed out above, the Global Agreement itself does not contain any provisions 
relating specifically to financial services. Such provisions are included in the Decision. Article 
12(1) of the Decision lays down a general clause granting the right to financial service suppliers 
of each party to establish a commercial presence in the territory of the other Party (Mode 3 under 
GATS). Article 12(2) safeguards the power of the Parties to require the suppliers to incorporate 
under each Party’s own law, or to impose specific terms and conditions provided that they are 
in line with the Decision. Article 12(3), however, imposes on the Party what could be labelled a 
‘standstill obligation’ to the extent that it prevents the parties from enacting pejorative measures 
 
The provisions of the Agreement provide for a sound legal framework that seems able to
guarantee a great deal of liberalisation of financial services between the two Parties. 
However, the impact of such provisions is limited considering the far-reaching exceptions
listed in Annex I to Decision 2/2001. 
The Agreement contains only vague commitments when it comes to transparency of
financial services. It only lays down a best endeavours obligation. 
The same holds true in respect of combatting money laundering and drug trafficking.
Only elusive forms of voluntary cooperation and liaison are envisaged. 
Taxation is only addressed in a general manner. The Agreement contains a clause
safeguarding the power of the Parties to implement measures aimed at preventing the
avoidance or evasion of taxes. The clause is however standard practice in free trade
agreements and does not imply that Parties have adopted a common strategy to fight
tax misconduct. 
The governance structure of the Agreement appears flawed. The works and activities of
monitoring bodies set up by the Agreement are not publicly available, and no annual
reports to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the
Agreement are provided by the European Commission. 
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than those already existing at the time the Decision came into force.21 Article 12(4) provides 
quite a far-reaching list of measures limiting the supply of financial services which are expressly 
prohibited under the Decision. It includes some typical ‘protectionist’ measures such as 
limitations on the number of suppliers (i.e. quotas), limitations on the total value of financial 
transactions, and limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum 
shareholding percentage, etc. 
 
Article 13(1) replicates its predecessor in laying down a general clause granting to the suppliers 
of financial services of each Party the right to provide such services on a cross-border basis, 
namely in the territory of the other Party, without establishing a commercial presence (Mode 1 
under GATS). Article 13(2) contains a standstill obligation identical to that of Article 12. 
However, Article 13(4) provides a limited carve-out allowing the Parties to exercise their 
regulatory powers in respect of related activities such as advertisement and market solicitation. 
 
Article 14 grants national treatment to the suppliers of financial services operating in both modes 
identified above – those operating through commercial presence abroad and those supplying 
the services on a cross-border basis. The provision in question refers to several types of activities 
– such as establishment and sale or disposition – admittedly extending national treatment to 
both the pre-establishment and the post-establishment phases. Article 15 grants most favoured 
nation treatment (MFN) to suppliers of the other party, with the only limitation of special 
treatments accorded on the basis of regional trade agreements (RTAs) notified under Article V 
GATS. 
 
When it comes to transparency, the Decision contains only one article devoted to this aspect of 
financial services. It lays down no effective legal obligations, and more closely resembles a 
declaration of intent stating the  good willingness of the Parties to cooperate to enhance 
transparency. Article 20(4) states that the Parties shall make their ‘best endeavours’ to ensure 
that international standards – such as the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation of 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions - are implemented and applied in 
their territories. Article 20(5) stipulates that the Parties ‘take note’ of the ‘Ten Key Principles for 
Information Exchange’ adopted by the Finance Ministers of the G7. 
 
The Decision also lays down rules concerning investment and related payments. To begin with, it 
provides a broad definition of covered investments (Article 28) which admittedly includes 
foreign direct and partly indirect investment. Article 29 contains a standstill obligation not to 
introduce new restrictions on payments related to investments, and a best effort obligation 
towards the gradual elimination of all restrictions between the Parties. The Decision also 
contains ad hoc carve-outs applicable only to certain situations, such as in case of monetary or 





21 Standstill obligations are traditionally a common feature of free trade agreements, and have 
recently started to make their way into investment and tax agreements. See, among other 
examples, Article 2 of Chapter 2 of the text of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada, available at:  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf. 
The inclusion of financial services in EU free trade and association agreements: 
Effects on money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance 






A provision devoted entirely to combating drug trafficking and money laundering is instead 
included in the Global Agreement (Article 28). However, the legal obligations in this provision 
are rather lax. In particular, it requires the Parties to take appropriate measures for cooperation 
and liaison with a view to preventing and reducing the production and distribution of drugs, 
and related activities. Where money laundering is concerned, such cooperation consists of 
exchange of information regarding legislative and administrative treatment, and of the 
adoption of appropriate measures including measures adopted by the Union and international 
bodies active in this field. In other words, the provision in question contains – once again – a 
declaration of intent pointing to the adoption of international best practices, of which rules 
approved by the EU are considered part. Neither in the Global Agreement nor in the 
implementing Decisions, additional or more specific references to international instruments, 
such as the FATF standards, are made. 
 
The horizontal part of the Global Agreement, which is also applicable to financial services, 
contains another provision relevant for the sake of this study. Article 54 lays down a standard 
clause concerning tax evasion and avoidance. More specifically, with this provision the Parties 
confirm that nothing in the Agreement, or in any arrangements adopted under it, may be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of any measure aimed at preventing the 
avoidance or evasion of taxes pursuant to the tax provisions of agreements to avoid double 
taxation or other tax arrangements, or domestic fiscal legislation. 
 
2.1.2.1 Mexico’s specific list of commitments applicable to financial services: 
Annex I to Decision 2/2001 
 
Article 17 of the Decision lays down a general exception to the rules of the Chapter concerning 
financial services. According to this exception, the Parties are authorised to apply the limitations 
listed on Annex I to the Decision. Article 17(2) states that the latter shall be reviewed by the 
Special Committee on Financial Services to ‘propose to the Joint Council [its] modification, 
suspension or elimination’. The Joint Council, no later than three years after the coming into 
force of the Decision, ‘’shall adopt a decision providing for the elimination of substantially all 
remaining discrimination’, including those listed in Annex I. The research carried out in the 
context of this study, however, found no evidence of the adoption of this decision. This means 
that either the Joint Council has never adopted it, or that it has been adopted but not published 
in accordance with the rules concerning the functioning of this body already referred to above. 
It seems unlikely that such an important decision, if adopted, would not be made publicly 
available, if only because of the impact that it may have on the business community of the two 
Parties to the Agreement. As a result, the analysis of Annex I is based on the assumption that 
the limitations to market access therein provided are still in force. The examination will 
concentrate exclusively on the limitations applied by Mexico. 
 
The list contained in Annex I is divided by sectors and subsectors. However, some exceptions 
are applicable to all financial services, or at least to the bulk of them. First and foremost, foreign 
investors can hold up to 49% of the paid up capital of an established financial institution. This 
requirement applies almost invariably to all financial services with some limited exclusions, 
such as commercial banks. The other side of the coin of this rule is that effective control by the 
Mexican shareholders is mandatory. Investments by foreign governments and their official 
agencies  are  not  allowed.  As  far  as  insurance  services  are  concerned,  foreign  insurance 
Ex-Post Impact Assessment 






companies are requested to register with the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP, see 
below). A number of services auxiliary to insurance are generally excluded from the scope of 
application of Decision 2/2001. These include personal insurance of Mexican residents, 
insurance against civil liability for events occurring in Mexico, and other classes of insurance 
against risks occurring in Mexican territory. As far as banking is concerned, roughly the same 
general limitations apply, with the notable exception of commercial banks. Foreign investment 
in development banks and credit unions is not allowed. 
 
2.1.3 Assessment  of  Mexican  Legislation  on  Financial  Services, 
Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion and Elusion 
 
2.1.3.1 Financial services 
 
Over the last few years Mexico’s financial sector has undergone a series of major reforms aimed 
at increasing competition and transparency in the sector, in order to enhance its solidity and 
boost economic growth.22 In particular, Mexico was one of the first countries in the world to 
implement Basel III standards in 2013.23 
 
2.1.3.2 The National Banking and Securities Commission 
 
As a general, preliminary assessment, it should be noted that Mexico’s legal framework 
applicable to its financial system has been constantly updated and improved in recent years. 
Mexican authorities have made a considerable effort towards bringing the system in line with 
the most advanced international regulatory  standards.  The country’s  relevant authorities 
participate in all the main international institutions and bodies relevant to this field, such as 
IOSCO (International Organisation of Securities Commissions), the so-called Basel Committee, 
and the Financial Stability Board. No major specific challenge can be identified in this field. 
 
More specifically, the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (National Banking and Securities 
Commission, hereinafter: CNBV), an independent agency of the Secretariat of Finance and 
Public Credit, is the technical, autonomous body vested with executive powers over the 
Mexican financial system. Its main role is to supervise and regulate the entities that make up 
the Mexican financial system, in order to ensure its stability and proper operation, and to 
maintain and promote the healthy and balanced development of the financial system as a 
whole, while protecting the interests of the public.24 CNBV is part and parcel of Mexico’s 
strategy to conform to the best international standards and practices available in relation to 
regulation and supervision of financial markets. In a report published by the already mentioned 
FSB in 2010, it was acknowledged that the country has made significant progress in this 
 
 
22 Mex ico’s Pr esid ent Signs N e w Banking Refo rm s into La w , 9 January 2014. 
23 U.S. State Department of State, 2015 Investment Climate Statement - Mexico, p. 13.  
24 See the presentation of CNBV, available at:  
http://www.cnbv.gob.mx/CNBV/Paginas/Misi%C3%B3n-y-Visi%C3%B3n.aspx, 
last visited 19 November 2015. 
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direction.25 As far as CNBV is concerned, the report recognised that its supervisory powers have 
been consolidated, and generally improved compared to a previous assessment carried out only 
a few years earlier.26 
 
With regard to the supply of financial services by foreign banks, it is worth noting that foreign 
subsidiaries are incorporated under local laws, and they are regarded by Mexican authorities 
as standalone entities, even if they are supervised on a consolidated basis by a home supervisor. 
In addition, they have to be licensed in order to provide banking services. The requirements to 
obtain a license are numerous, detailed, and sufficiently transparent. Operating without a 
license is considered a criminal offence.27 
 
2.1.3.3 Insurance services 
 
Mexican legislation concerning insurance services does not seem to present specific challenges 
or weaknesses. No evidence was found of international monitoring bodies specifically singling 
out this sector. 
 
Insurance business regulation and supervision is carried out by two separate entities, namely 
the already mentioned SHCP, and the Comisión Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas (CNSF). The SHCP 
is in charge of setting the insurance policy and introducing primary regulation, always with 
strong input from the CNSF that issues the secondary legislation and conducts its supervision. 
The Comisión Nacional para la Protección y Defensa de los Usuarios de Servicios Financieros 
(CONDUSEF) is entrusted with consumer protection in the financial sector, including the 
insurance sector. 
 
A foreign insurer applying for a license to operate through a subsidiary in Mexico must provide, 
among other information, a confirmation from the home supervisory authority to the CNSF 
stating that the insurer is authorised to carry out the business proposed. A foreign insurer also 
has to provide evidence that it is solvent, and it meets all the regulatory requirements in the 
home jurisdiction, and the information and documentation required to be licensed. Insurance 
legislation states that the same institution cannot acquire a license to perform both life and non- 
life business lines.28 
 
The law lays down the requirements and procedures that must be met to properly establish an 
insurance institution.29 However, SHCP can impose additional requirements, conditions, or 
restrictions whenever it is deemed appropriate. These might include restrictions on non- 
insurance activities, or permission to make, in the terms set forth by the SHCP, analogous and 
related authorised transactions according to Articles 34 and 81 of the law in question.30 
 
 
25 See FSB, Country Review of Mexico, published on 23 September 2010. 
26 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
27 IMF, Mexico: Financial System Stability Assessment, 2012, at p. 34 et seq. 
28 Article 8 of Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualistas de Seguros. 
29 Articles 16 and 29 of Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualistas de Seguros. 
30 Articles 34 and 81 of Ley General de Instituciones y Sociedades Mutualistas de Seguros. 
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The CNSF’s supervision process verifies that these requirements are maintained on a 
continuous basis. If this is no longer the case, the authorisation may be revoked. The 
requirement to be licensed to operate in insurance and surety is established in the law. The 
license requirement is a sensitive issue, as operating without a license is considered a criminal 
offence. In addition, the license process seems to be transparent and sufficiently publicised 
through the CNSF website. 
 
The minimum capital requirements are at the current level of the Latin American region, but 
are low compared to the OECD countries. 
 
2.1.3.4 Money laundering 
 
In recent years, the situation concerning money laundering in Mexico seems to have largely 
improved, at least in theory. In particular, the country has enacted several reforms aimed at 
fighting against money laundering and has substantially improved its toolbox against money 
laundering. This was confirmed by a 2014 FATF Report, which acknowledged that the country 
has built a comprehensive and solid legal and institutional framework, which has efficiently 
addressed the deficiencies identified in previous reports.31 As a result, Mexico has been 
removed from the list of countries placed under a follow-up process. In addition, money 
laundering is now criminalised by the Federal Criminal Code, which has also been amended in 
recent years. In particular, and based on recommendations issued by the FATF, in 2014 Mexico 
reformed Article 400bis of the Criminal Code so as to criminalise concealment – namely, the use 
or disposition of property or goods resulting from criminal proceedings. Another step taken by 
Mexico in the direction of fighting money laundering was the 2013 amendment to Article 421 
of the National Code of Criminal Procedure, which introduced criminal liability of legal 
persons. 
 
As is well-known, money laundering was, and to a large extent still is, traditionally a significant 
problem in Mexico. The country is a major hub for drug-producing and transit, which makes it 
naturally vulnerable to activities associated with money laundering. For this reason drug 
proceeds are the main source of money laundering in Mexico,32 and they often involve actors 
from the U.S. and Europe, which are Mexico’s two major drug markets.33 The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has brought into the open the attempt to launder some €236 million in 
drug proceeds from Spain to Mexico through the export of precious metals involving an 
international network of individuals. The same report also mentioned an attempt to launder 
US-sourced drug proceeds in Mexico through a highly sophisticated network of legal entities.34 
 
 
31 FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
 – Mexico, 2008, pp. 6-7. 
32   Other  significant  sources  of  laundered  funds  include  notably  corruption,  kidnapping, 
extortion, intellectual property rights violations, human trafficking, and trafficking in firearms. 
33 FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
 – Mexico, 2008, p. 16. 
34 IMF, Mexico: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism, 2009, p. 15. 
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These cases ‘illustrate the magnitude of illicit resources controlled by Mexican criminal 
organisations, as well as the complexity of their international operations’.35 In recent times, 
and more precisely in 2014, U.S. authorities unveiled a large trade-based money laundering 
operation involving the Los Angeles-based garment district. In this case, it was found that 
Mexican drug cartels not only laundered money through legitimate businesses, but also 
perpetrated tax frauds through the tax exemption granted to imported goods under the 
NAFTA.36 
 
As already mentioned, Mexico has long been a country under the strict surveillance of 
international bodies dealing with money laundering. In particular, the FATF, of which Mexico 
is a member,37 had placed Mexico under observation, and issued throughout the years a number 
of recommended measures that the country was meant to implement to bring its legal 
framework into compliance with internationally agreed standards. It is worth mentioning that 
Mexico became a FATF observer state in September 1999 and a full member in June 2000. 
Although Mexico’s accession to FATF was not specifically occasioned by the conclusion of the 
Agreement with the EU, it seems safe to affirm that such accession was part and parcel of the 
country’s strategy to improve its international credibility vis-à-vis its trade partners. 
 
More specifically, in 2010 a U.S. dollar cash deposit limit was imposed in an effort to prevent 
money-laundering transactions. The regulations stipulated that natural persons could only 
deposit up to $4,000 a month, while legal persons could deposit up to $14,000. However, this 
regulation has recently been softened. In order to boost economic growth a reform adopted in 
2014 allowed border and tourist areas businesses to exceed the limit under certain conditions, 
among which importantly is the obligation to provide more detailed and transparent 
information concerning financial and tax statements to Mexican authorities in exchange for the 
waiver of the cash deposit limit.38 Mexico has also recently enacted a major, comprehensive law 
on money laundering that was approved on 17 October 2012 and came into force nine months 
later in accordance with the Second transitory provision of the law in question.39 The law is now 
fully operational. Among other things, the law greatly expands the number of financial and 
designated non-financial entities required to submit reporting on financial transactions and 




35 FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
 – Mexico, 2008, p. 19, p. 18. 
36 For information see U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report  
(INCSR), March 2015, pp. 235-259. 
37 Mexico is also a member of the sister organisations Financial Action Task Force in Latin 
America (GAFILAT) and the Financial Action Task Force on Money laundering in South 
America (GAFISUD), despite not being located in South America. However, the last report 
concerning Mexico issued by these organisations dates back to 2008. See GAFILAT, Informe de  
Evaluación Mutua - Anti Lavado de Activos y contra el Financiamiento del Terrorismo – Mexico, 17 
October 2008. 
38 U.S. State Department of State, 2015 Investment Climate Statement - Mexico, June 2015, p. 25. 
39 See Ley Federal para la Prevención e Identificación de Operaciones con Recursos de Procedencia Ilícita. 
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cash intensive businesses to apply restrictions to cash transactions and bans the use of cash for 
transactions over set amounts’.40 
 
2.1.3.5 Tax evasion legislation 
 
The tax administration is traditionally an inefficient branch of the Mexican state. In recent times, 
companies have identified Mexican complex tax regulations as the second most problematic 
barrier to business, after corruption.41 The most recent OECD Report available reveals that 
Mexico has the lowest tax revenue to GDP among the 34 OECD Member States, way below 
OECD average.42 Mexico’s poor tax performance can partly be explained by high level of tax 
evasion and avoidance. For this reason, Mexico is struggling in an effort to increase the 
country’s tax base. A package of tax reforms has been approved in 2013 for this purpose. The 
measures include a raised VAT applicable to certain products and regions, an increased income 
tax for individuals earning more than 3 million pesos a year, and decreased deductions for 
companies for expenses related to employee benefits. The impact of such measures on the 
country’s overall tax base remains to be assessed. 
 
Tax-related crimes are duly criminalised by Title IV of the Mexican Federal Criminal Code 
(Articles 92-115bis), titled ‘Of tax-related infringements and felonies’. The perpetration of such 
crimes is also punishable in the form of the attempt, provided that the conduct undertaken by 
the perpetrators leads to at least the commencement of the crime itself (principio de ejecución). 
Aggravated penalties are applicable to civil servants (funcionario o empleado público) who commit 
or participate in the perpetration of tax-related crimes. However, it is worth noting that Mexican 
legislation suffers from an endemic lack of enforcement. This seems to be particularly true when 
it comes to the liability of civil servants for the acts committed in the exercise of their function. 
Cases in which public officials are actually held liable for illegal acts are extremely rare.43 
 
2.1.4 Concluding remarks 
 
As a general point, the EU-Mexico Agreement does not lay down any substantial obligations in 
the field of preventing and fighting illicit capital flows. Provisions devoted to these issues are 
scarce, often vague and indefinite.44 
 
At the same time, the analysis of the Mexican legal order carried out above has shown that there 
are no (or no longer) major gaps, deficiencies or challenges identifiable in the relevant 
legislation. As we have seen, after the signature of the Agreement, Mexico has committed itself 




41 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2014/2015, p. 286. 
42 OECD, Revenue Statistics 2014 - Mexico. It can be noted that Korea is also low on the OECD 
list. 
43 Business Anti-Corruption, Mexico Country Profile. 
44  See, among many examples, Commissioner Jourová Welcomes Progress towards a Stronger EU  
Framework to Combat Money Laundering. 
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highest international standards available. So far, these attempts seem to have been successful, 
as confirmed by the positive evaluations issued by the relevant international bodies, such as 
FATF. 
 
As already observed, although there is no evidence of a direct connection between the signature 
of the Global Agreement and such reform efforts, it seems safe to assume that Mexico has been 
motivated to take concrete steps in this direction, among other things, by the willingness to 
improve its modest international reputation in the matter, thus attracting more foreign capital 
and investment. 
 




However, the significant improvement of Mexican legislation in many fields does not mean that 
illicit capital flows to and from Mexico have decreased, and that the related problems have been 
resolved – quite the contrary. One major obstacle in this direction certainly has to do with the 
general lack of enforcement of Mexican legislation. To name but one example, only 14 
convictions for money laundering were reported nationwide in 2013, with little increase of the 
reported convictions in the following years.45 Second, endemic levels of corruption also play a 
major role. As a matter of fact, and despite corruption being a veritable national emergency, 
Mexico only equipped itself with a comprehensive anti-corruption law in 2015. The ambitious 
project had been awaiting the Senate’s approval for quite  some time and  only regained 
momentum in the wake of the tragic events that led to the 2014 Iguala Mass Kidnapping.46 This 
law has created the National Anti-Corruption System but the bulk of the reform will be 
substantiated by secondary legislation to be approved by the Congress.47 The process is still 
largely ongoing. As a consequence, at this stage it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the 
new legal framework. 
 
 
45 FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
 – Mexico, 2008, p. 19. 
46  J.C. Perez, Mexico Missing Students: Looking for Iguala Mass Graves, 8 December 2014, BBC 
News. 
47 See for further detail J. Benejam, Mex ico’s n ew N at ional Anticorr uption System : 7 Key Points , 20 
July 2015, DLA Piper. 
 
 Mexico’s legal framework has constantly been updated and reformed in recent years 
in an attempt to improve the international credibility of the country, and the 
perceived safety and profitability of investing in Mexico. Reform efforts are partly still 
ongoing. 
 The  improvement  of  Mexico’s  legal  framework  has  been  certified  by  relevant 
international bodies such as FATF. 
 Despite this fact, Mexico’s ability to successfully tackle illicit capital flows is still 
regarded as partly unsatisfactory. This is mainly due to general deficiencies in the 
enforcement of Mexican legislation and endemic levels of corruption. 
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2.2 EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement 
 
2.2.1 Trade context 
 
2.2.1.1 Bilateral trade relations and the nature of the Agreement 
 
Signed on 11 October 1999 in Pretoria, the ‘EU – South Africa Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement’ (TDCA) entered into force on 1 May 2004.48 The TDCA created a 
comprehensive political and development partnership between the EU and South Africa, and 
provided for the introduction of a free trade area with preferential trade arrangements. The EU 
is South Africa’s main trading and investment partner. The FTA aims to ensure better access to 
the EU market for South Africa and access to the South African market for the EU. As a result, 
it plays an important role in South Africa's integration into the world economy. The Agreement 
covers around 90% of bilateral trade between the two parties. The EU offered to remove 95% of 
its duties on South African originating products by 2010. In turn, South Africa offered to remove 
86% of its duties on EU originating products by 2012.49 
 




Following the review procedure as envisaged in articles 18 and 103 TDCA, South Africa and the 
EU negotiated new provisions in 2007 under Titles I (Political Dialogue), IV (Economic 
Cooperation), V (Development Cooperation), VI (Other areas of cooperation), and VII (Financial 
aspects of cooperation) of the Agreement. As regards the revision of the trade chapters (Title 
II – Trade, and Title III – Trade related issues), it was decided in March 2007 to unlink them 






48 The TDCA has been implemented in the European legal order by 'Council Decision of 26 April 2004  
(2004/441/EC)', OJ L127/109. 
49 Republic of South Africa, Department of Trade and Industry, available at: 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/trade_investment/ited_trade_agreement.jsp. 
 
 The strength of the wording of the relevant provisions in the TDCA can be considered 
‘weak’; 
 Nevertheless, South Africa’s overall implementation of international standards can be 
considered ‘advanced’; 
 In terms of implementation of international standards in national law, no causal link was 
detected between the TDCA and South Africa’s performance; and 
 In practice, the TDCA focuses on promoting free trade and investment rather than on 
promoting the implementation of international standards. 
The inclusion of financial services in EU free trade and association agreements: 
Effects on money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance 






process.50 The negotiations on an EU-Southern Africa Development Community Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EU-SADC EPA) were concluded on 15 July 2014.51 For services, it is 
envisaged that all four traditional GATS-modes will be covered by the EU-SADC EPA (i.e. 
cross-border supply; consumption abroad; commercial presence; temporary presence). 
However, the EPA shall be based on asymmetry and gradual market opening,52 since some 
SADC States felt the need to have prior regional integration, while there are only limited 
interests in exporting services to the EU. 
 
2.2.1.2 Institutional framework of the Agreement 
 
The TDCA established a Cooperation Council to ensure the smooth operation of the 
Agreement.53 The Joint Cooperation Council is the body that oversees the overall 
implementation of the TDCA. It meets on an annual basis, in order to take stock of progress in 
implementing the TDCA and to discuss the way forward on a wide range of issues where policy 
dialogues and cooperation have been established in the context of the EU-South Africa Strategic 
Partnership. The latest ‘Progress Report’, published in 2013, did not mention cooperation 
between the EU, the EU Member States and South Africa on the area of financial services, the 
implementation of international standards related to the provision of financial services or 
cooperation in tax matters. Furthermore, the implementation of the TDCA is facilitated by the 
EU-South Africa ‘Dialogue Facility’.54 Among the ‘Dialogue Areas’ listed on the website of the 
Facility, ‘financial services’ does not appear as a separate issue.55 
 
For the years 2014 and 2015, no press communiqués or joint statements of the Joint Cooperation 
Council were released. For those years for which joint statements were released (2008-2013), the 
topics of combating money laundering, fighting IFFs, and tax evasion and avoidance do not 
appear to be addressed to the extent that this deserved mentioning in the final texts released. 
Only the communiqués of 2009 and 2010 mentioned the strengthening of the supervisory and 
regulatory framework for the financial sector in the context of countering the 2008 financial 
crisis and the stimulation of sustainable economic growth.56 
 
In 2015, an inter-ministerial meeting took place within the framework of the newly concluded 





50 Republic of South Africa, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, available 
at: http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/saeubilateral/tdca.html. 
51 European Commission, DG Trade, Southern African Development Community. 
52 Article 73(2)(e) EU-SADC EPA. 
53 Article 97 TDCA. 
54 SA-EU Strategic Partnership Dialogue Facility, About. 
55 SA-EU Strategic Partnership, Dialogue Facility, Dialogue Areas. 
56 See for example: Joint Communiqué, Second South Africa-European Union Summit, Kleinmond, 
Doc. no. 13231/09 (Presse 266), 11 September 2009, p. 2. 
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this agreement. In addition, the Parties agreed to consolidate efforts in supporting frameworks 
for better economic governance in order to better prevent ‘financial leakages’.57 
 
Last but not least, the move by the EU and South Africa to negotiate a separate FTA outside the 
framework of the SADC has been criticised for creating negative economic effects for the other 
Southern African countries and for frustrating the process of further regional integration, 
because the SADC’s desire to eventually conclude a regional trade agreement was already 
known at the time of the conclusion of the TDCA.58 Furthermore, the EU was criticised for 
splitting the Southern African Customs Union through the EU-SADC EPA negotiations and, 
accordingly, to have contributed to the fragmentation of the region rather than its further 
integration.59 
 
2.2.2 Assessment of the Regulatory Framework for the provision of 
Financial Services and Combating Illicit Financial Flows 
 
2.2.2.1 Financial services 
 
Right to establishment and supply of services 
 
The TDCA is less ambitious than most other FTAs concluded between the EU and its trading 
partners. For example, this is exemplified by the use of the terminology ‘endeavour’ in article 
30 TDCA. With regard to the right to establishment and the supply of services, the TDCA refers 
to the obligations of the Parties under the GATS, and in particular to the Most-favoured-nation 
principle, including the protocol and annexes.60 The Parties reaffirm their respective 
commitments as annexed to the fifth Protocol to the GATS concerning financial services.61 The 
parties pledge to endeavour to go beyond the GATS requirements by aiming for a further 
liberalisation of the supply of services in order to eliminate all discrimination between the 
Parties in the services sector. This shall include the supply of services: (a) from the territory of 
one Party into the territory of the other; (b) in the territory of one Party to the service consumer 
of the other; (c) by a service supplier of one Party, through commercial presence in the territory 
of the other; and (d) by a service supplier of one Party, through presence of natural persons of 





57  Joint Communiqué EU-SADC Political Dialogue Meeting at Ministerial Level, Luxembourg, 27 
October 2015. 
58 G. Wellmer, Join My Value Chain, South Africa’s Regional Trade Policy, in: J. Becker and W. 
Blaas, Strategic Arena Switching in International Trade Negotiations, Ashgate Publishing lt., 2007. 
59 A. Adebajo, The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa, C. Hurst & Co. London, 2012, 
pp. 128-129. 
60 Article 29 TDCA. 
61 Article 29(3) TDCA. 
62 Article 30 TDCA. 
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Similarly, the terminology chosen, i.e. ‘to foster cooperation’ and to ‘encourage’, does not evince 
any strong ambitions of the Parties in this context. Under the TDCA, the Parties committed to 
‘foster’ the cooperation in the services sector in general and in the areas of banking, insurance 
and other financial services in particular.63 This is to be performed by, inter alia: (a) encouraging 
trade in services; (b) exchanging, where appropriate, information on rules, laws and regulations 
governing the services sector in the Parties; and (c) improving accounting, auditing, supervision 
and regulation of financial services and financial monitoring, for example through the 
facilitation of training schemes.64 
 
In the 2013 Progress Report on cooperation between the EU, the Member States and South 
Africa under the TDCA,65 no reference is made to cooperation in the area of financial services. 
However, in the section covering the bilateral relations between the EU Member States and 
South Africa, one notion deserves attention. It is explicitly mentioned that South African 
investment in the financial services sector of Ireland is ‘significant’, stating that ‘South African 
investment in Ireland has mainly focussed on financial services companies, many of which now 
have a significant presence in Ireland’.66 It can be deduced from this that the TDCA is facilitating 
money flows between these two countries, and, from the South African perspective, specifically 
to the financial services sector in Ireland. A strong argument can be made with regard to the 
reasons behind the choice for Ireland as destination for South African investments in the 
financial services sector, since Ireland is often reported as having one of the lowest corporate 
tax rates in the developed world.67 More specifically, Irish corporate tax is currently set at 12.5% 
for trading income (and 25% for non-trading income such as investments made), whereas the 
EU average is currently 22.25%.68 As such, Ireland is considered a relatively advantageous 
destination to conduct business compared to other EU  countries (Germany: 29.65%; The 
Netherlands: 25%; France: 33.33%; Belgium: 33.99%).69 Especially for non-EU trading partners, 







63 Article 63 TDCA. 
64 Article 63(b) TDCA. 
65 Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of South Africa, The EU and South Africa:  
Development Partners, Progress Report 2013. It can be noted that the report is not the same type of 
report as the European Commission’s annual reports to the European Parliament and the 
Council as presented under the trade agreements with Colombia/Peru and with Korea. 
66 Ibid., p. 16. 
67 See for example: State Aid: European Commission Press Release, Commission Investigates Transfer  
Pricing Arrangements on Corporate Taxation of Apple (Ireland) Starbucks (Netherlands) and Fiat  
Finance and Trade (Luxembourg), Brussels, 11 June 2014; Andersen, J., FDI in Ireland: A Reason for  
Optimism?, The World Bank, Private Sector Development: News and Views on a Competitive 
Private Sector and a Resilient Financial Sector, 19 March 2012. 
68 KPMG, Corporate Tax Rate Table, 18 March 2016. 
69 Ibid. 
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Current payments and capital movements 
 
With regard to the facilitation of current payments, the wording chosen can be considered to 
allow for significant room for manoeuvring by the States Parties. Under the TDCA, the Parties 
‘undertake to allow’ all payments for current transactions between residents of the Community 
and of South Africa to be made in a freely convertible currency.70 To compare, the EU- 
Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement uses the wording ‘shall’ (see Annex 1).71 Apparently, the 
negotiators of the TDCA deemed it necessary to refrain from mandatory liberalisation in this 
particular area. Furthermore, South Africa may take additional measures to ensure that this 
provision is not used by its residents to make unauthorised capital outflows.72 During and after 
the 2008 financial crisis, South African banks introduced restrictions aimed at preventing an 
outflow of private capital.73 
 
The TDCA stipulates that the Parties shall ensure that direct investments in South Africa in 
companies formed in accordance with current laws can move freely, and that such investment 
and any profit stemming therefrom can be liquidated and repatriated.74 With regard to 
investment promotion and protection, the Parties shall aim to establish a climate which favours 
and promotes mutually beneficial investment, both domestic and foreign, especially through 
improved conditions for investment protection, investment promotion, the transfer of capital 
and the exchange of information on investment opportunities.75 The TDCA promotes the 
conclusion of agreements between South Africa and the EU Member States in the area of 
investment promotion and protection, the avoidance of double taxation and the exchange of 
information on investment opportunities.76 
 
Transparency aspects of financial services/Data protection 
 
The TDCA contains few provisions covering transparency aspects of financial services as such, 
but does contain a general provision on data protection. The TDCA creates an explicit obligation 
for the Parties to cooperate to improve the level of protection for the processing of personal 
data,  taking  into  account  international  standards.77   Cooperation  may  include  technical 
 
 
70 Article 32(1) TDCA. 
71Article 168 EU- Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement: “The Parties shall authorise, in freely 
convertible currency and in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, any payments and transfers on the current 
account of balance of payments between the Parties.” 
72 Article 32(2) TDCA. 
73 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program Detailed Assessment of Compliance on the  
Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, IMF Country Report No. 15/55, March 2015, 
p. 12. 
74 Article 33(1) TDCA. 
75 Article 52(1) TDCA. 
76 Article 52(2) TDCA. 
77 Article 91(1) TDCA. 
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assistance in the form of exchanges of information, exchange of experts and the establishment 
of joint programmes and projects.78 As such, this provision contains relatively strong language 
compared to the other provisions discussed here, committing the Parties to undertake action in 
this area. 
 
2.2.2.2 Money laundering and fight against drugs 
 
Considering the fact that it is well known that both Parties face significant challenges in the 
fight against money laundering, the commitments made under the TDCA are rather minimal. 
Furthermore, a comparison of provisions on money laundering among EU FTAs leads to the 
conclusion that stricter formulations are used in other FTAs. In the EU-Korea FTA for instance, 
it is stated that ‘[e]ach party shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that internationally agreed 
standards (…) are implemented and applied in its territory,’79 thus explicitly committing the 
Parties to cooperate (see Annex 1). 
 
The TDCA contains a general provision on money laundering in which explicit reference is 
made to the FATF standards. The Parties undertake to cooperate in the fight against money 
laundering by preventing the use of their financial institutions to launder capital arising from 
criminal activities in general on the basis of standards equivalent to those adopted by 
international bodies, in particular the FATF.80 Furthermore, South Africa can take measures to 
prevent abuse of the liberalisation of current payments, in order to prevent unauthorised capital 
outflows.81 As such, the TDCA does not provide for an explicit obligation for the Parties to 
combat money laundering, but rather encourages them to take action. 
 
2.2.2.3 Tax evasion and avoidance 
 
The TDCA does not contain an explicit obligation for the Parties to combat tax elusion and 
evasion. What is more, the TDCA does not address cooperation in international tax matters. 
Rather, the TDCA safeguards the rights of the Parties to take autonomous measures in this 
context and preserves the functioning of existing or future bilateral tax arrangements between 














78 Article 91(2) TDCA. 
79 Article 7.24 EU-Korea FTA. 
80 Article 90 TDCA. 
81 Article 32(2) TDCA. 
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On a more general note, as mentioned earlier, the Parties have ‘pledged’ to further cooperate in 
the services sector through, inter alia, exchanging, ‘where appropriate’, information on rules, 
laws and regulations governing the services sector.82 This provision can imply cooperation and 
exchange of information on tax matters. Nevertheless, phrased like this, it can hardly be 
concluded that a serious commitment to ensure the exchange of tax information between the 
Parties has been created. 
 
Tax carve-out clause 
 
The Parties confirm that nothing in the TDCA, or in any arrangements adopted under this 
Agreement, may be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of any measure aimed at 
preventing the avoidance or evasion of taxes pursuant to the tax provisions of agreements to 
avoid double taxation or other tax arrangements, or domestic fiscal legislation.83 South Africa 
concluded numerous ‘Double Taxation Agreements’ (DTAs), the purpose of which is to enable 
the administrations of the States Parties to eliminate double taxation. South Africa has 
concluded DTAs with all EU Member States, except Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.84 














82 Article 63(b) TDCA. 
83 Article 98(2) TDCA. 
84 South African Revenue Service, available at: http://www.sars.gov.za/Legal/International-  
Treaties-Agreements/DTA-Protocols/Pages/default.aspx. 
 
 As the largest financial centre of the region, South Africa is an important hub for IFFs; 
 While the legal frameworks to combat IFFs and tax evasion are generally in place, lack of 
enforcement capacity frustrates the fight against these illegal practices; 
 Without mutual commitment from both the EU and its Member States and South Africa, 
tax evasion and elusion will continue to take place; and 
 In this regard, the EU, as developed partner, has an enhanced responsibility to address 
tax evasive practices, also outside the OECD frameworks and especially vis-à-vis EU 
companies. 
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2.2.3 Assessment of South African Legislation on Financial Services, 
Money Laundering and Tax Evasion and Elusion 
 
2.2.3.1 Financial services 
 
A. Banking sector 
 
South Africa has a large and sophisticated banking sector based on a well-developed financial 
infrastructure.85 It is highly concentrated, with approximately 90% of total assets being 
controlled by four banks, the ‘Big Four’ (First Rand, Standard Bank, ABSA, Nedbank), and an 
investment firm (Investec). Since the end of Apartheid, major efforts have been directed at 
opening up access to banking services for low-income South Africans to counter the 
exclusionary effects of the former regime. Three key trends can be identified which shaped the 
current state of the banking sector: (I) a strong emphasis on international compliance; (II) 
international ambitions for South African financial institutions; and (III) state-driven financial 
inclusion attempts to rectify inequality.86 
 
During the 2008 financial crisis, the South African banking sector remained financially sound, 
maintaining good asset quality and solvency ratios. Nevertheless, the banks have to operate in 
an economically challenging environment with stagnating economic growth, high 
unemployment, and a recently downgraded credit rating, warranting exchange controls on 
capital transactions by residents.87 Despite these challenges, it can be concluded that, overall, 
the South African banking sector is functioning well. 
 
All banks and branches of foreign banks operating in South Africa are governed by the Bank 
Act, 1990 (Act No. 94, 1990). Apart from rules on establishment, shareholding, functioning and 
solvency standards, the Bank Act contains detailed provisions on behaviour of directors and 
officers of a bank or controlling company. For example, each director, chief executive officer 
and executive officer of a bank owes a duty towards the bank to act bona fide for the benefit of 
the bank and to avoid any conflict between the bank’s interests.88 
 
The ‘Registrar of Banks’ is concerned with the registration of banks or public companies who 
desire to perform banking services.89 This person may implement such international regulatory 
 
 
85 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program Detailed Assessment of Compliance on the  
Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, IMF Country Report No. 15/55, March 2015, 
p. 10. 
86 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, So uth Afric a’s Engag em ent with th e Stan d ard Setting  
Bodies and the Implications for Financial Institutions, 2011, p. 1. 
87 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program Detailed Assessment of Compliance on the  
Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, IMF Country Report No. 15/55, March 2015, 
pp. 11-12. 
88 Article 60(1)(a) Bank Act. 
89 Article 4(1) Bank Act. 
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or supervisory standards and practices as he or she deems appropriate after consultation with 
banks.90 All banks must establish an independent compliance function as part of the risk 
management framework of the bank, headed by a compliance officer.91 Foreign banks who wish 
to operate in South Africa may do so with the prior written authorisation of the Registrar and 
subject to other prescribed conditions.92 For example, the Registrar may request the foreign 
branch to supply specific information or documents.93 If foreign branches fail to ascertain the 
Registrar that proper supervision is ensured in the ‘home jurisdiction’, the Registrar can decide 
to refuse the operating licence.94 Failure of the foreign institution to comply with a prescribed 
condition may result in revocation or suspension of the licence by the Registrar, upon consent 
by the Minister and by notice in writing to the foreign institution concerned.95 Formulated as 
such, the Registrar is allowed a significant amount of discretion in deciding whether or not to 
issue operating licences to foreign branches. 
 
The Financial Services Board 
 
The securities regulatory and supervisory responsibilities in South Africa are divided among 
several public authorities: the Financial Services Board (FSB) and the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (JSE).96 The FSB is an independent institution established by statute to oversee the 
South African Non-Banking Financial Services Industry in the public interest. The FSB oversees 
retirement funds, short-term and long-term insurance, companies, funeral insurance, schemes, 
collective investment schemes (unit trusts and stock market) and financial advisors and brokers. 
The functions and powers of the FSB are set out in the FSB Act and in various sectoral Acts, 
such as the Financial Markets Act (FMA) and the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 
(CISCA).97 
 
On 27 October 2015, the Minister of Finance tabled the Financial Sector Regulation (FSR) Bill in 
Parliament,98 which contained a set of major reforms aimed at the supervisory system of the 
financial sector. The planned reforms are inspired by the ‘Twin Peaks model’ of financial sector 
regulation. Essentially, the Twin Peaks model contemplates that the financial services sector 
will have two primary regulators. The reforms will create a prudential regulator, the Prudential 
 
 
90 Article 4(6) Bank Act. 
91 Article 60A Bank Act. 
92 Article 18A Bank Act. 
93 Article 18A(3)(a) Bank Act. 
94 Article 18A(5) Bank Act. 
95 Article 18B(1) Bank Act. 
96 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program Detailed Assessment of Implementation on  
the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, IMF Country Report No. 15/57, 
March 2015, p. 8. 
97 Ibid., p. 7. 
98 South African Treasury, Financial Sector Regulation Bill, As  introduced  in the  National 
Assembly (proposed section  75), explanatory summary of Bill published in Government 
Gazette No. 39127, 21 August 2015. 
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Authority, housed in the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), while the FSB will be transformed 
into a dedicated market conduct regulator, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA). The 
implementation of the Twin Peaks model in South Africa has two fundamental objectives: to 
strengthen South Africa’s approach to consumer protection and market conduct in financial 
services, and to create a more resilient and stable financial system. The Prudential Authority’s 
objective will be to promote and enhance the safety and soundness of regulated financial 
institutions, while the Financial Sector Conduct Authority will be tasked with protecting 
financial customers through supervising market conduct. Structures will be in place to ensure 
proper co-ordination between the two authorities and other regulators.99 The intention is for the 
FSR Bill to be enacted towards the end of 2016 or early 2017 to enable implementation soon 
thereafter. 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 
Overall and despite certain pitfalls reflected below, the supervision over the South African 
banking sector can be considered (largely) compliant with the Basel framework. Through the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB), South Africa has been a member of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) since 2009.100 Its Membership status came with the global 
expansion of the BCBS beyond the OECD countries after the 2008 financial crisis. Similarly, the 
SARB was invited to join the ‘Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures’ (CPMI)101 in 
2009 when the G-7 Countries extended membership to the G-20 Countries. According to the 
IMF, South Africa was deemed to be either ‘compliant’ (22 of the 29 principles) or ‘largely 
compliant’ (6 of the 29 principles) with the Basel Core Principles on Effective Banking 
Supervision,102 with only one instance of ‘material non-compliance’. It pertained  to Core 
Principle 11, which refers to the corrective and sanctioning powers of supervisors.103 When a 
bank registered in South Africa does not comply with conditions attached to the registration, 
the Registrar can suspend or cancel that registration in accordance with South African law. 
Similarly, the Registrar can restrict a bank’s activities where: the bank does not satisfactorily 
carry out the business of a bank; the bank has failed to comply with a requirement of the Bank 
Act; or the bank continues to employ an undesirable practice. However, the Bank Act provides 
for a 30 day prior notice period and a subsequent possibility for banks to challenge decisions of 




99 Financial Services Board, ‘Twin Peaks: What is Twin Peaks?’. 
100 Basel Committee, Membership, available at: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm. 
101   Since  September  2013,  the  CPMI  is the  successor  of  the  Committee  on Payment  and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS). 
102 The Basel Core Principles on Effective Banking Supervision are available at:  
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf. 
103 Principle 11 (Corrective and sanctioning powers of supervisors): “The supervisor acts at an 
early stage to address unsafe and unsound practices or activities that could pose risks to banks 
or to the banking system. The supervisor has at its disposal an adequate range of supervisory 
tools to bring about timely corrective actions. This includes the ability to revoke the banking 
license or to recommend its revocation.” 
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in South Africa’s compliance with Principle 11 of the Basel Core Principles, which advocates 
action at an ‘early stage’ and an ‘adequate range of supervisory tools’.104 
 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
 
South Africa is a member of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
and as such it is required to implement the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.105 
According to the IMF, South Africa was ‘partly implementing’ seven of the 38 IOSCO Objectives 
and Principles of Securities Regulation,106 15 were ‘broadly implemented’, 13 were ‘fully 
implemented’, and two were ‘not implemented’.107 The principles that have not been 
implemented are principles 26 and 27,108 which deal with disclosure requirements related to 
asset valuation. This assessment leads to the conclusion that, although implementation of the 
IOSCO Principles is ‘complete in several areas, there is room for enhancement’.109 
 
B. Insurance sector 
 
The insurance sector is an important pillar of the financial system in South Africa. In 2013, assets 
held by insurers accounted for nearly 23% of all financial sector assets in South Africa. The long- 
term insurance sector is highly concentrated with the top five conglomerates dominating the 
market with over 73% of total industry assets in 2013. In contrast, the short-term insurance 
industry is less concentrated.110 
The insurance division of the FSB supervises and enforces insurers’ compliance with the 
financial soundness, governance and conduct of business requirements of the Long-term 
 
 
104 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program Detailed Assessment of Compliance on the  
Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, IMF Country Report No. 15/55, March 2015, 
pp. 75-76. 
105 For more information, see: https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=about_iosco. 
106 The IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation are available at:  
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf. 
107 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program Detailed Assessment of Implementation on  
the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, IMF Country Report No. 15/57, 
March 2015, pp. 17-26. Note that the IMF assessment refers to 37 IOSCO principles, whereas 
there are 38. 
108 IOSCO Principle 26: “Regulation should require disclosure, as set forth under the principles 
for issuers, which is necessary to evaluate the suitability of a collective investment scheme (CIS) 
for a particular investor and the value of the investor’s interest in the scheme;” and IOSCO 
Principle 27: “Regulation should ensure that there is a proper and disclosed basis for asset 
valuation and the pricing and the redemption of units in a CIS”. 
109 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program Detailed Assessment of Implementation on  
the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, IMF Country Report No. 15/57, 
March 2015, p. 6. 
110 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program: Detailed Assessment of Observance on the  
Insurance Core Principles, IMF Country Report No. 15/56, February 2015, p. 11. 
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Insurance Act (No. 52 of 1998) and Short-Term Insurance Act (No. 53 of 1998), and develops 
regulatory proposals on how these requirements may need to be adapted to best meet the 
objectives of insurance regulation and supervision. 
 
South Africa, through the FSB, was one of the co-founders of the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). The FSB is still an active member of the IAIS,111 and consequently, 
South Africa implements the Insurance Core Principles, standards, guidance and assessment 
methodology. In 2015, the IMF concluded that South Africa ‘observed’ six of the 29 Insurance 
Core Principles, ‘largely observed’ eleven and ‘partly observed’ nine.112 As such, there is still 
room for considerable improvement of South Africa’s compliance to the IAIS Insurance Core 
Principles. 
 
Ongoing legislative reforms are expected to enhance South Africa’s ability to adhere to 
international standards related to the supervision of the insurance sector. The ‘Insurance Bill’, 
tabled in January 2016, was approved by the South African Government on 4 November 2015. 
The Bill forms part of the above-mentioned Twin Peaks reforms,113 and provides a consolidated 
legal framework for the prudential supervision of the insurance sector that is consistent with 
international standards for insurance regulation and supervision. It also seeks to replace and 
consolidate substantial parts of the Long- and Short-term Insurance Act relating to prudential 
supervision.114 As such, the Bill is expected to improve the maintenance of a fair, safe and stable 
insurance market by establishing a legal framework for insurers that: enhances financial 
soundness and oversight through higher prudential standards, insurance group supervision; 
increases access to insurance through a dedicated micro-insurance framework; strengthens the 
regulatory requirements in respect of governance, risk management and internal controls for 
insurers; and aligns with international standards.115 
 
 
2.2.3.2 Money laundering 
 
South Africa, being the largest regional economy, faces significant challenges concerning money 
laundering related activities, including the narcotics trade, smuggling, human trafficking, and 




111 GPFI, South Af rica’s E ngag e m ent with th e Standard S ettin g Bod ies and th e Im p licat ions f or Fina ncial  
Inclusion, Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2011, p.4. 
112 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program: Detailed Assessment of Observance on the  
Insurance Core Principles, IMF Country Report No. 15/56, February 2015, p. 29. 
113 The Twin Peaks model of financial sector regulation will see the creation of a prudential 
regulator – the Prudential Authority – housed in the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), while 
the FSB will be transformed into a dedicated market conduct regulator – the Financial Sector 
Conduct Authority. 
114 South Africa, National Treasury, Media Statement on the Tabling of the Insurance Bill, 1 February 
2016. 
115 Ibid. 
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its relatively sophisticated banking and financial sectors, and its large cash-based market, 
render the country a very attractive target for transnational and domestic crime syndicates. 
 
In April 2014, the South African Central Bank (SARB) fined four South African banks after it 
detected deficiencies in their control mechanisms to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing (see Table 1 below).116 The SARB emphasised that the banks did not engage in the 
active facilitation of transactions involving money laundering and terrorist financing. All four 
banks announced that remedial action would be taken. In January 2014, the London branch of 
one of the four banks was fined by the UK regulator for not having adequate policies or 
procedures in place to protect corporate customers connected to political figures in relation to 
the prevention of money laundering.117 
 









Standard  Bank 
of South Africa 
Client identification and verification in contravention of 
Directive 
section 21 FIC Act 
Record-keeping in contravention of sections 22-24 FIC Act R10 million 
Duty  to  report  suspicious  and  unusual  transactions  in 
R20 million 
contravention of section 29 FIC Act 
Duty to report cash threshold transactio 
of section 28 FIC Act 
ns in contravention 
R20 million 
Reporting of property associated with terrorist and related 
R10 million 





Client identification and verification in contravention of 
R5 million 
section 21 FIC Act 
Record-keeping in contravention of sections 22-24 FIC Act Directive 
Duty  to  report  suspicious  and  unusual  transactions  in 
R25 million 




Client identification and verification in contravention of 
R15 million 
section 21 FIC Act 
Reporting of property associated with terrorist and related 
R10 million 
activities in contravention of section 28A FIC Act 
 
 
Barclays  Africa 
Group Ltd 
Client identification and verification in contravention of 
R10 million 
section 21 FIC Act 
Record-keeping in contravention of sections 22-24 FIC Act Directive 
Duty  to  report  suspicious  and  unusual  transactions  in 
Reprimand 
contravention of section 29 FIC Act 






116 FIC Annual Report 2014/2015, p. 30. 
117 R. Bonorchis, 'South African Banks Fined After Money-Laundering Probe', Bloomberg, 16 April 
2014. 
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The South African Government estimates that between $2-8 billion are laundered each year 
through South African financial institutions. Money laundering investigations involved 
offences of fraud, theft, corruption, racketeering, and gambling. Major profit-generating crimes 
include precious metals smuggling, abalone poaching, and sophisticated investment scheme 
frauds. Other trends in money laundering are based on investment frauds through pyramid 
schemes and fraud cases through fake cheques. Funds are noted to have been laundered 
through lawyers or other service providers, purchase of properties, establishment of shell 
companies and home businesses. The authorities also pointed to an increase in the 
sophistication and scale of economic crime and crimes through criminal syndicates.118 The scope 
of the challenges related to IFFs faced by South Africa is further highlighted in the empirical 
part of this study; see notably Box 15 in section 3.3.2. 
 
South African AML legislation 
 
According to the 2015 IMF assessment of South Africa’s financial sector, the country has made 
significant progress in in improving its AML/CFT legal and institutional framework since it 
was last assessed against the AML/CFT standard in 2008. However, significant technical 
deficiencies remain, such as the absence of requirements to identify and verify the identity of 
beneficial owners of customers, and to apply enhanced due diligence to high risk situations.119 
As such, the process of implementation of AML/CFT standards in South Africa is on the right 
track, but has still to be considered ‘work in progress’. 
 
Since 1992, the laundering of drug-related money has been criminalised in South Africa. The 
Proceeds of Crime Act (No. 76 of 1996) criminalised money laundering for all serious crimes. 
This Act was supplemented by the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (No. 121 of 1998), which 
confirmed the criminal character of money laundering, mandates the reporting of suspicious 
transactions, and provides a ‘safe harbour’ for good faith compliance. Violation of this act 
entails a fine of up to 100 million Rand or imprisonment for up to 30 years. The AML framework 
was further complemented when South Africa criminalised terrorist financing in the Protection 
of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act of 2004.120 
 
The Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), South Africa’s central financial intelligence body, was 
established in 2001 under the FIC Act (No. 38 of 2001) to act as the primary authority over anti- 
money laundering efforts in South Africa. The FIC Act, together with the said Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy Act, is aimed at ensuring that South African law complies with the 
key FATF recommendations on terrorist financing and money laundering. The FIC Amendment 
Act  (No.  11  of  2008),  which  took  effect  in  2010,  sought  to  further  clarify  the  roles  and 
 
 
118 FATF/ESAAMLG, Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the  
Financing of Terrorism, South Africa, 26 February 2009, p. 16. 
119 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program, Anti-money Laundering and Combating  
the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) - Technical Note, IMF Country Report No. 15/51, February 
2015, p. 4. 
120 GPFI, South Af rica’s E ngag e m ent with th e Standard S ettin g Bod ies and th e Im p licat ions f or Fina ncial  
Inclusion, Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2011, p. 3. 
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responsibilities of supervisory bodies. The FIC is responsible for establishing an AML regime 
and maintaining the integrity of the South African financial system by enforcing record-keeping 
and reporting procedures of financial institutions within the country. The FIC Act also sets up 
a regulatory AML regime which is intended to break the cycle used by organised criminal 
groups to benefit from illegal profits. By doing this, the Act aims to maintain the integrity of the 
financial system. The regulatory regime of the FIC Act imposes 'know your client-obligations' 
and record-keeping and reporting obligations on the responsible institutions. It also requires 
the responsible institutions to develop and implement internal rules to facilitate compliance 
with these obligations. The FIC Act complements and works with the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act (No. 121 of 1998) which contains the substantive money laundering offences.121 
 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
 
South Africa has been a member of the FATF since 2003 and as such is required to implement 
the FATF Recommendations.122 In fact, South Africa was implementing the Recommendations 
even before its accession to FATF.123 South Africa is an active participant in review groups and 
projects, most notably related to financial inclusion. As the only African member of FATF, South 
Africa represents the interests of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering 
Group (ESAAMLG), the regional body consisting of eastern and southern African countries, in 
the FATF.124 The purpose of the ESAAMLG is to combat money laundering by implementing 
the FATF Recommendations. This effort includes coordinating with other international 
organisations concerned with combating money laundering, studying emerging regional 
typologies, developing institutional and human resource capacities to deal with these issues, 
and coordinating technical assistance where necessary. ESAAMLG enables regional factors to 
be taken into account in the implementation of AML measures. 
 
FATF Mutual Evaluation (2008) 
 
The most recent comprehensive assessment of South Africa’s AML/CFT system based on the 
FATF Recommendations took place in 2008.125 Although the Mutual Evaluation Report, 
published in early 2009, concluded that the South African government was strongly committed 





121 FIC, Organisation profile, https://www.fic.gov.za/SiteContent/ContentPage.aspx?id=1. 
122 See http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#South Africa. 
123 GPFI, South Af rica’s E ngag e m ent with th e Standard S ettin g Bod ies and th e Im p licat ions f or Fina ncial  
Inclusion, Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2011, p. 6. 
124 Ibid., p. 3. 
125 The next comprehensive assessment of South Africa’s AML/CFT system, which will be based 
on the revised FATF standard and methodology, is expected to take place after 2017.See: IMF,  
South Africa Financial Sector  Assessment Program, Anti-money Laundering and Combating the  
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) - Technical Note, IMF Country Report No. 15/51, February 
2015, p. 7. 
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South Africa was deemed to be a ‘work in progress’.126 Identified concerns were, amongst 
others, related to: monitoring of financial institutions on their compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations; requirements ensuring that accountable institutions apply enhanced due 
diligence for higher risk categories of customers, business relationships or transactions; 
requirements in law or regulation requiring accountable institutions to identify or verify the 
identity of beneficial owners; and to the prohibition on financial institutions from entering into, 
or continuing, correspondent banking relationships with shell banks. It was expected that many 
of the identified deficiencies would be addressed by the FIC Amendment Act 2008.127 
 
As already mentioned, the Mutual Evaluation Report, published early 2009, exposed certain 
weaknesses in the South African AML/CFT system. The FATF Report differentiated between 
four levels of compliance. These are: compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant and non- 
compliant. Based on the, then, 40 FATF Recommendations and the nine Special 
Recommendations, South Africa was still found to be in non-compliance with regard to seven 
out of the 40 FATF Recommendations.128 These seven cases are highlighted in Table 2. 
 













The absence of a requirement for enhanced due diligence measures 
for politically exposed persons is  addressed in ‘Guidance Notes’ 
drafted by the FIC.129 However, these measures are not anchored in 
the current FIC Act and are not enforceable. As a consequence, there 
are no legal obligations to apply enhanced due diligence on politically 









Some banks have developed frameworks to assess money 
laundering/financing terrorism risks and apply enhanced measures 
for cross-border correspondent banking relationships. However, no 
corresponding obligation for the responsible institutions to conduct 
enhanced due diligence on cross-border correspondent banking and 









Reliance on third 
parties 
Exemption 5 to the FIC Act does not require the institution relying on 
third-party verification to immediately obtain the relevant CDD 
information; Exemption 5 does not require the accountable institution 
to satisfy itself that copies of identification data and other relevant 
documentation relating to CDD requirements will be made available 
from the other institution ‘without delay’; furthermore there is no 
explicit requirement that the financial institution satisfies itself of the 
adequacy of applicable AML/CFT measures applicable to the foreign 
 
 
126   FATF/ESAAMLG,  Mutual  Evaluation  Report  Anti-Money  Laundering  and  Combating  the  
Financing of Terrorism, South Africa, 26 February 2009, p. 6. 
127 Ibid., p. 10. 
128   FATF/ESAAMLG,  Mutual  Evaluation  Report  Anti-Money  Laundering  and  Combating  the  
Financing of Terrorism, South Africa, 26 February 2009. 
129 See for more information: www.fic.gov.sa, Compliance Guidelines. 
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Issue/Topic Present status of compliance in South Africa 
financial institution. Despite the lack of determinations by relevant 
supervisory bodies, some the responsible institutions are applying 
Exemption 5 and fully exempt all customers from FATF membership 










South Africa is still non-compliant with regard to ensuring adherence 
of foreign branches and subsidiaries to the standards. To address the 
risks arising from foreign branches of some South African banks, the 
BSD has coordinated with its foreign counterparts in planning joint 
inspections of a few foreign branches of South African banks, which 









Legislation creating additional obligations when dealing with high- 
risk countries is still absent. Some banks have developed frameworks 
to assess money laundering/financing terrorism risks and apply 
enhanced measures for high risk customers and business 
relationships such as domestic and foreign politically exposed 








General deficiencies in consumer due diligence still apply. Casinos 
are fully exempted from collecting and verifying residential 
addresses and income tax registration numbers of natural persons 









ownership of legal 
persons 
In the absence of  a legal requirement to identify and  verify the 
identity of beneficial owners, the type of measures implemented by 
banks concerning beneficial owners varies. Some banks indicated that 
they identify beneficial owners when they consider the risks posed by 
a customer are higher. Nonetheless, it seems that the majority of 
banks do not try to identify individuals beyond legal ownership. 
Source: FATF/ESAAMLG, Mutual Evaluation Report Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of  
Terrorism, South Africa, 26 February 2009. 
 
The IMF’s South Africa financial sector assessment (2015) 
 
As part of the ‘Financial Sector Assessment Program’, the IMF carried out an assessment of 
South African measures aimed at combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. 
The IMF concluded that South Africa had made significant progress in improving its AML/CFT 






130 The ‘AML/CFT standard’ was developed by the FATF together with the World Bank and 
the IMF. As such, the Report did not assess South Africa’s AML/CFT standard in the light of 
the FATF Recommendations, but rather conducted a review of specific aspects of South Africa’s 
AML/CFT framework which were found deficient in the previous assessment. 
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Most notably, the AML/CFT supervisory framework for the financial sector, in particular the 
banking sector, had been strengthened by the FIC Amendment Act, which took effect in 2010, 
and the creation of the AML/CFT supervision team within the Banking Supervision 
Department (BSD) of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). Law enforcement efforts had also 
been strengthened through the creation of the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation 
(DPCI) within the South Africa Police Service as a specialised unit responsible for investigations 
of money laundering.131 On a more critical note, the Report highlights that significant technical 
deficiencies remain, such as the absence of requirements to identify and verify the identity of 
beneficial owners of customers and to apply enhanced due diligence to high risk situations.132 
Furthermore, the Report stresses that structural capacity weaknesses frustrate the overall 
effectiveness of the efforts made by the South African law enforcing and prosecutorial 
authorities.133 These findings are in line with the general assessment of the functional 
weaknesses of the AML systems in the developing countries included in this study, presented 
in section 3.5.3 of the empirical part of this study. 
 
In order to address these remaining deficiencies, the South African government adopted 
another amendment to the FIC Act, the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Bill,134 which 
is currently under consideration by the SA Parliament. More specifically, the amendment of the 
FIC Act will: 
 Introduce the concepts of beneficial ownership, ongoing due diligence, and foreign and 
domestic prominent influential persons; 
 Enhance the customer due diligence requirements; 
 Provide for the adoption of a risk based approach in the identification and assessment 
of AML and CTF risks; 
 Provide for the implementation of the UNSC Resolutions relating to the freezing of 
assets; 
 Dissolve the Counter-Money Laundering Advisory Council ('the CMLAC'); 
 Extend the functions of the FIC in relation to suspicious transactions; 
 Enhance the supervisory powers of accountable institutions; and 





131 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program, Anti-money Laundering and Combating  
the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) - Technical Note, IMF Country Report No. 15/51, February 
2015, p. 13. 
132 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program, Anti-money Laundering and Combating  
the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) - Technical Note, IMF Country Report No. 15/51, February 
2015, p. 12. See also: Transparency International: South Africa: Beneficial ownership transparency, 
2012. 
133 Ibid., p. 22. 
134 Republic of South Africa, Treasury, Legislation, Financial Intelligence Amendment Bill, 
Government Gazette No. 39277, 9 October 2015. 
135 Government notice, National Treasury, No. 342, Invitation for Public Comments on the Draft 
Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Bill, 22 April 2014. 
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These amendments are expected to address most of the remaining deficiencies in the legal 
framework for AML/CFT preventive measures and supervision of the financial sector.136 
 
2.2.3.3 Tax evasion and elusion 
 
A. Institutional framework 
 
The South African Revenue Service (SARS) is the nation’s tax collecting authority. Established 
by the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 as an autonomous agency, SARS is 
responsible for administering the South African tax system and customs service through: 
collecting and administering all national taxes, duties and levies; collecting revenue that may 
be imposed under any other legislation as agreed on between SARS and a State entity entitled 
to the revenue; providing a customs service that facilitates trade, maximises revenue collection 
and protects South African borders from illegal importation and exportation of goods; and 
advising the Minister of Finance on all revenue matters.137 
 
The International Relations Division (IRD) of SARS is responsible for improving relations 
through contact with international tax and customs authorities. Among the duties of the IRD 
are the implementation of international tax and customs policies, strategies, procedures and 
instruments, and the monitoring of developments in this regard. Furthermore, the IRD is tasked 
with strengthening the relationships with  foreign customs and tax administrations, both 
bilaterally and multilaterally, and through international organisations and the development of 
a regulatory framework. To conclude, the IRD is to protect the revenue base of South Africa by 
combating fiscal evasion through international cooperation.138 
 
Implementation of international standards 
 
South Africa is a member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes.139 Membership to the Forum entails the implementation of certain standards 
with regard to: (1) availability of information; (2) access to information; and (3) exchange of 








136 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program, Anti-money Laundering and Combating  
the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) - Technical Note, IMF Country Report No. 15/51, February 
2015, p. 16. 
137 SARS, About us, available at: http://www.sars.gov.za/About/Pages/default.aspx. 
138 SARS, About, International Relations, available at:  
http://www.sars.gov.za/About/HowTax/Pages/International-Relations.aspx. 
139    OECD,  Information  available  at:  http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/about-the-   
global-forum/members/. 
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‘compliant’ with the Global Forum’s standards.140 As such, South Africa is scheduled to conduct 
the first automatic exchanges of information under the Standard in 2017.141 
 
Nevertheless, certain shortcomings in South Africa’s implementation were identified. With 
regard to the availability of information, it was recommended that South Africa should monitor 
the availability of ownership of the information on partnerships, in particular where one or 
more of the partners are a trust.142 With regard to exchange of information, South Africa still 
needs to improve implementation of its Exchange of Information network with all relevant 
partners.143 
 
South Africa endorsed the Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters, 
adopted on 6 May 2014. The Declaration commits countries to implement a new single global 
standard on automatic exchange of information. The standard, which was developed by the 
OECD and endorsed by G20 finance ministers, obliges countries and jurisdictions to obtain all 
financial information from their financial institutions and exchange that information 
automatically with other jurisdictions on an annual basis.144 South Africa and all EU Member 
States, except for Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, have concluded bilateral agreements 
based on the OECD Agreement on exchange of information on tax matters.145 
 
Several South African laws contain provisions for the purposes of preventing tax fraud.146 For 
example, the Securities Transfer Act (Act No. 25, 2007) contains a provision on schemes for 
obtaining undue tax benefits.147 The Minerals and Petroleum Resources Royalties Act (Act No. 
28 2008) contains a ‘general anti-avoidance clause’ in order to ensure appropriate taxation of 






140 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Peer Review 
Report Combined: Phase 1 + Phase 2, Incorporating Phase 2 Ratings: South Africa, OECD, November 
2013, p. 80. 
141 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Tax  
Transparency 2015: Report on Progress, OECD, 2015, p. 19. 
142 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Peer Review 
Report Combined: Phase 1 + Phase 2, Incorporating Phase 2 Ratings: South Africa, OECD, November 
2013, pp. 17-50. 
143 Ibid., pp. 60-80. 
144 OECD, information available at: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/  
countries-commit-to-automatic-exchange-of-information-in-tax-matters.htm. 
145 Exchange of Tax Information Portal, Information available at:  
http://www.eoi-tax.org/jurisdictions/ZA#agreements. 
146 SARS, home, legal and policy, Primary legislation, available at: http://www.sars.gov.za/  
Legal/Primary-Legislation/Pages/default.aspx. 
147 Article 9 STA. 
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which are not bona fide, or are not entered into at arm’s length or are entered into solely for the 
purpose of obtaining a certain royalty benefit,148 should be avoided at all times. 
 
To conclude, South Africa is a State Party to the Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. The Convention was signed on 3 November 2011 and 
entered into force on 1 March 2014.149 As a member of the G-20, South Africa was co-author of 
the ‘G20 statement on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes’. 
 
2.2.3.4 Perceived  EU  influence  on  the  implementation  of  international 
standards 
 
Although not strictly dealing with the EU’s influence over the process of the implementation of 
international standards in South Africa, the following development is at the least indirectly 
relevant here. The year 2015 was important in terms of promoting global sustainable 
development and poverty eradication. Two high-level international meetings were organised, 
respectively establishing the new ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ and the financial framework 
to underpin them. The latter agenda included international cooperation on tax matters and was 
discussed during the ‘Third International Conference on Financing for Development’ in Addis 
Ababa in July.150 
 
Considering that international rule-making procedures concerning international cooperation on 
tax matters are largely in the hands of developed countries, developing countries and NGOs 
made ‘global tax democracy’ and reform of decision-making procedures a priority.151 However, 
the EU did not support their proposal for the creation of a permanent global tax body, which 
would significantly enhance the influence of developing countries over the decision-making 
process surrounding international cooperation on tax matters. The EU took the position that, 
rather than creating new intergovernmental structures, the functioning of the existing structures 
should be strengthened,152 and the cooperation with developing countries should be enhanced 
within these structures.153 In Addis Ababa, none of the individual EU Member States challenged 
 
 
148 Article 12 MPRRA. 
149 OECD, Jurisdictions Participating in the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters, Status, 4 November 2015. 
150 European Commission, A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development  
after 2015, COM(2015)44 final, Brussel, 5 February 2015, p. 2. 
151 See for example: Statement on behalf of the Group of 77 and China by H.E. Ambassador Kingsley J.N.  
Mamabolo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa, Chair of the Group of 77, at the Round Table   
on Ensuring Policy Coherence and an Enabling Environment at all Levels for Sustainable Development at the Third  
International Conference on Financing for Development, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14 July 2015; Concord,   
Destination Addis Ababa: The European Union's Responsibilities at the Third Financing for Development  
Conference, Brussels, 26 February 2015. 
152 European Commission, A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development  
after 2015, COM(2015)44 final, Brussel, 5 February 2015, p. 7. 
153 C. Barbière, A. Robert, 'Tax Evasion to Dominate Addis Ababa Development Conference', 
Euractiv, 17 July 2015. 
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the approach adopted by the EU. France was even among the staunchest opponents of 
upgrading the UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters system, 
opting rather for the OECD route. After three days of debate, the representatives of the UN 
Member States agreed on a compromise, namely to strengthen the capacities of the pre-existing 
UN Committee. The final text adopted in the UN General Assembly remained very general in 
nature.154 Developing countries and NGOs stressed afterwards that, with outcomes like these, 
decision-making on global tax standards and rules remains largely in the hands of the OECD 
countries.155 To illustrate the weight allocated to the compromised solution by the European 
Commission, its own conclusions as released after the conference made no mention of the 
enhanced powers of the UN’s Committee.156 
 
Even though the TDCA does not contain an explicit obligation for the Parties to cooperate on 
tax matters, this reading of the events at the Addis Ababa Conference questions the EU’s 
commitment to the enhancement of international cooperation on tax matters vis-à-vis 
developing countries. Rather, it emphasises a desire to safeguard the bilateral relationships as 
laid down, for example, in DTAs, only marginally commit to closer cooperation within the 
framework of the existing structures of the UN and to consolidate power within the OECD 
framework, in which the developed countries have a dominant position. 
 
2.2.4 Concluding remarks 
 
South Africa’s troubled recent history has translated into a strong desire to catch up with the 
rest of the world in terms of engagement with the international frameworks governing the 
global financial systems. South Africa’s implementation of international standards pertaining 
to the combating of money laundering and tax evasion and elusion can be considered advanced. 
Complying with the relevant international standards has been and could continue to be 
problematic for African countries because of their inadequate human and financial resources 
and regulatory frameworks. Nevertheless, it is important for Africa to strive to be a part of the 
emerging global frameworks to tackle IFFs.157 
 
The ongoing reforms concerning the supervision of the banking and insurance sectors seek to 
enhance South Africa’s performance in this regard. The reforms introduced by the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Amendment Bill and the Financial Sector Regulation Bill are expected to 
address the remaining shortcomings in South Africa’s implementation of the main international 
standards. Nevertheless, South Africa’s position as the, by far, largest financial centre of the 
region and the presence of a strong extractive sector, which is often associated with lack of 
 
 
154 See more specifically: Addis Ababa Action Agenda, par. 22-23 and 29. 
155 C. Barbière, 'Addis Ababa Development Financing Conference Stumbles on Tax Evasion', 
Euractiv, 17 July 2015. 
156 Ibid. 
157 High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, Illicit Financial Flows: Track It, Stop It,  
Get It!, Report commissioned by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development, 2015, p. 46. 
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transparency, susceptibility to bribery and transfer-pricing practices, persistently renders the 
country very vulnerable to IFFs, money laundering and tax evasion.158 
 
Overall, it is very difficult to assess the EU’s role in the implementation process of international 
standards in South Africa, or more specifically, the role played by the TDCA therein. Many of 
South Africa’s engagements with international standards were established after the TDCA came 
into force. However, it cannot be concluded that the improvement in implementation and 
adherence to international standards was a direct consequence of EU influence exerted through 
the bilateral structures of the TDCA. Rather, South Africa gained membership status of key 
international organisations through planned expansion of the membership of standard setting 
bodies – as such it was not specifically motivated by South African progress in a certain area or 
any EU involvement therein. Therefore, it can be concluded that no significant causality exists 
between the implementation of the TDCA and EU support therein on the one hand, and South 
Africa’s performance with regard to adhering to international standards combating money 
laundering, and tax evasion and elusion on the other hand. 
 
The wording of the relevant provisions in the TDCA can be considered weak when making a 
comparison with other provisions in similar, more recent, Agreements. Such general wording 
provides considerable room for manoeuvring in the implementation process, or moreover, the 
option of not undertaking meaningful action to improve cooperation at all. Without adequate 
implementation and subsequent monitoring mechanisms, a provision worded in such a way is 
at risk of being rendered meaningless. It has to be reiterated here though that the current South 
African government’s position towards standards ‘imposed’ by developed countries through 
Bilateral Investment Treaties seems to suggest  that such a strategy might be 
counterproductive.159 
 
Another example of wording lacking strength and depth would be the limited references to the 
advancement of cooperation in the area of international tax matters. Rather, the focus is put on 
the prevention of potential interference of the functioning of the TDCA with bilateral tax treaties 
between South Africa and the EU Member States. The TDCA does not commit the Parties to 
cooperate on tax matters, but rather aims to ensure that nothing captured therein jeopardises 
the application of bilateral tax agreements. Indeed, both the EU Member States and South Africa 
are committed, through multiple international fora, to the implementation of far-reaching and 
elaborate frameworks for cooperation on tax matters. Nevertheless, tax evasion and elusion 











158 See Box 15, section 3.3.2. 
159 See for example: J. Lang and B. Gilfillan, Bilateral Investment Treaties – a Shield or a Sword?, 
Bowman Gilfillan African Group, Corporate Newsflash. 
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2.3 EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
 
2.3.1 Trade context 
 




2.3.1.1 Bilateral trade relations and the nature of the Agreement 
 
Trade relations with the EU are crucial for the Serbian economy, because the EU is Serbia’s most 
important trading partner. According to the official data of the Serbian Statistics Office, the 
latest reporting period (January-September 2015) shows that the EU accounts for no less than 
66% of Serbia’s total exports and 62.5% of its imports.160 Conversely, in 2014, Serbia accounted 
for only 0.5% of the EU’s total trade.161 Nevertheless, the volume of the EU’s total trade with 
Serbia has steadily grown, from €3.8 billion in 2005 to close to €17.5 billion in 2014.162 
 
The free trade agreement between the EU and Serbia operates under the name of Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement (SAA).163 It was signed on 29 April 2008 in Luxembourg and 
entered into force on 1 September 2013.164 The SAA succeeds the Interim Agreement on Trade 




160 Statistics Office of the Republic of Serbia, Announcement no. 293 of 30 October 2015, p. 7. 
161 European Commission, DG Trade, European Union, Trade with Serbia, 20 October 2015, p. 2. 
162 European Commission, DG Trade, European Union, Trade with Serbia, 20 October 2015, p. 3. 
163  'Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part', [2013] OJ L 278/16. 
164   See  the  ratification process  at:  www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/  
agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid=2007137. 
 
 The lack of capacity for efficient law enforcement and effective adjudication, coupled 
with corruption and organised crime, reduce the achievements of Serbia’s criminal 
justice sector 
 The first judgment ever to be handed down in Serbia against a legal person in general 
and against money laundering in particular was rendered in the Omorika case by the 
Special Department of the High Court in Belgrade in June 2014. 
 International supervision over Serbia’s reform of anti-money laundering legislation by 
the Council of Europe’s MONEYVAL Committee and the realisation of a joint capacity- 
building project (MOLI-Serbia) led by the EU and the Council of Europe have proven the 
added value of international cooperation in the field of money laundering and tax 
evasion. 
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provisional implementation of the trade provisions of the SAA, pending its entry into force.165 
This interim agreement was the first time Serbia and the EU entered into  a contractual 
relationship. 
 
The SAA was concluded in the context of Serbia’s European integration process and it is, hence, 
not a typical free trade agreement of the EU, but one that seeks above all to ensure that this 
country meets the conditions for accession. In this regard, pursuant to a decision of the 
European Council, Serbia has held the status of candidate for EU membership since 1 March 
2012. EU accession negotiations began on 21 January 2014, when the first EU-Serbia 
intergovernmental conference was held in Brussels. Therefore, the SAA will cease to apply once 
Serbia becomes a Member State of the EU and thus also a full member of its internal market. 
 
Serbia’s EU accession negotiations consist of 35 negotiating chapters, of which those on the free 
movement of capital (chapter 4), financial services (chapter 9), and financial control (chapter 32) 
are instrumental to combating money laundering and tax evasion. On 14 December 2015, the 
Second Intergovernmental Conference EU-Serbia officially opened two negotiating chapters, 
among which was that on financial control. 
 
2.3.1.2 Institutional framework of the Agreement 
 
The SAA establishes three bodies charged with ensuring it fulfils its objectives.166 The 
Stabilisation and Association (SA) Council is composed of representatives of the European 
Commission and of the Council of the EU, on the one part, and of representatives of the Serbian 
Government, on the other part. It meets once a year at ministerial level and in special sessions 
at the request of one of the parties. It examines major bilateral and international issues of mutual 
interest and supervises the application and implementation of the SAA. To this end, it may 
adopt binding decisions and issue recommendations. The SA Council is also tasked with 
resolving any disputes that may arise between the EU and Serbia in relation to the application 
or interpretation of the agreement. Its dispute-settling decisions are binding. The SA Council is 
assisted in its work by a Stabilisation and Association (SA) Committee. The SA Committee meets 
typically at the senior civil servant level. It may also establish subcommittees to oversee the 
implementation of provisions in the relevant sectors of the SAA. In addition to the SA Council 
and the SA Committee, a Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee was set up to 
provide a forum for the exchange of views between the members of the European Parliament 
and the Serbian National Assembly. Furthermore, two joint consultative committees are 
established: one gathering representatives of the EU’s European Economic and Social 
Committee and of Serbia’s social partners and civil society organisations; and the other 





165 When this Interim Agreement was signed, the EU declared its intention not to apply it before 
its entry into force. Conversely, to demonstrate its commitment to EU integration, Serbia 
decided to start applying it unilaterally on 16 October 2008 and began doing so on 1 January 
2009. 
166 Articles 119-125 of the SAA. 
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2.3.2 Assessment of the Regulatory Framework for the Provision of 
Financial Services and Combating Illicit Financial Flows 
 
2.3.2.1 Financial services 
 
As a corollary of its specific nature as an agreement within Serbia’s EU accession process, the 
SAA has a somewhat different structure of the provisions on financial services compared to EU 
free trade agreements with other countries. However, there are a number of provisions in the 
SAA that are of immediate relevance for financial services providers and for the efforts to 
combat illicit capital flows, money laundering and tax evasion. They primarily specify the 
objectives and means of cooperation between the contracting parties. In regulating market 
access, the SAA outlines the importance of granting national treatment and most favoured 
nation treatment to EU and Serbian operators in the financial sector. At the same time, while 
the agreement foresees the usual guarantees for prudential reasons, it also permits derogations 
where this is necessary for a contracting party to address exceptional adverse circumstances 
that impact its financial system. The SAA establishes a system of gradual liberalisation of capital 
flows, based on minimum cooperation commitments. These are chiefly aimed at enhancing 
Serbia’s regulatory and legislative blueprints for financial services provision. 
 
As a consequence, the Serbian Government and Parliament have successfully cooperated to 
achieve a moderately high level of implementation of the SAA, and, where this has not yet been 




The SAA contains only one provision explicitly referring to financial services. In a very general 
fashion, this provides for cooperation between the two parties with the aim of ‘establishing and 
developing a suitable framework of the banking, insurance and financial services sectors in 
Serbia based on fair competition practices and ensuring the necessary level playing field’.167 A 
financial service is defined broadly ‘as any service of a financial nature offered by a financial 
service provider of a Party’.168 
 
Right of establishment 
 
In the first place, the SAA enshrines equal treatment concerning the right of establishment of EU 
and Serbian companies on each other’s territory. It obliges the parties to guarantee non- 
discriminatory conditions for the setting up of operations of their companies in the territory of 
the other party, whereby neither of the parties is allowed to subject the companies of the other 
party to conditions less favourable to those applicable to their own companies or companies of 
third countries.169 However, as long as equal treatment is maintained, the parties are free to 
regulate the establishment and operation of companies on their territories. In the field of 
 
 
167 Article 91 of the SAA. 
168 See Annex VI of the SAA. This contains a list of services considered to be financial services. 
169 Article 53 of the SAA. 
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financial services, a prudential carve out is foreseen. This means that the parties may adopt 
measures for prudential reasons, which include but are not limited to: (a) measures for the 
protection of investors, depositors, policy holders, and persons to whom a fiduciary duty is 
owed by a financial service supplier; and (b) measures to ensure the integrity and stability of 
the financial system.170 Yet, these measures may not be used to avoid the parties’ obligations 
under the SAA. Furthermore, neither party is under a duty to disclose information on the affairs 
and accounts of individual customers or any confidential or proprietary information in the 
possession of public entities.171 The SAA also enables companies of one party that are 
established in the territory of the other party to employ their own nationals in the territory of 
the other party under certain conditions.172 
 
Supply of services 
 
When it comes to the supply of services, the parties are prohibited from taking any measures or 
actions that would render cross-border provision of services ‘significantly more restrictive’ for 
the companies or nationals of the other party compared to the situation existing before the entry 
into force of the SAA.173 
 
Movement of capital 
 
With respect to current payments and movement of capital, the parties undertake to authorise any 
payments and transfers on the current account of balance of payments between the EU and 
Serbia.174 As regards transactions on the capital and financial account of balance of payments, 
the parties are obliged to guarantee free movement of capital in respect of two groups of 
transfers. On the one hand, this duty applies to direct investments made in companies formed 
in accordance with the laws of the host country; investments made pursuant to the aforesaid 
rights of establishment; as well as the liquidation or repatriation of these investments and of 
any profit thus made. On the other hand, it applies to credits related to commercial transactions 
or cross-border provision of services, and to financial loans and credits with maturity longer 
than a year.175 As of 1 September 2017, the EU and Serbia shall ensure free movement of capital 
in relation to portfolio investment and financial loans and credits with maturity shorter than a 
year.176 While the SAA prohibits any new restrictions on the movement of capital between the 
EU and Serbia, each party is entitled to introduce safeguard measures in exceptional 





170 Article 54(2) of the SAA. 
171 Article 54(3) of the SAA. 
172 Article 58 of the SAA. 
173 Article 60 of the SAA. 
174 Article 62 of the SAA. 
175 Article 63(1)-(2) of the SAA. 
176 Article 63(4) of the SAA. 
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difficulties for the operation of exchange rate policy or monetary policy; (b) such measures are 




Another matter of importance for financial services is that of investment. With a view to 
supporting Serbia’s economic and industrial revitalisation, the EU and Serbia agreed to 
cooperate in the field of investment promotion and protection. This is aimed at creating a 
favourable climate for both domestic and foreign private investment through an improvement 




Collaboration in the area of taxation is of paramount significance for avoiding illicit capital 
flows. In this regard, the SAA has established several goals.179 The first one refers to ensuring 
the effectiveness of tax collection and the fight against fiscal fraud, which is to be achieved 
through a further reform of Serbia’s fiscal system and the restructuring of tax administration. 
The second goal seeks to eliminate harmful tax competition. This is to be carried out in 
accordance with the principles laid down in the legally non-binding but politically important 
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, which was adopted by the Council on 1 December 
1997.180 The third goal is to: (a) strengthen the enforcement of measures aimed at preventing tax 
fraud, evasion and avoidance through enhanced transparency; (b) fight against corruption; and 
(c) exchange information with the EU Member States. 
 
To these ends, Serbia has accepted the obligation to complete the conclusion of bilateral 
agreements with the EU Member States in coherence with the latest versions of the OECD’s 
Model Tax Convention of Income and Capital and its Model Agreement on Exchange of 
Information in Tax Matters. Furthermore, the SAA lays down that it may not be construed in a 
way that would prevent the adoption or enforcement of national measures that seek to prevent 
tax avoidance or evasion pursuant to agreements on the avoidance of double taxation or 
national fiscal legislation.181 
 
The implementation of these commitments has thus far yielded suboptimal results. This is 
primarily due to three factors: (a) Serbia’s exclusion from global tax cooperation arrangements 
and networks; (b) weak cooperation between Serbia’s administrative authorities in charge of 
tackling tax evasion; and (c) the unfavourable combination of extremely complex tax regulation 




177 Article 63(6) of the SAA. 
178 Article 93 of the SAA. 
179 Article 100 of the SAA. 
180 See Annex 1 of the 'Conclusions of the Ecofin  Council Meeting of 1 December 1997  
Concerning Taxation Policy', [1998] OJ C2/1, which identifies tests for verifying whether 
national tax measures give rise to harmful tax competition. 
181 Article 68(2) of the SAA. 
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2.3.2.3 Money laundering 
 
The SAA further foresees cooperation in the fight against money laundering. As a general 
principle, Serbia undertook to contribute to regional stability and the development of good 
neighbourly relations, which is to be done by developing programmes of common interest, such 
as those related inter alia to money laundering, organised crime and corruption.182 
 
In more concrete terms, the EU and Serbia seek to prevent the use of their financial systems and 
relevant non-financial sectors, on the one hand, for the laundering of proceeds from general 
criminal activities (in particular drug offences), and, on the other, for the purpose of financing 
terrorism. The key objective is to provide Serbia with administrative and technical assistance in 
order for it to implement relevant regulations and ensure the efficient functioning of the 
mechanisms to combat money laundering and terrorism financing in accordance with EU and 
international standards.183 Key among them are the EU’s 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive 
of 2015 and standards adopted by the Financial Action Task Force. The latter were adopted in 
the form of Recommendations in February 2012 and updated in October 2015. Furthermore, the 
SAA provisions on combating organised crime and other illegal activities envisage cooperation 
on preventing and combating inter alia fiscal fraud.184 
 
Therefore, the EU-Serbia free trade agreement creates a solid overarching framework for 
regulatory cooperation aimed at the liberalisation of trade in general and the prevention of illicit 
capital flows – particularly money laundering, tax fraud, and terrorism financing. This 
framework, however, lacks a detailed scheme and action plan for achieving these objectives. 
Trade in financial services as such is not a developed area of this agreement, but future rounds 
of accession negotiations between the EU and Serbia in this field will focus on harmonising the 




















182 Article 6 of the SAA. 
183 Article 84 of the SAA. The goal of preventing and suppressing acts of terrorism and terrorism 
financing is also foreseen in Article 87 of the SAA. 
184 Article 86(1)(d) of the SAA. 
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2.3.3 Assessment of the Serbian Legislation on Financial Services, 
Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion and Elusion 
 
2.3.3.1 General framework for the harmonisation of Serbian law with EU law 
To fulfil its duties under the SAA and ensure a timely and smooth harmonisation of domestic 
law with the EU acquis, the Serbian Government adopted the so-called National Program for the 
Adoption of the EU Acquis. This is prepared by the Government’s European Integration Office 
and the latest such programme was adopted in July 2014 and covers the period of 2014-2018.185 
As far as the prevention of illicit capital flows is concerned, Serbia has carried out a number of 
legislative reforms, chiefly in the fields of financial services regulation, AML and counter- 
terrorism financing, and combating tax evasion. These are examined in turn below. 
 




Substantive safeguards in the banking sector 
 
The key piece of Serbian legislation in the area of financial services pertaining to banking is the 
Banks Act of 2005.186 The amendments to this Act that were passed in 2010 to a significant extent 






185 Nacionalni Program za Usvajanje Pravnih Tekovina Evropske Unije [National Programme for the 
Adoption of EU Acquis]. 
186 Zakon o Bankama [Banks Act] (Official Gazette no. 107/2005 and 91/2010). 
 
 As an EU candidate country, Serbia’s FTA with the EU has been the most effective 
and most influential in occasioning domestic legal reform. 
 The prospect of EU integration has contributed to the creation in Serbia of a Money 
Laundering Prevention Administration and to the strengthening of the supervisory 
prerogatives of the National Bank of Serbia, both of which have increased their 
regulatory and administrative action in the respective policy fields. 
 Serbian law is largely compliant with FATF recommendations, while more work 
needs to be done on harmonisation with EU law (notably 4th AML Directive) 
 While not a member of the FATF, Serbia is a member of the Egmont Group of 
financial intelligence units and engages in transnational cooperation with the 
European Banking Authority and the European Bank Coordination Initiative. 
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the Basel III standards,187 rendering Serbian law only partially in line with the EU acquis. 
However, on 17 December 2013 the National Bank of Serbia (NBS), which is Serbia’s central 
bank, adopted a Strategy for the introduction of Basel III in Serbia, which lays out a plan to 
implement EU law in three phases. Despite this, harmonisation with the requirements relating 
to the right of establishment and the supply of services by credit institutions from the EU 
Member States in Serbia is only planned for completion by the time Serbia accedes to the EU. 
 
The currently applicable Serbian law does not permit the cross-border provision of banking 
services by foreign banks and other credit institutions through subsidiaries, but only through 
the establishment of a bank.188 However, for a foreign bank to establish a bank in Serbia, the 
applicants must submit to the NBS evidence that the competent regulatory body of the foreign 
bank’s country of origin has authorised the participation of such a bank in the establishment of 
a new bank in Serbia. Furthermore, a foreign bank may not acquire direct or indirect ownership 
in a Serbian bank without a prior authorisation of the NBS. This authorisation shall only be 
granted if control or supervision over the applying foreign bank is carried out in the latter’s 
country of origin in a manner that satisfies the requirements prescribed by the NBS, if there 
exists adequate cooperation between the foreign bank’s supervisory body and the NBS, and if 
other conditions are fulfilled. Namely, the NBS may require the submission of further 
information or documentation.189 
 
However, the law contains an important shortcoming. Namely, while it expressly provides that 
the bank’s licence may be revoked if the bank’s activities are linked with money laundering, 
terrorism financing or other criminal acts,190 it provides the NBS with the discretion to decide 
whether or not to withdraw the license where such a link exists. In other circumstances, such as 
‘critical undercapitalisation’, no such faculty exists and the licence must be withdrawn. Thus, 
the approach to licence withdrawal in cases of banks’ linkages with money laundering and 
terrorism financing is not sufficiently strict because it leaves a certain margin of discretion to 
the NBS. This in turn does not provide watertight safeguards that suspicious banks and 









187 'Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
Access to the Activity of Credit Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms, Amending Directive 2002/87/EC and Repealing Directives 
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC', [2013] OJ L 176/338; 'Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Prudential Requirements for Credit 
Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012', [2013] OJ L 
176/1. 
188 Article 11 of the Banks Act. 
189 Article 94 of the Banks Act. 
190 Article 130(2)(11) of the Banks Act. 
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Supervision over the banking sector 
 
Control over the banking sector is carried out by the NBS, particularly through its Administration 
for the Supervision over Financial Institutions. EU and international regulatory action have 
strengthened the supervisory role of the NBS, which it conducts diligently and in line with 
global developments. A notable exercise in this regard is the completion in December 2015 of a 
‘special diagnostic investigation’ of banks as part of a programme agreed with the International 
Monetary Fund. The objective of this exercise was to verify the level of the capitalisation of 
Serbian banks according to international standards of financial reporting. The results revealed 
that all 14 banks under scrutiny, which were chosen according to their systemic importance for 
Serbia’s financial system, exceeded the regulatory capital requirement of minimum 12%.191 As 
a result, the NBS’ latest quarterly report on the control over the functioning of banks in Serbia, 
adopted in December 2015, reveals a ‘satisfactory level of competition and a low level of 
concentration’ of banking activities.192 
 
When it comes to implementing its supervisory duties, the NBS adopted a Decision in 2009 
laying down minimal procedural requirements that banks and insurance providers must follow 
to ensure customer due diligence.193 These are expressly aimed at reducing client-derived risks 
of money laundering that various financial services providers may be exposed to. This Decision 
obliges all such providers to adopt concrete written procedural requirements for determining 
the acceptability of new and existing clients, for classifying clients according to risk factors, for 
knowing and tracking their clients’ operations, for managing risks for money laundering and 
terrorism financing that clients may pose to such providers, and for training the staff who are 
in direct contact with clients or execute their transactions. 
 
Specific further conditions apply to banks. They are under a duty to put in place procedures for 
establishing correspondent relations with other banks, especially foreign banks. In particular, 
they must refuse the establishment of correspondent relations with banks that apply AML and 
counter-terrorism standards lower than those applied at the EU level.194 Furthermore, if a 
member of staff who is in direct contact with the client suspects that the client and/or the 
transaction requested pose a risk for money laundering or terrorism financing, an internal 
written report must be drawn up, and these reports are kept for the following 5 years.195 
Financial service providers must also establish adequate systems for discovering unusual or 





191 NBS, Posebna Dijagnosticka Ispitivanja [Special diagnostic investigations]. 
192 NBS, Sector for Control over Banking Operations, Bankarski Sektor u Srbiji: Izvestaj za III 
tromesecje 2015. Godine [Banking Sector in Serbia: Report for III Quarter of 2015], p. 4. 
193 NBS, Od luka o Minim alnoj Sad rzini P roced u re ‘Up oznaj Sv og Klijenta’ [Decision on the minimal 
contents of the ‘know your client’ procedure] of 17 June 2009, (Official Gazette no. 46/2009). 
194 Point 12 of the Decision. 
195 Point 13 of the Decision. 
196 Point 16 of the Decision. 
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Moreover, the NBS concluded a multilateral memorandum of cooperation with the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) on 23 October 2015.197 This non-binding statement of intent seeks to 
achieve a greater level of regulatory and supervisory coherence between the signatories. This is 
to be carried out by means of information exchange through a dedicated forum. The EBA 
undertook to provide information on the development of the Single Rulebook, the convergence 
of supervisory practices and the functioning of supervisory colleges in the EU to the 
participating Southeast European banking supervisory authorities. In return, the latter will 
supply information on the main risks and vulnerabilities in their national banking sectors and 
other data and analyses according to the EBA’s risk assessment needs. These arrangements are 
consonant with the FATF recommendation on establishing other forms of international 
cooperation in combating money laundering and terrorist financing (no. 40). 
 
Public-private sector dialogue and cooperation in the field of banking is further maintained 
within the European Bank Coordination Initiative, also known as the ‘Vienna Initiative’.198 This 
was established in January 2009 during the sub-prime mortgage global financial crisis and 
involved a large number of key institutions, including: (a) international financial institutions 
(the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
European Investment Bank and the World Bank); (b) EU institutions (the European Commission 
and the European Central Bank as observer); (c) home and host country regulatory and fiscal 
authorities of large cross-border bank groups; and (d) the largest banking groups operating in 
the region.199 The initial goal of the Initiative (Vienna Initiative 1.0) was to support the stability 
of the financial sector in Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe (jointly referred to as ‘emerging’ 
Europe) by preventing the exodus of large cross border bank groups from these regions. After 
the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the participating institutions in 
January 2012 decided to change focus (Vienna Initiative 2.0) and concentrate on avoiding 
disorderly deleveraging and on supporting policy actions, especially with regard to financial 




Substantive safeguards in the insurance sector 
 
In the area of insurance, Serbia’s 2014 Insurance Act200 implements the EU’s acquis in the areas of 
life and other types of insurance and insurance mediation,201 and partially in the area of taking- 
 
 
197 The other signatories of the Memorandum are the Banking Agency of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Banking Agency of the Republic of Srpska, the National Bank of the Republic of 
Macedonia, and the Central Bank of Montenegro. 
198 See http://vienna-initiative.com. 
199 EBRD, Vienna Initiative – Moving to a New Phase, April 2012. 
200 Zakon o Osiguranju [Insurance Act], (Official Gazette no. 139/2014). 
201 See 'Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 
2002 concerning life assurance; Third Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992 on the 
Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Direct Insurance 
Other than Life Insurance and Amending Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC'; and 
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up and pursuit of insurance and reinsurance.202 Among other things, this Act transposes the EU 
requirements concerning the freedom of establishment of subsidiaries, the freedom of provision 
of insurance services and mediation, and the operation of subsidiaries from third countries.203 
Yet these safeguards will only become applicable upon Serbia’s accession to the EU. 
 
However, there are certain safeguards in the legislation in force against the negative influences 
that could result from cross-border insurance deals. Notably, one of the explicit conditions for 
acquiring qualified ownership in an insurance company in Serbia is the absence of reasonable 
doubt that such acquisition is aimed at, or can increase the risk of, money laundering or terrorist 
financing.204 Furthermore, the NBS shall reject any requests for the authorisation of the 
acquisition of qualified ownership in an insurance company, where it determines that, taking 
into account the foreign law applicable to persons that the applicant is closely connected with 
and the way such law is applied, supervision over such a company would be significantly more 
difficult or impossible.205 The same applies to rejections of applications for work licences.206 In 
the case of foreign acquisitions of Serbian insurance companies, the Insurance Act provides for 
cooperation between the Serbian insurance supervisor – the NBS – and foreign insurance 
supervisors. This is aimed at ensuring that the foreign applicant is subject to regular supervision 
in the country of origin (determined through company seat or domicile), at establishing whether 
the applicant abides by the laws of the country of origin, and at determining whether other 
conditions foreseen under Serbian law are fulfilled.207 
 
Serbian law also regulates insurance activities of Serbian insurance companies abroad and 
imposes on them the duty of obtaining prior authorisation from the NBS for the establishment 
of subsidiaries abroad, and the duty of notification where such activities are carried out directly 
without establishing a subsidiary.208 The same provision on rejecting authorisation requests 
outlined above applies here too. 
 
Moreover, foreign investment by insurance companies operating in Serbia is allowed upon 





'Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December 2002 on 
Insurance Mediation'. See: National Programme for the Adoption of EU Acquis, p. 265. 
202 'Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
on the Taking-up and Pursuit of the Business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II)', [2009] 
OJ L 335/1, as amended by' Directive 2013/58/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 December 2013'. 
203 See Chapter XIV (Articles 232-255) of the Insurance Act. 
204 Article 32(1)(6) of the Insurance Act. 
205 Article 34(1)(4) of the Insurance Act. 
206 Article 45(1)(7) of the Insurance Act. 
207 Article 35 of the Insurance Act. 
208 Article 81 of the Insurance Act. 
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investment is capped at no more than 25% of the base capital, which ranges from €2.2 million 
to €3.2 million depending on the type of insurance.209 
 
Therefore, Serbian legislation provides a good level of protection against abuse and fraudulent 
action in the field of insurance in line with EU law requirements. This is performed through a 
high degree of involvement of the central authority – the NBS – in a variety of situations related 
to cross-border provision of insurance services. 
 
Supervision over the insurance sector 
 
As with banking, supervision in the field of insurance, including over the activities of foreign 
insurers operating in Serbia, is performed by the NBS.210 Its supervision is relatively effective. 
As shown by the latest report, adopted in December 2015, the insurance sector recorded growth 
in almost all categories. Insurance companies’ capital grew by 2% and their technical reserves 
grew by 10.8%, providing full coverage for both life and non-life insurance. The report also 
demonstrates that the NBS requires insurance companies to abide by risk management 
requirements laid down in the EU’s Solvency II Directive, which was recast on 1 January 2016.211 
 
To conduct supervision in the field of insurance, the NBS has been endowed with far-reaching 
competences. Importantly, the NBS may carry out supervision not only over the addressees of 
supervision but also over legal persons that have property, administrative or business links 
with the persons subjected to insurance supervision. Additionally, the NBS may have insight 
into the business records of all the participants in a deal that is the object of supervision. 
 
It is also significant that the law expressly provides for cooperation between the NBS and other 
supervisory and other competent bodies in Serbia and abroad, as well as with international 
organisations. Specifically, the NBS may conclude cooperation agreements with these bodies 
and exchange information with them, under the conditions that these bodies and organisations 
are under a duty to keep this information confidential in a way that corresponds to the 
requirements of Serbian law.212 Administrative provisions on customer due diligence in the 
field of banking apply to the field of insurance mutatis mutandis. 
 
2.3.3.3 Anti-money laundering legislation 
 
Serbia has had anti-money laundering legislation since 2001. The currently applicable 
legislation, the Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prevention Act (AML/CFT Act), which 





209 Article 137 in conjunction with Article 27 of the Insurance Act. 
210 Articles 13-19 of the Insurance Act. 
211 NBS, Sector for Insurance Supervision, Sektor Osiguranja u Srbiji: Izvestaj za Trece Tromesecje 
2015. Godine [Insurance Sector in Serbia: Report for III Quarter of 2015], p. 12. 
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National Assembly on 18 March 2009 and was subsequently amended in 2009, 2010 and 2014.213 
The Act entered into force on 1 October 2015. 
 
The current AML/CFT Act is expressly adopted with a view to implementing EU legislation. 
However, with the EU’s adoption in May 2015 of the 4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive,214 
Serbian legislation will need to be amended to bring it into conformity with the requirements 
of the new Directive. 
 
Other Serbian legislation of relevance to capital flows, which is not examined here for reasons 
of space and focus, includes the Foreign Exchange Operations Act of 2006 (last amended in 
2014),215 the Foreign Trade Operations Act of 2009 (last amended in 2015),216 and the Investments 
Act of 2015.217 
 
C. Substantive safeguards 
Preventive arm 
In accordance with EU law, FATF recommendations (no. 1), the International Core Principles 
(ICP) of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (principle 22.0.3), and the Basel 
Committee Guidance on Banking Supervision (principle 29),218 the AML/CFT Act takes a risk- 
based approach to combating money laundering and terrorism financing. 
 
The core of this approach is to ensure customer due diligence, regarding which Serbian law 
fully complies with FATF recommendations (no. 10).219 This entails a duty for obliged entities 
to carry  out  risk  analysis  on the  basis  of  guidelines  to  be  laid  down  by  the  competent 
 
 
213 Zakon o Sprecavanju Pranja Novca i Finansiranja Terorizma [Money Laundering and Terrorism 
Financing Prevention Act] (Official Gazette nos. 20/2009, 72/2009, 91/2010). The latest 
amendment was published in the Official Gazette no. 139/2014 of 18 December 2014. 
214 'Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money Laundering or 
Terrorist Financing, Amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council', and 'Repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC', [2015] OJ L 141/73. 
215 Zakon o Deviznom Poslovanju (Official Gazette nos. 62/2006, as amended by 31/2011, 119/2012 
and 139/2014) 
216 Zakon o Spoljnotrgovinskom Poslovanju (Official Gazette nos. 36/2009, 36/2011 of another Act, 
88/2011 and 89/2015 of another Act). 
217 Zakon o Ulaganjima (Official Gazette no. 89/2015). 
218 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document– Guidance on the Application  
of the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision to the Regulation and Supervision of Institutions  
Relevant to Financial Inclusion, 21 December 2015. 
219 See, in particular, Articles 8-9 (general requirements) and 34 (on the prohibition of the 
provisions of services that enable the concealment of the client’s identity) of the AML/CFT Act. 
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supervisory authority in accordance with international standards.220 The obliged entities 
include primarily financial institutions (e.g. banks, insurance companies, auditors, etc.), as well 
as designated non-financial businesses and professions. With regard to the latter, Serbian law 
applies to all the obliged entities recommended by the FATF (no. 22), except trusts and company 
service providers, and dealers in precious metals and precious stones.221 
 
The AML/CFT Act is also in harmony with the FATF recommendations on the duty of obliged 
entities to report to the financial intelligence unit when there is a reasonable doubt that funds 
are proceeds of crime or are related to terrorist financing (no. 20),222 on the use of third parties 
for customer due diligence purposes (no. 17),223 on correspondent banking (no. 13),224 on the use 
of new technologies (no. 15),225 on foreign politically exposed persons (no. 12),226 on internal 
controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries (no. 18),227 and on the duty of confidentiality to 
the client (no. 21a).228 
 
When it comes to ‘tipping-off’, the Serbian legislation provides several exemptions to the FATF 
recommendation (no. 21b) that obliged persons may not disclose the fact that a suspicious 
transaction report or related information is being filed with the financial intelligence unit. 
Namely, the Serbian AML/CFT Act allows ‘tipping-off’, first, when obliged entities receive a 
court request for information necessary for the determination of facts in a criminal proceeding; 
and, second, when information is sought by the competent AML/CFT supervisory authority. 
These exemptions are in harmony with the goal of ensuring the good functioning of the rule of 
law. 
 
However, a third exemption is questionable. It allows lawyers, auditors, accountants and tax 
advisors to ‘tip-off’ if they attempt to dissuade the client from performing illegal activity.229 This 
can frustrate the purpose of the prohibition of ‘tipping-off’ while not guaranteeing that 
dissuasion will succeed. Yet, in some cases, Serbian legislation exceeds FATF requirements. For 
instance, FATF recommendations suggest at least five years as the obligatory period for keeping 
records about the obliged entities’ clients, transactions and data gathered through customer due 




220 Article 7 of the AML/CFT Act. 
221 Article 4 of the AML/CFT Act. 
222 Article 37 of the AML/CFT Act. 
223 Articles 23-26 of the AML/CFT Act. 
224 Article 29 of the AML/CFT Act. 
225 Article 29a of the AML/CFT Act. 
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Furthermore, Serbian law mandates the application of enhanced measures of knowing and 
monitoring clients when: (a) establishing a correspondent banking relationship with a foreign 
bank or similar institution that does not adhere to international standards that are at least at the 
level of those applied in the EU; (b) the client is a foreign politically exposed person; and (c) 
when the client is not physically present during the process of establishing and verifying his or 
her identity.231 
 
Additionally, in 2009 the NBS adopted a set of risk assessment guidelines for combating money 
laundering.232 These guidelines, which are coherent with ICP in the field of insurance (principle 
22.2), establish four categories of risks: geographical, client-related, transactional, and product- 
related. In assessing these risks, Serbia to a great extent relies on international and European 
standards. For example, geographically risky countries are defined as: 
(a) countries against which the UN, the Council of Europe, the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control of the U.S. Department of Treasury and other organisations have applied 
sanctions, embargoes or similar measures; 
(b) countries that credible institutions, such as FATF and the Council of Europe, have 
designated as not applying adequate measures to combat money laundering and 
terrorism financing, or as supporting or financing such activities or organisations; and 
(c) countries that credible institutions, such as the World Bank or IMF, have marked as 
having a high level of corruption and crime. 
 
On this basis, the Finance Minister draws up a list of countries that apply international 
standards at least to the level adopted by the EU (‘white list’) and of those that apply no 
standards in these areas (‘black list’). These guidelines specifically refer to international 
standards as a reference point for ensuring customer due diligence, regarding which three types 
of measures are foreseen: general, simplified and intensified.233 All of these provisions ensure 
the implementation of the FATF recommendation on higher-risk countries (no. 19). 
 
The implementation of EU and international standards in the AML field has yielded positive 
results insofar as the NBS carries out regular indirect control over the AML activities of the 
actors in the financial services sector. However, the latest NBS report, adopted in December 
2015, unveils a number of fallacies that refer to inconsistencies and incompleteness of the data 
reported by banks. The risk of money laundering and terrorism financing is therefore at the 
medium level. However, the NBS underlines that banks have successfully installed risk 
management systems and that it is very positive that ‘all banks devote due attention to training’, 




231 Article 28 of the AML/CFT Act. 
232 Odluka o Smernicama za Procenu Rizika od Pranja Novca [Decision on the Risk Assessment 
Guidelines for Combating Money Laundering] of 17 January 2009. 
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The AML/CFT Act foresees sanctions for failure to comply with the duties laid down therein. 
The sanctions consist of fines ranging from 5,000 dinars (€40) to 3,000,000 dinars (approx. 
€25,000) depending on the severity of the infringement.235 Money laundering is furthermore 
criminalised by the Serbian Criminal Code, which was adopted in 2005 and last amended in 
2014.236 The code follows the FATF recommendation on criminalising money laundering (no. 
3). 
 
Under the Criminal Code, money laundering occurs when one, knowing that property derives 
from a criminal act, carries out one of the following acts: (a) converts or transfers property with 
the intention of concealing or falsely representing the illegal origins of the property; (b) hides 
or falsely represents the facts with respect to such property; or (c) acquires, holds or uses 
property. This is punishable by imprisonment of 6 months to 5 years and a pecuniary fine. If 
the value of the property, or the amount of money laundered, exceeds 1,500,000 dinars, the 
imprisonment is 1-10 years and a pecuniary fine. If money laundering is committed by a group 
of people, the sanction is imprisonment of 2-12 years and a pecuniary fine. If a money launderer 
could know and was obliged to know that the property or money derives from a criminal act, 
he or she will be punished by imprisonment of up to three years. The Code also provides for 
the culpability of the responsible person within a legal person (e.g. a company). In all of these 
cases, the money and property in question will be confiscated.237 
 
The Criminal Code also criminalises terrorism financing and foresees the sanction of 
imprisonment for 1-10 years as well as the confiscation of assets used to this end.238 In addition 
to this, on 20 March 2015 the Serbian National Assembly adopted the Act on Limitations on the 
Disposition of Property for the Purpose of Terrorism Prevention.239 This statute provides for a 
temporary prohibition of the transfer, conversion or management of property – whatever its 
nature or source – by natural and legal persons when they establish that they are dealing with 
persons designated as terrorists by the UN and other international organisations of which Serbia 
is a member or by the Serbian authorities on their own initiative or on the request of a third 
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Assets,240 which was created within the Ministry of Justice in 2008 pursuant to the Act on the 
Confiscation of Property Derived from Crime.241 These legal provisions implement the FATF 
recommendations on the confiscation of property laundered or used for financing terrorism (no. 
4) and on the criminalisation of terrorist financing (no. 5). 
 
When it comes to the implementation of AML legislation, it is important to note that the first 
time a legal person was sentenced in general, and for money laundering in particular, in a court 
proceeding in Serbia took place in June 2014, when the Special Department of the High Court 
in Belgrade handed down a judgment against the company Omorika. The latter was sentenced 
to pay a fine of 1.5 million dinars (approx. €12,500), return the proceeds of over 21 million dinars 
(approx. €175,000) which had been acquired through extortion, and sentenced its director and 
owner to imprisonment for eight and a half years along with ten other persons.242  This is an 
important milestone in the judicial fight against money laundering, albeit more resolve is 
needed to continue this initial step in the direction of enforcement of AML law. 
 
Another significant channel for money laundering and financing of terrorism in Serbia goes 
through the non-profit sector. Particularly important is the legal gap existing with respect to 
religious organisations, which are not subject to registration with the Serbian Business Registers 
Agency.243 This leaves unimplemented the FATF recommendation on the prevention of misuse 
of non-profit organisations for the financing of terrorism (no. 8). Yet the Action Plan for the 
implementation of the national AML/CFT Strategy foresees amendments to the legislation on 
the registration and ownership of non-profit organisations.244 
 
D. Institutional safeguards 
National institutional safeguards 
Implementing a number of significant international standards, the AML/CFT Act establishes 
the Money Laundering Prevention Administration (MLPA) as the central financial intelligence unit 
in Serbia. It is established within the Ministry of Finance and is tasked with the prevention of 
crime in the field of money laundering and terrorism financing.245 This is carried out by 
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competent state authorities.246 The MLPA may impose both a temporary suspension of the 
processing of suspicious transactions and the monitoring over such transactions and clients. In 
return, the Administration must report back to the obliged entity on the results of the 
investigations carried out pursuant to the information provided by them. 
 
Apart from the MLPA, the preventive arm of AML/CFT activities is performed by the aforesaid 
obliged entities themselves. Additionally, legal persons authorised to organise the securities 
market as well as the Central Securities Depository and Clearing House are also obliged to 
inform the MLPA of facts that could be related to money laundering and terrorism financing.247 
 
Supervision over the application of the AML/CFT Act is primarily ensured by the MLPA and 
the NBS. Besides direct supervision over the banking and insurance sectors described above, 
the NBS performs indirect supervision. This is done through a questionnaire, which banks must 
return twice a year and which the NBS analyses in order to carry out aggregate as well as 
individual assessments of money laundering and terrorism financing risks in the banking 
sector. Other state organs in charge of AML/CFT supervision include ministries in charge of 
finance, trade and postal services, the Securities Commission,248 the Tax Administration,249 the 
Foreign Exchange Inspectorate,250 the Bar Association of Serbia,251 and the Chamber of 
Authorised Auditors.252 All of these bodies and their operations are supported through the 
action of the police, the prosecutors’ offices and courts. 
 
These institutional arrangements to a great extent implement the essence of the ICP (no. 22.5) 
and FATF recommendations on national cooperation and coordination (no. 2), on the powers 
and responsibilities of competent authorities (nos. 26-32), as well as on sanctions (no. 35). 
 
International institutional safeguards 
 
An important component of the Serbian AML/CFT Act is the explicit regulation of international 
cooperation and mutual legal assistance.253 Information obtained from third countries may only 
be used for AML/CFT purposes and under the conditions set by the third country. Conversely, 
Serbia may reject a third-country request for information if such a request fails to show that 
there is reasonable doubt that the information sought relates to money laundering or terrorism 
financing, or if providing information would jeopardise ongoing criminal proceedings in Serbia. 
As a consequence of a third-country request and under the condition of reciprocity, the MLPA 
may order the suspension of the targeted transaction, but may not impose the monitoring, 
which it may do in purely domestic matters. 
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It is arguable whether these provisions conform to the FATF recommendation (no. 37) for 
countries to provide the ‘widest possible range’ of mutual legal assistance and for them to do 
so without placing ‘unreasonable or unduly restrictive conditions’ on the provision thereof. This 
is because Serbian authorities might decide to reject mutual legal assistance requests that seek 
information for reasons or circumstances that the third country may not fully disclose or for 
those that the authorities of the requesting country deem to exhibit reasonable doubt of money 
laundering but which Serbian might disagree to be of such a nature. However, it is justified for 
Serbian authorities to seek to provide the greatest possible extent of protection of personal data 
and privacy of natural and legal persons domiciled in Serbia. For these reasons, it is advised 
that any mutual legal assistance requests that Serbian authorities may assess as insufficiently 
substantiated are given the greatest possible degree of deference so as to enable the widest 
possible scope for the international exchange of information related to AML/CFT. 
 
Moreover, Serbia has signed and ratified all international conventions aimed at combating 
money laundering and terrorism financing that are recommended by the FATF (no. 36). These 
include: the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988 (the Vienna Convention), the UN Terrorist Financing Convention of 1999, 
the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime of 2000 (the Palermo Convention), 
the UN Convention against Corruption of 2003, the Council of Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime 0f 2001, and the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism of 2005. 
 
When it comes to international cooperation in practice, Serbia is moderately well involved. 
While not a member of the FATF, Serbia is subjected to the evaluation process conducted by the 
Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering 
Measures and the Financing of Terrorism – MONEYVAL.254 This Committee was established in 
1997 and performs self and mutual assessments of AML/CFT measures in force in the Member 
States of the Council of Europe that are not members of the FATF. As such, MONEYVAL is one 
of eight FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs). MONEYVAL is an essential monitoring 
mechanism because it provides recommendations on improvements of the AML/CFT systems 
above all in line with FATF recommendations. MONEYVAL also possesses enforcements 
mechanisms, which include reporting duties, the sending of a high-level diplomatic mission to 
the country concerned, and, as the strictest sanction, the expulsion of a non-complying country 
from the Council of Europe. MONEYVAL assessments are additionally important because they 
are used by the IMF and the World Bank for their own assessments. Serbia is currently 
preparing for the 5th round of mutual evaluation (2015-2021),255 and Serbia and Armenia were 
the only two countries to have undergone pre-evaluation trainings in 2014, which are aimed at 
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Another European project of importance is MOLI-Serbia, worth €2.2 million. The project was 
funded jointly by the EU (approx. 91% of the funds) and the Council of Europe (approx. 9% of 
the funds), and implemented by the latter organisation during the period of 42 months (15 
November 2010-14 May 2014).257 Its key objectives were to enhance the rule of law in terms of 
legislation, operations and capacities in the fight against money laundering, terrorism financing 
and other forms of economic and financial crime as well as to ensure Serbia’s AML/CFT system 
complies with international standards. 
 
The MOLI project has brought rather positive results in the fight against money laundering and 
terrorist financing. Concretely, it has been reported that the project has: 
 
‘successfully managed to complete a range of strategically important activities, including the 
drafting of the new AML/CFT Strategy and Action Plan, legislative reviews of over 40 relevant 
legislative and regulatory acts; conducted a number of sectoral risk assessments, as well as 
reviews of interagency cooperation practices and frameworks in the areas of law enforcement 
and supervision; a major IT upgrade for the Administration on the Prevention of Money 
Laundering was carried out’.258 
 
The project resulted in the publication of the National Risk Assessment for Money Laundering 
in April 2013, the only such exercise ever done in Serbia.259 The activities undertaken in the 
preparation of this report have significantly informed the drawing up of Serbia’s latest National 
AML/CFT Strategy for the period 2015-2018, which the Serbian Government adopted on 31 
December 2014.260 This Strategy was designed specifically to take into account the most recent 
changes in international (FATF) and EU standards (4th AML Directive) with a view to elevating 
Serbia’s AML/CFT efforts from the fulfilment of technical requirements to enabling an ongoing 
appraisal of the system’s overall effectiveness in practice. 
 
As concerns international efforts, although the IMF has since 2002 published so-called Detailed 
Assessment Reports on AML/CFT measures in different countries, Serbia was not among 
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The inclusion of financial services in EU free trade and association agreements: 
Effects on money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance 






System Stability Assessment for Serbia, last carried out in May 2010, stated that it was ‘clear that 
Serbia is taking a number of steps to update its AML/CFT legal and institutional framework’.262 
 
Serbia furthermore joined the Egmont Group of financial intelligence units in July 2003. In 
addition, since June 2010 Serbia has also held observer status in the Eurasian Group on 
Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, which is another FSRB. 
 
Finally, and most importantly, the European Commission assesses Serbia’s financial sector 
through its reports on progress made by EU candidate countries. The latest such document, 
adopted in November 2015 and covering the period October 2014-September 2015,263 evaluated 
Serbia as being ‘moderately prepared’ in the areas of the freedom of movement of capital, 
financial services and financial control. The European Commission underlined the need for 
Serbia to step up its efforts to investigate wider criminal networks and process money 
laundering cases.264 It assessed that the MLPA needs ‘greater administrative and analytical 
capacity’ and is yet to establish a track record of ‘proactive investigation, prosecution, final 
conviction and asset confiscation’ in cases of organised crime, including money laundering.265 
Exchange of data and cooperation between the different agencies involved in combating money 
laundering, also needs improvement.266 These concerns led the European Commission to 
appraise Serbia’s AML capacity as ‘weak’.267 
 
These cooperative arrangements and assessment mechanisms show that Serbia has a solid 
AML/CFT legal framework in place and that this could serve as a basis for an efficient 
international exchange of financial intelligence. However, operational capacities required to 
implement this are still lacking. 
 
2.3.3.4 Tax evasion legislation 
 
A. Substantive safeguards 
Preventive arm 
In Serbia, tax evasion – particularly the non-payment of withholding tax – is one of the highest- 
risk predicate criminal offences for money laundering and accounts for some 15.5% of all the 





262 IMF, Republic of Serbia: Financial Sector Assessment Program Update– Financial System Stability  
Assessment, IMF Country Report No. 10/147, May 2010, p. 33. 
263  European Commission, St aff Working D ocument ‘Se rb ia 2 0 15 Rep ort’, accomp any ing th e EU  
Enlargement Strategy, SWD(2015) 211 of 10 November 2015. 
264 Ibid., p. 15. 
265 Ibid., pp. 33 and 59. 
266 Ibid., p. 63. 
267 Ibid., p. 16. 
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or shell companies,268 by submitting forged tax documentation, by inserting smuggled or illegal 
goods into legal trade flows, and generally by engaging in the activities of the ‘grey’ or ‘shadow’ 
economy. Equally conducive to tax evasion is the fact that many international trade transactions 
are carried out in cash in order to avoid tax duties.269 According to the Belgrade Chamber of 
Commerce’s announcement in March 2015, Serbia had lost some RSD 10 billion (approx. €82 
million) due to tax evasion in the previous 14 months.270 
 
An important legal provision linking tax evasion and the provision of financial services is laid 
down in the Serbian Banks Act. This exempts banks from their duty of confidentiality to the 
customer (the so-called ‘bank’s secret’ in Serbian law) when it comes to disclosure of such data 
to the Tax Administration.271 This aims to prevent banks from withholding information that can 
provide leads in tax evasion investigations. This is in line with the FATF recommendation on 
financial institution secrecy laws (no. 9). 
 
One of the key problems in curbing illicit money flows through trade, including money 
laundering and tax evasion, remains insufficient coordination and cooperation between, on the 
one hand, the MLPA, the Tax Administration and the Customs Administration, and, on the 
other hand, the prosecutorial bodies.272 However, eliminating tax evasion needs to be tackled in 
conjunction with combating the wider, systemic phenomena of corruption and organised crime 




The Serbian Criminal Code criminalises tax evasion in the following way. Tax evasion is 
punishable if carried out with the intention of fully or partially avoiding the payment of tax or 
other fiscal duties. This happens in several instances: (a) when the tax addressee gives false 
information about the legally acquired income, objects and other facts of relevance for 
determining these duties; (b) when, with respect to these information, he or she fails to report 
legally acquired income where such reporting is obligatory; and (c) when he or she otherwise 
hides information of relevance for determining the fiscal duties owed. This is sanctioned by 
imprisonment of six months to five years and a pecuniary fine, where evasion concerns an 
 
 
268 I. Raonic and Z. Vasic, , ‘Poreska utaja PDV u Srbiji i Fenomen Fantomskih Firmi’ [VAT Fraud in 
Serbia and the Phenomenon of Shell (Phantom) Companies], Ekonomika, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2014, p. 
99. 
269 J. Pantelic, National Risk Assessment for Money Laundering in the Republic of Serbia, Council of 
Europe (Office in Belgrade), April 2013, p. 15. 
270 See: http://inserbia.info/today/2015/03/serbia-loses-rsd-10-bln-through-tax-evasion-in-   
14-months. 
271 Article 48(1)(8) of the Banks Act. 
272 J. Pantelic, National Risk Assessment for Money Laundering in the Republic of Serbia, Council of 
Europe (Office in Belgrade), April 2013, p. 29. 
273 B. Simonovic and G. Boskovic, Symbiosis of Politics, the Shadow Economy, Corruption, and Organized 
Crime in the Territory of the Western Balkans: The Case of the Republic of Serbia, in M. Edelbacher et al. 
(eds), Corruption, Fraud, Organized Crime, and the Shadow Economy (Boca Raton, FL: CRS Press, 2016), p. 120. 
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amount of up to 150,000 dinars (approx. €1,250). If the amount exceeds 1,500,000 dinars (approx. 
€12,500), the sanction is imprisonment of 1-8 years and a pecuniary fine, and if it exceeds 
7,500,000 dinars (approx. €62,000), the sanction is imprisonment of 2-10 years and a pecuniary 
fine.274 
 
It has recently been argued in the literature that Serbia’s system of sanctions for tax evasion is 
‘relatively well defined’ and ‘appropriate’, but that problems arise because of the ‘inappropriate 
and inconsistent application of the available penal mechanisms’ and inadequate Government 
practices (e.g. writing off interest for late tax payments). However, tax evasion and shadow 
economy are partly facilitated by the sheer number of small businesses and the great complexity 
and variety of types of taxes existing in Serbia. These factors lower the ability of taxpayers fully 
to comprehend their duties (which can lead to tax evasion by omission), for courts to sanction 
convoluted tax evasion schemes (e.g. so-called ‘VAT carousel’), and for tax inspectors to audit 
all tax types.275 These deficiencies point to the low probability of detecting tax evasion, which 
encourages shadow economy. 
 
B. Institutional safeguards 
National institutional safeguards 
The Tax Administration, established within the Ministry of Finance, is the central government 
authority for assessing, controlling and collecting public revenue as well as for issuing and 
revoking authorisations exchange activities and auditing of such activities. Within this body, 
two sectors are particularly important for combating tax evasion and money laundering. The 
Sector of Tax Police was formed in 2003 and is charged with detection and investigation of tax 
crimes (especially tax evasion) and their perpetrators in accordance with the Tax Procedure and 
Tax Administration Act of 2002, last amended in 2014.276 The Sector for Foreign Exchange and 
Games of Chance exercises control over the activities of both resident and non-resident 
operators in these two areas. It also supervises operators in the field of factoring, forfeiting and 
international money transfers. 
 
The Tax Administration has been ill-equipped to carry out efficient control over the process of 









274 Article 229 of the Serbian Criminal Code. 
275 M. Arsic et al., Causes of the Shadow Economy, in G. Krstic and F. Schneider (eds), 
Formalizing the Shadow Economy in Serbia: Policy Measures and Growth Effects, (Springer, 2015), pp. 
24-25. 
276 Zakon o Poreskom Postupku i Poreskoj Administraciji [Tax Procedure and Tax Administration 
Act]. See specifically Article 135 thereof. 
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structure, the lack of exchange of information with other agencies, and the lack of automation 
of business processes.277 
 
International institutional safeguards 
 
At present, Serbia does not seem to be sufficiently involved in the international exchange of tax 
information. It is not a member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes, which consists of 130 states or territories across the world. This 
makes Serbia the only European country apart from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Kosovo,278 Moldova and Belarus, still remaining outside this Forum.279 As a result, Serbia does 
not participate in the creation and implementation of international standards of tax 
transparency and information exchange. It also does not take part in the Forum’s in-depth peer 
review processes aimed at establishing a level playing field in the application of these standards 
worldwide. Serbia is also not a state party to the  Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters, which was jointly developed by the OECD and the Council of 
Europe, signed in 1988 and came into effect in 1995.280 
 
However, in July 2015 Serbia joined the EU’s Fiscalis 2020 programme (2014-2020) – an EU 
cooperation programme worth €234 million.281 This is aimed at supporting the exchange of 
information and expertise between the tax authorities and experts of the participating countries 
(EU Member States and EU candidate states that join) with a view to combating tax fraud and 
tax evasion, increasing the level of tax collection, and ensuring the implementation of EU law 
in the field of taxation. This is an important development given the European Commission’s 
assessment of November 2015 that ‘despite some improvements in the reporting period, 
instruments to fight and reduce tax evasion, fraud and the informal economy need to be further 
strengthened’.282 
 
To fulfil this, Serbia adopted an Action Plan to implement the National AML/CFT Strategy, 
which also addresses  tax  evasion.283 In particular, plans  have  been  made to achieve  the 
following three goals that are paramount for tackling tax evasion. The first is to improve the 
legislative and regulatory framework relating to the registration of economic actors, so as to 
 
 
277 M. Arandarenko, Analysis of the Administrative Capacity of the Institutions in Charge of 
Overseeing the Operations of Business Entities, in G. Krstic and F. Schneider (eds), Formalizing 
the Shadow Economy in Serbia: Policy Measures and Growth Effects, (Springer, 2015), p. 110. 
278 In Europe, Kosovo is not recognised as an independent country by Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and 5 EU Member States: Spain, Greece, Romania, 
Cyprus and Slovakia. 
279 See the map at: www.eoi-tax.org/#default. 
280      See:    www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Status_of_convention.pdf. 
281 See: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/tax_cooperation/fiscalis_   
programme/fiscalis_2020/index_en.htm. 
282  European Commission, St aff Working D ocument ‘Se rb ia 2 0 15 Rep ort’, accomp any ing th e EU  
Enlargement Strategy, SWD(2015) 211 of 10 November 2015, p. 73. 
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prevent the setting up of ‘phantom firms’ and enhance the transparency of, and access to 
information on, the ownership of legal persons. The second is to strengthen the mechanisms for 
domestic and international cooperation and exchange of information on money laundering, 
terrorism financing and tax evasion. The third is to establish joint working groups and 
operational teams to deal with particularly large cases and areas of high level of priority, such 
as tax crimes and corruption. 
 
2.3.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The above analysis shows that Serbia exhibits a good degree of legislative responsiveness, but 
that problems arise in applying AML/CFT and tax legislation in practice. This is mainly due to 
the insufficient operational capacity of administrative authorities and systemic problems 
related to corruption and the enforcement of the rule of law. 
 
Nevertheless, the EU, acting through the medium of the SAA, has exerted substantial and direct 
legislative influence on Serbia in the area of combating of illicit capital flows, especially money 
laundering, terrorist financing, and tax evasion. The origin of this influence lies in Serbia’s 
aspiration to become an EU member state, which entails harmonisation of Serbian law with the 
EU acquis. The EU has therefore provided an invaluable incentive in developing Serbia’s legal 
capacity for AML/CFT and anti-tax evasion activities. 
 
In this regard, the requirements imposed by the SAA have been a decisive instrument in 
stimulating the incorporation of international and European  standards into Serbian law. 
Although up-to-date compliance assessments by international bodies are largely missing, the 
insights into the relevant laws and regulations presented above reveal that numerous FATF 
recommendations have been implemented. However, as EU law evolves, Serbia needs to put 
additional efforts to harmonise its legislative and administrative acts accordingly. This is 
notably the case with the EU’s tax transparency package, initiated by the European Commission 
in the wake of the 2014 Luxembourg Leaks scandal. The core of this package is the Directive 
requiring mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation, adopted in 
December 2015.284 Finally, it must be noted that Serbia’s position in the EU’s foreign trade 
strategy is fairly exceptional, because, except for some countries of the Western Balkans and of 
the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s external trade partners are typically not countries that seek 
EU accession. However, this means that the closer the ties with the trading partner the greater 
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2.4 EU-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement 
 
2.4.1 Trade context 
 




2.4.1.1 Bilateral trade relations and the nature of the Agreement 
 
The Republic of Korea (Korea) is a member of the G20, it is classified as an advanced economy 
by the IMF, and its trade surplus for December 2015 is estimated at $10.4 billion.285 The EU has 
had a strategic partnership with Korea since 2010. The relations are governed by two key 
agreements on the following topics: political dialogue under the EU-Korea Framework 
Agreement;286 and trade under the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter called the ‘EU- 
Korea FTA’).287 In October 2010 the EU, its Member States and Korea signed the new agreements 
at the EU-Korea Summit in Brussels. Both agreements update and replace the 1996 Framework 
Agreement for Trade and Cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Korea. As far as domestic 
support for the FTA goes, Mazur observes that, ‘[a]lthough representatives of manufacturing 
industry supported the conclusion of the FTA with the EU, some reluctance has been observed 
within the [Korean] groups involved in the liberalisation of services’.288 
 
As of 1 July 2011 the EU-Korea FTA was applied provisionally289 until its entry into force on 13 
December 2015.290 The FTA stipulates a gradual approach to liberalisation, with 1 July 2016 as 
 
 
285 See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-korea/balance-of-trade. 
286 Free Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic 
of Korea, of the other part, 2010. 
287 Ibid. 
288 G. Mazur, The European Union–South Korea Free Trade Agreement. A New Model of Trade 
and Economic Cooperation between Developed Countries, Research Papers of Wroclaw 






 Trade between the EU and Korea has increased significantly, lifting the EU’s trade deficit 
with Korea and generating a trade surplus in EU’s favour. 
 The Committee on Trade in Services, Establishment and Electronic Commerce convened 
numerous times but has not reported in detail its deliberations about Financial Services 
sector. Korea regularly and extensively updated its legislation and regulation concerning 
the sectors and subject areas governed by the FTA. 
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the date for the elimination of most import duties on products except for a limited number of 
agricultural products.291 It is expected that the FTA will also impact the free trade of goods and 
services, especially in relation to the electronics sector, the car industry, the pharmaceutical 
sector,  and  the  shipping  industry.  Bilateral  trade  exchange  between  the  EU  and  Korea 
amounted to €65 billion in 2008, while this trade exchange had increased to €81 billion in 2014.292 
 
Figure 1 EU exports to and imports from Korea, 2005-2013 (€ billion) 
 
 
Sources: COMEXT & Chief Economist Note (ISSN 2034-9815)293 
 
As for the (financial) services sector, the LSE reported in 2010 that the regulatory framework for 
the Korean financial services sector has remained highly discriminatory; and that the FTA 
makes important progress towards removing discrimination against EU suppliers and that the 
agreement has also an important impact on market access.294 It underlines that costs savings 
alone, resulting from the FTA’s provisions, are expected to measure in the tens of millions of 
euros for EU financial services. Furthermore the LSE report noted that the FTA will ensure 
greater transparency and predictability of the future business environment in Korea, partly due 
to the ‘negative list’ (itemising restrictions, and deeming everything else restriction free) and 
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The (financial) services sector has seen growth ever since the provisional implementation of the 
FTA (as seen from the statistics of DG Trade).296 The 2014 Annual Report on the Implementation 
of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement describes the impact on the services sector as follows: 
‘[s]ervices trade data is produced with a severe time lag and is very aggregated, making it 
impossible to make the same kind of up-to-date and detailed comparisons as with goods. The 
comparison has thus been made for calendar year 2011, compared to 2010, i.e. the year when 
the FTA was “half implemented” compared to the calendar year before the FTA was 
provisionally applied. On this basis, EU exports of services (GATS modes 1 and 2) to Korea 
increased by 9% in 2011 compared to 2010. At the same time imports of services from Korea 
decreased by 2%, leading to an increased surplus for the EU’s trade in services.’297 The total 
trade shows a similar trend. The 2015 Annual Report describes that the EU’s trade deficit with 
Korea (€7.6 billion) turned into a trade surplus (€3.6 billion); and that the EU's share in Korea’s 
total imports increased from 9% before the FTA to 11% in the third year. Over the same period 
of time, the EU's share in total exports from Korea declined from 11% to 9%.298 
 
2.4.1.2 Institutional framework 
 
The implementation of the EU-Korea FTA is overseen by numerous specialised committees299 and 
working groups300 which focus on specific sectors or detailed aspects of the trade relations. The 
specialised committees convene on an annual basis (unless the FTA specifies another regularity 
for a specific committee) while the working groups convene on an ad hoc basis, at request of 
either party or of the Trade Committee. 
 
This Trade Committee carries the responsibility to ensure the proper operation of the FTA, to 
supervise and facilitate the implementation and application, to  supervise the specialised 
committees and working groups, and to consider ways to enhance trade relations between the 
parties.301 The Trade Committee convenes once a year.302 The Trade Committee has the power 
to dissolve, establish or change the task assigned to specialised committees and working 




296            http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/south-korea/. 
297 European Commission, 2014 Report from the Commission tot the European Parliament and the  
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299 Article 15.2 EU-Korea FTA. Notably the Committee on Trade in Services, Establishment and 
Electronic Commerce, see also next section. 
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from bringing any matter directly to the Trade Committee.304 The powers of the Trade 
Committee are specified in Article 15.1(4). The Trade Committee can make decisions that are 
binding upon the Parties.305 However, the Trade Committee shall draw up decisions and 
recommendations by agreement between the Parties.306 
 
Furthermore the relevant professional bodies in the respective territories of the parties to the 
FTA also assume an important role for the operation of the FTA. The Agreement provides that 
the Parties must encourage these bodies to jointly develop and provide recommendations on 
mutual recognition to the Trade Committee, for the purpose of the fulfilment, in whole or in 
part, by service suppliers and investors in services sectors, of the criteria applied by each Party 
for the authorisation, licensing, operation and certification of service suppliers and investors in 
services sectors and, in particular, professional services, including temporary licensing.307 
 
The institutional framework of the EU-Korea FTA furthermore encompasses the Joint 
Committee established under the EU-Korea Framework Agreement which focuses on the 
political dialogue between the EU and Korea.308 The Trade Committee must report to the Joint 
Committee about its activities, and that of the specialised committees and working groups.309 
Upon the entry into force of the FTA, the Parties must also designate coordinators in order to 
facilitate communication and ensure effective implementation of the FTA.310 
 
2.4.2 Assessment of the Regulatory Framework for the Provision of Financial 
Services and Combating Illicit Capital Flows 
 
The EU-Korea FTA contains various provisions relating to financial services. Article 7.37 defines 
a financial service as: ‘any service of a financial nature offered by a financial service supplier of a 
Party. Financial services include the following activities: (a) [i]nsurance and insurance-related 
services; and (b) [b]anking and other financial services’.311 The provision details an extensive 
list of activities which fall under the two categories.312 Furthermore, the provision defines a 
financial service supplier as ‘any natural person or juridical person of a Party that seeks to provide 
or provides financial services and does not include a public entity’ and specifies what 
constitutes a public entity for the purposes of the FTA.313 The FTA provides that each Party must 
‘to the extent practicable, ensure that internationally agreed standards for regulation and 
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305 Article 15.4(1)(2) EU-Korea FTA. 
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310 Article 15.6(1) EU-Korea FTA. 
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supervision in the financial services sector and for the fight against tax evasion and avoidance 
are implemented and applied in its territory’,314 and provides a non-exhaustive overview of 
such international standards.315 
 
The FTA establishes the Committee on Trade in Services, Establishment and Electronic 
Commerce which oversees the implementation of the FTA in matters concerning services.316 
The FTA also incorporates a clause on new financial services – defined as ‘a service of a financial 
nature, including services related to existing and new products or the manner in which a 
product is delivered, that is not supplied by any financial service supplier in the territory of a 
Party but which is supplied in the territory of the other Party’.317 In this regard, it is important 
to note that the FTA recognises that the financial service providers of one Party established in 
the territory of the other Party can provide any new financial service that the Party would allow 
to its own financial service providers under its domestic law in similar circumstances. The 
limitations to this rule are that the rule: does not ‘require a new law or modification of an 
existing law’; and that a Party can ‘determine the institutional and juridical form through which 
the service may be provided and may require authorisation for the provision of the service’.318 
 
The Committee on Trade in Services, Establishment and Electronic Commerce convened on 27 
September 2012 in Seoul, 12 June 2013 in Brussels and 16 December 2014 in Seoul.319 The 
European Commission’s reports do not elaborate the details of the Committee’s deliberations 
about financial services other than to say that the meeting in 2012 provided a useful exchange 




314 Article 7.24 EU-Korea FTA. 
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and that the meetings in 2013 and 2014 had discussed a broad range of issues in the area of 
financial services.321 
 
Foreign financial institutions in Korea constitute roughly 11% of the financial sector’s assets. 
With a 15% market share in the banking sector and a 12% market share in the insurance sector, 
the financial sector has the highest presence of foreign companies in Korea. There are 41 foreign- 
owned banks (2 subsidiaries, 39 branches) from 16 countries, making up 14% of the Korean 
banking sector. There are also 12 insurance companies’ subsidiaries from 5 countries, making 
up 10% of the Korean insurance sector.322 The EU-Korea FTA does not fully liberalise financial 
services. Those activities which are liberalised under Mode 1 (cross-border supply) are, among 
others, specific banking services such as the transfer of financial information and data 
processing, and insurance services for maritime shipping and goods in international transit.323 
Figure 1 illustrates the total export and import growth between the EU and Korea.Table 3 
 




2.4.3 Assessment of Korean Legislation on Financial Services, Money 
Laundering, and Tax Evasion and Elusion 
 
2.4.3.1 General framework 
 
Domestic rules concerning the Banking and Insurance Sectors and rules related to preventing 
and countering money laundering and tax evasion are shaped by the following acts (year of last 
amendment): the Bank of Korea Act (2012); the Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial 
 
 
321 European Commission, 2014 Report from the Commission tot the European Parliament and the  
Council: Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, 28 February  
2014, Brussels; and 2015 Report from the Commission tot the European Parliament and the Council:  
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Brussels. 
322 IMF, Financial Sector Assessment Program, Crisis Preparedness and Crisis Management Framework 
 – Technical Note, January 2015, IMF Country Report No.15/5. 
323 Y. Decreaux, The Economic Impact of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union  
and Korea, Report for the European Commission, CEPII/ATLASS, Contributors: C. Milner and 
N. Péridy Final Report, May 2010, p.29. 
 
FTA was applied provisionally and has recently entered into force. Full impact of the FTA
is yet to be observed while growth has been noted. 
Overall mismatch observed between FTA policy and implementation, especially on a
social, cultural and institutional level. 
Korean  law  is  largely  compliant  with  FATF  recommendations,  minor  legislative
adjustments and improvements are required. 
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Services Commission (2011) [FSC Establishment Act (2011)]; the Banking Act (2011); the 
Insurance Business Act (2011); the Enforcement Rules of the Insurance Business Act (2011); the 
Act for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs (2009); the Corporation Tax Act (2009); and 
the Act on Reporting and Use of Certain Financial Transaction Information (2011). Additional 
decrees enforcing these acts are: the Enforcement Decree of the Bank of Korea Act (2012); the 
Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Services Commission 
(2011) [Enforcement Decree of the FSC Establishment Act (2011)]; the Enforcement Decree of 
the Banking Act (2011); the Enforcement Decree of the Insurance Business Act (2011); the 
Enforcement Decree of the Act for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs (2009); the 
Enforcement Decree of the Corporation Tax Act (2009; and the Enforcement Decree of the Act 
on Reporting and Use of Certain Financial Transaction Information (2011). 
 
The Financial Services Commission (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FSC’) and the Financial 
Supervisory Service (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FSS’) are tasked with the duty to ‘maintain 
fairness and secure transparency’ and ‘check the autonomy of financial institutions in 
performing their affairs’.324 The FSC has responsibility over a wide range of affairs, ranging 
from policy to supervision and inspection, to authorisation and sanctions.325 The FSS has the 
responsibility to conduct the inspection of financial institutions and to supervise the sector.326 
The instruments and authority equipping the FSC and FSS in order to fulfil these tasks are 
elaborated under Chapter IV of the FSC Establishment Act. 
 
2.4.3.2 Financial services legislation 
 
As regards the implementation if Financial Services provision in the FTA, there is neither a 
single body of code implementing the provision – for the obvious reason that much of domestic 
law and institutional framework on the subject matter already existed – nor has there been any 
legislative amendment or institutional rearrangement since 2011 that was specifically for the 
purposes of implementing the FTA. Rather what occurs is that, under various specialised global 
fora, specific aspects of the financial service sector are addressed, reported, reviewed and 
incorporated for follow-up action. While Korea achieves overall high compliance levels in 
various reports on these specific aspects, no evaluation occurs of the financial sector as such, 
and none so about the implementation of the FTA provision and any matter beyond the legal- 
organisational-economic concerns (such as the social and environmental considerations). 
 
A. Banking sector 
The Bank of Korea Act defines the duties and rules of the Bank of Korea (BOK) in supervising 
and carrying out monetary and credit policies in Korea. Chapter V of the Bank of Korea Act 
describes the powers of the BOK to request materials from banking institutions and to request 
the FSC to examine banking institutions within a determined specific range.327 The ability to 
 
 
324 Articles 1 and 2 FSC Establishment Act. 
325 Article 17 FSC Establishment Act. 
326 Article 21 FSC Establishment Act. 
327 Articles 87 and 88 Bank of Korea Act. 
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inspect and the forms  of inspection by the FSS are  described in Chapter IV of the FSC 
Establishment Act328 and Chapter VII of the Banking Act.329 The Banking Act aims to ‘contribute 
to the stability of financial markets and the development of the national economy by pursuing 
the sound operation of financial institutions, enhancing efficiency of the fund brokerage 
functions, protecting depositors and maintaining the order of credit’.330 
 
It defines banking business as a business of lending funds raised by bearing debts from many 
unspecified persons through the receipt of deposits and issuance of securities and other bonds; 
and financial institutions are defined as ‘all legal persons other than the Bank of Korea regularly 
and systematically engaging in the banking business’.331 Any person desiring to be engaged in 
the banking business is subject to authorisation by the FSC.332 The authorisation involves an 
assessment of feasibility of a business project, the appropriateness of capital stock, the 
stockholders’ composition and stock subscription capital, managerial abilities and probity of 
the organisers or the management. 
 
Chapter IX of the Banking Act is devoted to domestic branches of foreign financial institutions. 
Article 58 establishes the authorisation rules applicable to a foreign operator (defined as 
‘financial institution which presently runs the banking business overseas after having been 
established pursuant to foreign Acts and subordinate statutes’333 and extended also to the 
branches and agents of a financial foreign institution334), while the cancellation of authorisation 
is addressed under Article 60 and the rules concerning closure and liquidation and domestic 
assets and capital stock under Articles 61-63. The FSC is designated as the entity responsible for 
issuing and revoking authorisation to any financial institution, including those established 
abroad, and it is also the FSC to which a foreign financial institute must file a report in advance 
of an intention to relocate or close its branch or agency, for which authorisation has been granted 
under Article 58(1). Cancellation of authorisation is possible in cases where the authorised 
entity: ceases to exist due to a merger or transfer of business operations; has been subject to 
disciplinary action due to causes such as unlawful acts or unsound business activities; or 
(temporarily) suspends business.335 The various implementation and enforcement details of the 








328 Article 62 FSC Establishment Act. 
329 Articles 44-54 Banking Act. 
330 Article 1 Banking Act. 
331 Article 2(2) Banking Act. 
332 Article 8(1) Banking Act. 
333 Article 58(1) Banking Act. 
334 Article 59(1) Banking Act. 
335 Article 60(1) Banking Act. [Translation of the text describes it cumulatively (use of “and”).] 
336 Enforcement Decree of the Banking Act (2011). 
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Core principle for effective banking supervision of the Basel Committee 
 
In its Country Report assessing compliance on the Basel Core Principle for Effective Banking 
Supervision (BCP), the IMF describes Korea’s compliance level as observed.337 While the BCP’s 
concern is much broader than countering money laundering and tax evasion and elusion, 
assessment reports about its implementation provide some information about the effectiveness 
of domestic supervision of banking activities in Korea. Recognising the strength and 
effectiveness – albeit also the complexity – of the regulatory framework, in its 2014 report the 
IMF recommends various steps in order to achieve higher standards of effective supervision. 
These steps include: 
 Expanding FSC and FSS responsibilities, objectives and powers; 
 Checks and balances in the independence, accountability for supervisors; 
 Considerations on certain definitions used for licensing criteria by the FSC; and 
 Strengthening of models used by FSC to ensure capital adequacy.338 
The IMF report also notes that the  FSC and FSS need to enhance the length of time to 
communicate the results of their supervisory activities. 
 
B. Insurance sector 
The Insurance Business Act (2011) and the Enforcement Rules of the Insurance Business Act 
(2011) govern the insurance sector. The Insurance Business Act defines an insurance business as 
‘the business of underwriting insurance, receiving premiums, paying insurance proceeds, etc. 
which arise in selling insurance products, and refers to a life insurance business, a non-life 
insurance business and a Type 3 insurance business.’339 
 
The insurance products are specifically defined in Articles 2(1) and 4(1), excluding health and 
employment insurance as prescribed by the National Health Insurance Act and Employment 
Insurance Act respectively. The FSC is designated as the authority which can licence an 
insurance business.340 A foreign insurer is defined as ‘any person incorporated under Acts and 
subordinate statutes of any country other than the Republic of Korea who runs the insurance 
business in a country other than the Republic of Korea’.341A foreign insurer is among those 
categories of persons entitles to obtain a licence for the insurance business.342 Specific licence 
requirements are established for foreign insurers under Articles 6(2) and 9(3) of the Insurance 





337IMF and the World Bank, Detailed Assessment of Compliance on the Basel Core Principles for  
Effective Banking Supervision, Financial Sector Assessment Program, IMF Country Report 
No.14/310, October 2014. 
338 Ibid. 
339 Articles 2(2) and 4(1) Insurance Business Act. 
340 Article 4(1) Insurance Business Act. 
341 Article 2(8) Insurance Business Act. 
342 Article 4(6) Insurance Business Act. 
The inclusion of financial services in EU free trade and association agreements: 
Effects on money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance 






Act.343 Further rules concerning a foreign insurer’s local office(s) in Korea are specified in Article 
12 of the Insurance Business Act. Section 4 addresses the additional rules to which the local 
branches of foreign insurers are subject, such as: the situations that may lead to revocation of 
licenses,344 obligations to hold local assets,345 representation of local branches,346 the filing of 
registration,347 the application of certain provisions of other domestic Korean legislation,348 and 
the exclusion of certain provisions of the Insurance Business Act.349 
 
Korea’s observance of the BCPs is deemed high in the Joint World Bank-IMF Financial Sector 
Assessment Program report.350 The implementation of the majority of the 26 core principles is 
qualified as observed, the highest level attainable. However, in accordance with the assessment, 
certain core principles need additional improvement. Concerning supervision (ICP2), the 
report’s recommendations suggest the enhancement of legal protection in practice and reducing 
the risk of politicisation of the leadership positions (in the FSS and FSC). The core principles 
concerning risk management and internal controls (ICP8) are deemed as largely observed. However, 
no specific recommendations are suggested. It is expected that observance will be fully achieved 
as industry capacity improves and internalises the risk management approaches throughout 
the business operations.351 
 
The core principles on supervisory cooperation and coordination (ICP25) and cross-border cooperation 
and coordination on crisis management (ICP26) require additional improvement, especially on the 
level of deepening engagement in cooperation activities with groups by exploring exchange of 
understanding of supervisory issues at operational levels and contingency planning and by 
exploring exchange of understanding.352 One subject on which Korea received lower scores – at 
the level of ‘partly observed’ – is the core principle on group-wide supervision (ICP23). On this 
matter, the IMF’s recommendation is that Korea should advance supervisory college 
considerations with respect to larger groups that are internationalising, and that the FSS should 
request participation in colleges for foreign insurers utilising their international network to 
minimise costs and to consider strengthening the voluntary nature of the laws on financial 





343 Articles 6(2) and 9(3) Insurance Business Act. 
344 Article 74 Insurance Business Act. 
345  Article 75 Insurance Business Act and Article 25-2 Enforcement Rules of the Insurance 
Business Act. 
346 Article 76 Insurance Business Act. 
347 Article 78 Insurance Business Act. 
348 Articles 79, 80 and 80-2 Insurance Business Act. 
349 Article 82 Insurance Business Act. 
350 IMF and the World Bank, Insurance Core Principles: Detailed Assessment of Observance, Financial 
Sector Assessment Program, Republic of Korea, May 2014. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ibid. 
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2.4.3.3 Anti-money laundering legislation 
 
A. Substantive safeguards 
Domestic rules on AML are established in the Act on Reporting and Use of Certain Financial 
Transaction Information (2014) [FTRUA] and the Enforcement Decree of the Act on Reporting 
and Use of Certain Financial Transaction Information (2011) [EDFTRUA]. The purpose of the 
FTRUA is to ‘provide for matters concerning reporting on, and the use of specific financial 
transaction information  necessary for regulating money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism using financial transactions, such as foreign exchange transactions, so as to prevent 
crimes and furthermore contribute to laying the foundation for facilitating sound and 
transparent financial transactions’.353 It defines money laundering as, inter alia, (a) crimes under 
Article 3 of the Gains from Crimes Regulation Act; (c) hiding the acquisition or disposition of 
assets, or the causes of accrual thereof or concealing the assets, with the intention to commit a 
crime under Article 3 of the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act, Article 270 of the Customs Act, or 
Article 8 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes.354 
 
Article 2(1) of the Act provides an exhaustive list of the financial institutions which carry an 
obligation to report while Article 2(2)(a) allows the inclusion of other entities, not yet defined, 
to be included by presidential decree. The EDFTRUA establishes that the financial institutions 
may verify the authenticity of information from documents, information or other reliable 
sources when they have doubts about the veracity of customer data.355 
 
The 2014 FATF Korea Report has examined and addresses several inadequacies found by the 
FATF. One concern was the discretion that financial institutions enjoyed in Customer Due 
Diligence (CDD).356 Article 24(2) of the AML/CFT Regulation requires financial institutions to 
undertake CDD when there are suspicions that the existing customer information may be 
incorrect. The threshold for suspicious transactions that must be reported is set at $10,000.357 
This threshold for Suspicious Transaction Reports (STR) was lowered before. On that occasion, 
the FATF already expressed concern that lowering the STR threshold would significantly 
undermine the STR reporting obligation.358 Furthermore, Article 10-2(3) EDFTRUA provides 
that these financial institutions ‘may’ verify the authenticity of information.359 The FATF reports 




353 Article 1 FTRUA. 
354 Article 3 FTRUA. 
355 Article 10(2)(3) EDFTRUA. 
356 Under Korea’s Anti Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) 
Regulation. 
357 Article 6 EDFTRUA. 
358 FATF and APG, Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing  
of Terrorism – Korea, June 2009, p. 124. 
359 FATF, 8th Follow-up Report: Mutual Evaluation of Korea, June 2014. 
360 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Moreover, the period in which financial institutions are expected to find linked extensions has 
been increased from a twenty-four hour period to seven days in order to provide sufficient time 
to identify structured transactions intended to avoid the threshold for occasional transactions.361 
Korea has also amended the AML/CFT Regulation to require financial institutions to check the 
authority of natural persons acting for legal persons362 and obtain the name of the legal person, 
its identification number and address, and to check the existence of the legal person through 
the corporate registry or other sources.363 
 
The FATF report identified deficiencies and needs for improvements in the provisions 
concerning CDD. On this subject, the FATF observes that Korea has addressed include, inter 
alia: the need to require financial institutions to review existing documentation data and 
information on a regular basis;364 the need to prohibit financial institutions from opening 
accounts, commencing business relations or performing transactions when they are unable to 
perform effective CDD for a new customer;365 the need to require financial institutions to file a 
suspicious transaction report when they are unable to complete the CDD;366 the need to include 
internal controls to mitigate the risk posed by transactions undertaken before the completion of 
the CDD process;367 and the need to introduce a rule expressly requiring CDD to be applied to 
pre-existing customers (before the 2008 amendment of the FTRUA).368 The FATF observes the 
following CDD concerns that need to be (fully) addressed: the inclusion of the termination of 
existing business relations; the consideration of whether to file a suspicious transaction report 
when the pre-existing customer is unable to complete the CDD process;369 and the inclusion of 
a formal assessment which can justify the exclusion of small financial institutions.370 
 
B. Institutional safeguards 
The Korea Financial Intelligence Unit is founded under the FTRUA, inter alia, to supervise and 
inspect the business tasks carried out by financial institutions. Financial institutions carry the 
obligation to immediately report transactions presumed illegal to the Korea Financial 
Intelligence Unit. The FTRUA also has a specific clause on the notification of Data of Foreign 
Exchange Transactions which are subject to approval or reporting under Article 17 of the 
Foreign Exchange Transactions Act (FETA) and notification under Article 21 of the FETA.371 
Article 8 of the FTRUA establishes the framework within which the Korea Financial Intelligence 
 
 
361 Article 23(2) AML/CFT Regulation. 
362 Article 38(3) AML/CFT Regulation. 
363 Articles 38(2) and 38(4) AML/CFT Regulation. 
364 Article 34(2)(ii) AML/CFT Regulation. 
365 Article 44(1) AML/CFT Regulation, Article 5-2(4) FTRUA. 
366 Article 5-2(5) FTRUA. 
367 Article 10-5 EDFTRUA. 
368 Article 25 AML/CFT Regulation. 
369 Article 33 AML/CFT Regulation. 
370 FATF, 8th Follow-up Report: Mutual Evaluation of Korea, June 2014, p. 13. 
371 Article 6 FTRUA. 
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Unit may exchange information and cooperate with foreign countries. Korea has been a member 
of FATF since 2009 and a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) that 
falls under FATF auspices. 
 
As regards AML, the FATF provides data on Korea’s valuable commitments and efforts. It is to 
be noted, however, that the FATF examines the risks of money laundering and its mitigation in 
the context of countering terrorism financing. While the FATF reports do not provide 
information about any correlation between FTAs and money laundering, they do provide 
information about the legislative and institutional efforts of its Member States to mitigate 
money laundering. Initially the FATF reported that the FIU lacked sufficient human resources 
for effective analysis for the large volumes of STRs, and that other authorities – other than the 
FSC and FSS – lacked sufficient resources to supervise AML (see also Table 3 for statistics on 
STR analysis and dissemination).372 
 
 
Table 3 Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) Analysis and Dissemination 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number of STRs analysed 13,053 19,012 16,494 21,376 25,030 
Number of STRs disseminated 7,711 11,868 13,110 22,173 29,703 
Source: 8th Follow-up Report: Mutual Evaluation of Korea, FATF, June 2014, p. 16. 
 
Also in a previous report dating from 2014, the FATF observed that the sanctions imposed by 
Korea on legal persons convicted of money laundering are insufficiently effective and not 
dissuasive or proportionate and those imposed on natural persons not effectively 
implemented.373 On this matter, Korea has provided statistics about the number of 
investigations, indictments and convictions between 2007 and 2013 to demonstrate the 
improvement of its commitment. The figures show a clear trend of an increase in all three levels 
of law enforcement.374 There is, however, no qualitative information about the nature, context, 
impact, and consequences of these proceedings and convictions except the fact that they relate 
to money laundering. Moreover the statistics are not retrieved in a centralised, systematically 
prepared manner which distorts the consistency of the data. The FATF recommends centralising 
the information system for supervision and examination.375 It is important to note that AML 
regulations are not applied to any Designated Non-Financial Business Professions (DNFBPs) – 
i.e. business venues that are attractive for criminals – other than casinos.376 The situation on this 
matter remains unchanged. Given the diversity of the financial services market in Korea, this 
 
 
372 FATF and APG, Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing  
of Terrorism – Korea, June 2009, p. 153. 
373 FATF, 8th Follow-up Report: Mutual Evaluation of Korea, June 2014, p. 23. 
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375 Ibid., p. 33. 
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may  warrant  further  scrutiny.  Finally  the  FATF  also  reports  on  Korea’s  international 
cooperation in the field of AML and law enforcement. Korea has (at the time of the report) 29 
mutual legal assistance treaties. Furthermore, the report indicates that Korea is also willing to 
assist on the basis of reciprocity in situations where a mutual legal assistance treaty is absent.377 
 
Table 4 Number of money laundering investigations, indictments and convictions 
since 2007 
 









Cases 120 130 138 153 249 248 350 
Persons 254 208 240 280 607 430 605 
Cases 71 86 78 80 126 109 248 
Persons 99 114 97 114 152 134 351 
Cases 55 76 75 62 84 79 141 
Persons 67 99 73 87 107 98 173 
Source: 8th Follow-up Report: Mutual Evaluation of Korea, FATF, June 2014, p. 16. 
 
 
2.4.3.4 Tax evasion legislation 
 
Korea’s corporate tax regime is embodied by the Corporation Tax Act and the Enforcement 
Decree of the Corporation Tax Act. The Foreign Investment Promotion Act aims to provide a 
one-stop service, and various benefits and tax incentives to attract foreign direct investment, 
while the Act for the Coordination of International Tax Affairs (ACITA) and the aforementioned 
Act’s Enforcement Decree govern the taxation matters of an international dimension. Chapter 
IV of the Enforcement Decree specifies the corporation tax for each business year applicable for 





Korea is a State Party to the Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters of the 
OECD, the OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matter, a member 
to the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, and 
supports the Statement on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes of the 
G20. The Korean National Tax Service (KNTS) is tasked with directing and conducting 
investigations (Model 1, OECD). The regional taxation bureaus of the KNTS have criminal 
investigation departments which may submit investigation cases to the public prosecutor. Since 
2013, Korean tax authorities have access to STRs for civil purposes. While prior to 2013 the FIU 




377 FATF and APG, Mutual Evaluation Report: Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing  
of Terrorism – Korea, June 2009, pp. 184-185. 
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share STR information for the purposes of selecting and conducting tax audits and collecting 
tax debts. For this reason the OECD reports that Korea proves an interesting case study about 
the benefits of FIUs sharing STRs with tax administration. Korea reported to the OECD that in 
2013 an additional 367 billion Korean Won (ex ante, approximately $337 million) was assessed 
as a result of, or facilitated by, STR information.378  Furthermore, the OECD notes that Korea 
reports a record amount of tax assessment for the first quarter of 2014 as a result of the use of 
STR and CTR information for civil purposes. 
 
2.4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Due to the fact that the EU-Korea FTA only recently entered into force and the fact that it 
liberalises the market gradually, it is premature to provide any conclusive assessment or 
recommendations regarding the full impact of the FTA has yet to materialise. As Wróbel 
concludes, after exploring the various expected effects, ‘it should be stressed that the actual 
effects of the EU-Korea trade agreement will not be evident until successive stages in the 
reduction of trade barriers are implemented’.379 
 
In 2011 when the Parties and interested organisations convened at the Conference on the 
Implementation of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, the report of this conference referred 
to some of the expectations and challenges.380 Back then, no challenges surrounding FTA-related 
money laundering and tax evasion were reported. Nevertheless, interestingly, the report did 
note that the banking sector should benefit from the FTA ‘quite significantly’. In contrast to this 
expectation, the sources examined so far do not provide detailed information about the impact 
of the FTA for the financial services sector, let alone any significant impact. Thus, there is a 
discrepancy between the initial high expectations of the FTA’s impact for the banking sector 
and the limited amount of detail in the reports concerning the FTA’s impact on financial 
services. 
 
Given that 2016 is the year in which liberalisation is to be expanded, prudence seems necessary 
in examining the compatibility of Korea’s domestic law with the standards set out in the 
provisions of the FTA. Cherry makes an observation that globalisation in Korea produced a 
mismatch between policy and implementation. She states that this mismatch is caused by ‘soft’ 
social, cultural and institutional barriers, which in turn leads to the lack of predictability, 
consistency and transparency in the regulatory environment.381 Furthermore, she states that this 




378 OECD, Improving Co-operation between Tax and Anti-Money Laundering Authorities: Access by  
Tax Administrations to Information held by Financial Intelligence Units for criminal and Civil Purposes, 
September 2015, p. 14. 
379 A. Wróbel, The EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement, Stosunki Miedzynarodowe - International 
Relations, Issue 1 (45), 2012, p. 258. 
380          http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/november/tradoc_148383.pdf. 
381 J. Cherry, ‘Upgrading the ‘Software’: The EU–Korea Free Trade Agreement and Sociocultural  
Barriers to Trade and Investment’, The Pacific Review, Vol. 25, No. 2, May 2012, pp. 248 and 252. 
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unwillingness to increase transparency and that the EU-Korea FTA will not resolve these issues 
unless changes occur that are initiated from within Korean society.382 On this issue, Cherry 
states about Korea’s rationale that: ‘[t]he decision to pursue a range of FTAs with developing 
and developed countries was a key element of the Korean government’s ongoing commitment 
to achieving a greater degree of integration into the global economy. However, the ability of the 
government and its agencies to implement that policy – Korea’s “institutional capacity” – was 
constrained both by concerns that it would be perceived as favouring foreign firms over 
domestic interests and the awareness of the lingering fear of foreign domination and economic 
control. Thus, expressions of economic nationalism and anti-foreign capital sentiment could 
hinder the implementation of the policy by undermining the government’s efforts to create a 
business-friendly environment for foreign traders and investors.’383 While this critical view may 
be too general, it points to the dangers of overburdening governments with some of the text- 
based rules which may be disconnected from actual practice. 
 
Nonetheless, an extensive review of the domestic Korean law is ongoing in the field of AML 
regulation and banking regulations, as observed in the FATF and BCP reports. While these 
reports do demonstrate Korea’s commitment to countering money laundering and tax evasion 
and elusion, they do not identify the particular motivation of this commitment. No information 
is available that identifies particular action by Korea as a result of or in relation to the financial 
services provisions of the EU-Korea FTA. More detailed information concerning FATF statistics 
about Korea’s number of investigations, indictments and convictions in relation to money 
laundering would facilitate an increased understanding of the practices and effectiveness of 
Korean law enforcement against money laundering. Moreover a comparative examination of 
legislation and practice by EU28, on the one hand, and Korea, on the other hand, seems missing. 
This may be warranted as coordinated and concerted actions may be necessary in the context 
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2.5 EU-Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement 
 
2.5.1 Trade context 
 
2.5.1.1 Bilateral trade relations and parties 
 




Trade relations between the European Union and the Andean Community, a customs union 
comprising of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru,384 rose from €9.1 billion in 2000 to €15.8 
billion in 2007, representing an average annual growth rate of 8.25%. After the USA, the EU was 
the largest trade partner for the Andean countries, accounting for 14.2% of total trade in 2007. 
Conversely, trade with Andean countries accounted for 0.6% of EU total trade, i.e. some € 10 
billion in 2007. Trade between the EU and Colombia accounted for 50% of the total trade with 
the Andean countries, while trade with Peru accounted for 27%, with Ecuador for 19% and with 




384 The trade bloc was called the Andean Pact until 1996 and came into existence when the 
Cartagena Agreement was signed in 1969. Its headquarters are in Lima, Peru. Originally, Chile 
was also a party, but it withdrew in 1976. In the meantime, Venezuela had joined in 1973, but 
withdrew later on. In Spanish the organisation is called Comunidad Andina, CAN. The website 
of Andean is 
http://www.comunidadandina.org. 
385 Development Solutions, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and Institute for 
Development Policy and Management, School of Environment and Development, University of 
Manchester, EU-Andean Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment, Final report, 2009, p. 9. It can be 
noted that this Trade Sustainable Impact Assessment (Trade SIA), prepared by independent 
consultants, should have guided EU negotiators. As the report was finalised by October 2009, a 
reaction from the side of the Commission in the form of a so-called position paper was issued 
 
 The Colombia/Peru FTA encompasses the far-reaching liberalisation of current 
account transfers, rather than limiting the liberalisation to financial transfers related 
to trade, loans and investments as the EU- Korea agreement does. Given the 
challenges in the two countries, a more prudent approach to liberalisation and/or 
more safeguards or measures aimed at cooperating between the parties to the FTA on 
fighting money laundering and tax evasion seem necessary. 
 The provision allowing for non-disclosure of information relating to the affairs and 
accounts of individual customers may not contribute to the fight against tax evasion. 
 The FTA contains weak worded provisions in which parties ‘take note’ of international 
information exchange and transparency mechanisms, and make their ‘best 
endeavours to ensure’ that international AML standards are implemented. 
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€28.8 billion, representing a share of 0.9% of total EU trade. At the same time, the EU is now the 
third largest trading partner for the Andean countries, after the USA and China. The Andean 
countries export predominantly primary products to the EU.386 The EU exports consist mostly 
of manufactured goods.387 
 
In 2004, it was agreed to strive for a region-to-region association agreement between the EU and 
the Andean Community. Negotiations started in April 2007, but were suspended in June 2008 
after disagreement about approaches to a number of key trade issues. Bolivia decided to 
withdraw in September 2008, after which negotiations resumed with the remaining three 
Andean countries. Later on, Ecuador also withdrew and negotiations were concluded with Peru 
and Colombia in 2010. The agreement with the latter two countries was signed in June 2012 
under the name Trade Agreement,388 encompassing a free trade area in conformity with Article 
XXIV of GATT 1994 and Article V of GATS.389 It has been provisionally applied with Peru since 
1 March 2013 and with Colombia since 1 August 2013. In July 2014, negotiations were concluded 
for the accession of Ecuador to the agreement. After ratification by all parties this extension of 
the agreement will take effect. Bolivia might still join the trade agreement at a later moment in 
time. 
 
In December 2012, an NGO published a report that claimed the EU-Colombia/Peru Trade 
Agreement is lagging behind other EU trade agreements in which stronger commitment to 
cooperation and implementation of actions against money laundering, crime and tax evasion or 
avoidance are incorporated.390 This was described as a cause of grave concern, considering the 
fact that the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that the flow of Andean 
cultivated drugs generates $9.9 billion in gross transit profits. The Greens in European 
Parliament  were  against  the  agreement  as  well,  inter  alia,  they  strongly  opposed  the 
 
 
only in November 2010. This Trade SIA position paper was thus presented after the negotiations 
of the Multiparty Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru had already been concluded. As it 
thus could not fulfill its actual purpose any more, instead it focused on explaining how the 
Trade SIA recommendations were taken into account in the Agreement. 
386 Agricultural products (40.5%), fuels and mining products (52.3%). 
387 Notably machinery and transport equipment (48%), and chemical products (19.1%). Source: 
European Commission, Trade in goods with Andean community, 20 October 2015. 
388 'Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, a nd  
Colombia and Peru, of the other part', [2012] OJ L 354/3. The text of the Trade Agreement is 
also available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=691. 
389 Article 3 Trade Agreement. 
390 M. Vander Stichele, Free Trade Agreement EU– Colombia & Peru: Deregulation, Illicit Financial  
Flows And Money Laundering, Commissioned by  GUE/NGL Group  (German Delegation), 
Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen (SOMO), Amsterdam, 2012. The report 
was commissioned after a publication by the organisation Global Financial Integrity on the 
increased illicit flows between the USA and Mexico after NAFTA had entered into force (Mexico: 
Illicit Financial Flows, Macro-economic Imbalances and the Underground Economy, 2011). The latter 
report claims that illicit money flow in Mexico has soared up to $50 billion a year. 
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deregulation of the finance sector as foreseen under the agreement as increasing risky products 
without provisions on stronger oversight or capital controls is felt to encourage money 
laundering.391 Before signing up to the EU Trade Agreement, Peru had also concluded trade 
agreements with the USA and with China. Colombia likewise concluded an agreement with the 
USA, known as the U.S.–Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA).392 Recently, it was 
stressed that the lack of coordination between Chinese and Latin American regulators and 
authorities meant that financial infrastructure can be exploited by money launderers.393 In 
Colombia, it was estimated by UAIF that in 2012 some $10 billion was laundered.394 
 
The European Parliament managed to get additional instruments drafted before it agreed with 
the Trade Agreement. The roadmap drafted by Colombia was described by the European 
Commission as a ‘useful instrument in furthering the protection of human rights, labour rights, 
and the environment’. Asked what it intended to do against human rights violations, it added 
that while the responsibility for implementing the roadmap lies with Colombia, ‘the 
Commission and the HR/VP stand ready to support their implementation, alongside the 
European Parliament, through the mechanisms established in the context of our bilateral 
relations, including through the Trade Agreement’.395 
 
2.5.1.2 Institutional framework of the EU-Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement 
 
The Trade Agreement encompasses the establishment of a general body and an extensive 
number of specialised bodies that are to ensure that the agreement fulfils its objectives.396 First, 
a Trade Committee was established, comprising representatives of the EU and representatives 
 
 
391 The Greens in the European Parliament, EU Free Trade Agreement. Proposed Roadmap Fails To  
Resolve Human Rights Issues With Colombia And Peru Trade Deal, Press Release of 11 December 
2012. 
392 See https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text. 
Also see P. de Micco, The US And EU Free Trade  Agreements With Peru And Colombia: A 
Comparison, In-depth analysis for the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade, 
Brussels, 2014. 
393 A. Daugherty, 'Colombians Charged in Massive China-based Money Laundering Scheme', 
InSight Crime, 11 September 2015. 
394 As explained by M. Vander Stichele, Schriftelijke verklaring voor expertmeeting ‘Hoe de 
vrijhandelsovereenkomst tussen de EU en Colombia en Peru bijdraagt aan financiële 
deregulering, illegale geldstromen en het witwassen van geld’ (Written statement for expert 
meeting ‘How the free trade agreement between the EU and Colombia and Peru contributes to 
financial deregulation, illegal financial flows and money laundering’), 30 May 2013, p. 2. 
Unidad de Información y Análisis Financiero (UIAF) is Colombia’s financial and economic 
intelligence unit; see www.uiaf.gov.co for further information. 
395 'Answer to MEP questions on the Free Trade Agreement with Colombia and Peru given by 
High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission', 11 February 2014, 
OJ C 231, 17/07/2014. 
396 Articles 12-16 TA. 
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of each signatory Andean Country, and this Committee meets at least once a year at the level of 
Ministers or the representatives that the Ministers designate. In addition, the Trade Committee 
may meet at any time at the level of senior officials designated to take the necessary decisions. 
Inter alia, the Trade Committee is to: supervise and facilitate the operation of the Agreement and 
the correct application of its provisions, and consider other ways to attain its general objectives; 
evaluate the results obtained from the application of the Trade Agreement; supervise the work 
of all specialised bodies established under this agreement and recommend any necessary action; 
evaluate and adopt decisions as envisaged in the agreement regarding any subject matter which 
is referred to it by the specialised bodies; and supervise the further development of the Trade 
Agreement.397 Its decisions are to be adopted by consensus and are binding upon the Parties.398 
 
Several specialised bodies are mentioned in the Trade Agreement, notably the Sub-committees 
on Market Access, on Technical Obstacles to Trade and on Customs, Trade Facilitation and 
Rules of Origin. These bodies consist of representatives of the EU Party, and representatives of 
each signatory Andean Country. Their scope of competence and duties are defined in the 
relevant titles of the Trade Agreement. Further sub-committees, working groups or any other 
specialised bodies may be established by the Trade Committee in order to assist it in the 
performance of its tasks.399 
 
Colombia and Peru are not members of FATF, nor do they have observer status. Like Mexico, 
they are full members of GAFILAT (formerly GAFISUD), a regional FATF style organisation.400 
GAFILAT supports its members in the implementation of the 40 FATF Recommendations as 
national legislation and the creation of a regional prevention system against money laundering 
and terrorist financing. The two main GAFILAT tools are training measures and mutual 
evaluations. The last (3rd round) GAFILAT mutual evaluations of Colombia and Peru are from 
2008.401 After the evaluation reports were approved, it was determined that the follow up 
process for the two countries would be to check the progress made in order to overcome the 
deficiencies identified in the report. The countries had to submit an action plan with concrete 









397 Articles 12 and 13 TA. 
398 Article 14 TA. 
399 Article 15 TA. 
400 Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (GAFILAT) is a regionally based inter- 
governmental organisation that gathers 16 countries in order to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing by means of a commitment for continuous improvement of the national 
policies against both scourges, and the enhancement of different cooperation mechanisms 
among its member countries. 
401 The last mutual evaluation of Mexico also stems from 2008. 
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Follow up-reports for the two countries were issued in 2009.402 For Peru, a 3rd follow-up report 
was also issued.403 Further information on the procedures for legal cooperation on money 
laundering in Peru was published in July 2015.404 In December 2009, GAFILAT and the EU 
signed an agreement on a project known as ‘Support to the fight against money laundering in 
the Latin America and the Caribbean countries’, details of which are set out in Annex 3 to this 
report. 
 
2.5.2 Assessment of the Regulatory Framework for the provision of Financial 
Services and Combating Illicit Financial Flows 
 
2.5.2.1 Financial services 
 
The objectives of the Trade Agreement include: the progressive liberalisation of trade in 
services, in conformity with Article V of the GATS; the development of an environment 
conducive to an increase in investment flows and, in particular, to the improvement of the 
conditions of establishment between the Parties on the basis of the principle of non- 
discrimination; and to facilitate trade and investment among the Parties through the 
liberalisation of current payments and capital movements related to direct investment.405 As the 
Trade Agreement has only been provisionally applied since March 2013 (Peru) and August 2013 
(Colombia), the effects of the provisions on services are still hard to evaluate, particularly due 
to a lack of data.406 Where possible, some remarks on the apparent strengths or weaknesses of 
the provisions of the agreement will be made, though, notably, by comparing the provisions 
with those in the other agreements investigated in this report. 
 
Title IV of the TA deals with trade in services, establishment and electronic commerce.407 Title 
V deals with current payments and the movement of capital.408 Title IV starts with general 
provisions. ‘Services’ includes any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise 




402 Secretaría Ejecutiva GAFISUD, II Informe de Avance de la Evaluación Mutua de Colombia/Perú. 
Seguimiento Intensificado, http://www.gafilat.org/UserFiles/documentos/en/informe_   







405 Article 4 sub c, d and e TA. 
406 European Commission, Second Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU-Colombia/Peru 
Trade Agreement, COM(2016)58, at p. 6. 
407 Articles 107-167 TA. 
408 Articles 168-171 TA. 
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competition with one or more service suppliers.409 It is stressed that, subject to the provisions of 
this Title, each Party retains the right to exercise its powers and to regulate and introduce new 
regulations in order to meet legitimate public policy objectives.410 
 
Financial services are defined as ‘any service of a financial nature offered by a financial service 
supplier of a Party. Financial services include all insurance and insurance-related services, and 
all banking and other financial services (excluding insurance)’ followed by a list of activities.411 
 
2.5.2.2 Right of establishment 
 
The right of establishment is regulated by Chapter 2 of Title IV.412 This Chapter applies to 
measures of the Parties affecting the cross-border supply of all services sectors with some 
exceptions, such as audio-visual services and air transport services.413 
 
With respect to market access through establishment, the Trade Agreement prescribes that each 
Party shall provide treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the specific 
commitments contained in Annex VII (List of Commitments on Establishment) to 
establishments and investors of another Party. In sectors where market access commitments are 
undertaken, a Party shall not maintain or adopt, unless otherwise specified in Annex VII (List 
of Commitments on Establishment), limitations: (a) on the number of establishments; (b) on the 
total value of transactions or assets or on the total number of operations; (c) on the total quantity 
of output; (d) on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular 
economic activity; (e) on the participation of foreign capital in terms of a maximum percentage 
limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment; 
and (f) measures which restrict or require specific types of establishment (subsidiary, branch, 
representative office) or joint ventures through which an investor of another Party may perform 
an economic activity.414 Parties are to grant establishments and investors from the other parties’ 
treatment no less favourable than that they give to their own like establishments and 
investors.415 
 
2.5.2.3 Cross-border supply of services 
 
Market access through the cross-border supply of services is regulated in Chapter 3 of Title IV.416 
Each Party to the Trade Agreement shall accord services and service suppliers of another Party 
treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the specific commitments listed in Annex 
 
 
409 Article 108 TA. 
410 Article 107(5) TA. 
411 Article 152 TA. 
412 Articles 110-116 TA. 
413 Article 111 TA. 
414 Article 112 TA. 
415 Article 113 TA. 
416 Articles 117-121 TA. 
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VIII (List of Commitments on Cross-Border Supply of Services). In sectors where market access 
commitments are undertaken, Parties shall not maintain or adopt, unless otherwise specified in 
Annex VIII, limitations on: (a) the number of services suppliers; (b) the total value of service 
transactions or assets; and (c) the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of 
service output.417 
 
In the sectors where market access commitments are listed in Annex VIII, and subject to any 
conditions and qualifications set out therein, Colombia and Peru shall grant to EU services and 
service suppliers, with respect to all measures affecting the cross-border supply of services, 
treatment no less favourable than that they accord to their own like services and service 
suppliers. The same holds true for the EU where Colombian or Peruvian services and service 
suppliers are concerned.418 
 
Parties are not to apply licensing and qualification requirements, procedures and technical 
standards that nullify or impair their specific commitments in a manner which: (a) does not 
comply with certain GATS criteria;419 and (b) could not reasonably have been expected of that 
Party at the time the specific commitments were made. In determining whether a Party is in 
conformity with its obligations under these obligations, the international standards of relevant 
international organisations420 applied by that Party shall be taken into account. A recent KPMG 
report, it shows that in the case of Peru the current government is ensuring that the rights of 
foreign companies are well secured in these and other aspects.421 A 2010 report from the same 
organisation was positive about the rights of foreign investors in Colombia as well.422 
 
Current payments and movement of capital are dealt with in Title V of the Trade Agreement.423 The 
Parties are obliged to authorise, in freely convertible currency,424 any payments and transfers 
on the current account of balance of payments between the Parties.425 Parties are also to ensure 
free movement of capital relating to direct investments and relating to investments and other 
transactions made in accordance with the provisions of Title IV (trade in services, establishment 







417 Article 119 TA. 
418 Article 120 TA. 
419 Namely Article VI:4 (a), (b), (c) GATS. 
420 A footnote in the TA explains that this refers to international bodies whose membership is 
open to the relevant bodies of the Parties. 
421 KPMG, Investment in Peru, 2015. 
422 KPMG, Doing Business in Colombia, 2010. 
423 Articles 168-171 TA. 
424 And in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. 
425 Article 168 TA. 
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of any profit stemming therefrom.426 It has been noted that in other EU trade agreements, no 
such far reaching liberalisation of current account transfers was incorporated.427 For instance, 
in the EU-Korea agreement, the liberalisation only applies to financial transfers related to trade, 
loans and investments.428 
 
The signatory countries are allowed to take safeguard measures in case of serious difficulties 
for the operation of exchange rate policy or monetary policy.429 The final provisions of Title V 
stress that with the aim of supporting a stable and secure framework for long-term investment, 
the Parties shall consult with a view to facilitating the movement of capital between them, in 




The Trade Agreement contains several general provisions on taxation. Notably, each of the 
signatory countries is to implement and enforce measures that aim at collecting direct taxes and 
at preventing tax avoidance or evasion. These measures may distinguish between residents and 
those whose residence or capital is abroad.431 
 
As part of the provisions which are specific for the financial sector (covering banks, hedge 
funds, trusts, etc.), one provision stipulates that no signatory country is required neither to 
disclose information relating to the affairs and accounts of individual customers nor of any 
confidential proprietary information in the possession of public authorities.432 Such a clause 
does not seem to support actions to tackle tax evasion and avoidance for which (automatic) 
information exchange across borders is essential. It also seems to run counter to what is 
recommended in several of the international standards for regulation and supervision in the 
financial services sector that the parties promised to implement and apply (see below). 
 
The signatory countries are merely asked to ‘take note’ of the Ten Principles for Information 
Sharing issued by the G-7 Ministers of Finance and the Agreement on Exchange of Information 
on Tax Matters of the OECD, and of the Statement on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes of the G20.433 This is even weaker than a best endeavour clause 
 
 
426 Article 169 TA. The provision explains in a footnote that “direct investment” does not mean 
credits related to foreign trade, portfolio investment according to domestic legislation, public 
debt and related credit. 
427 M. Vander Stichele, Free Trade Agreement EU– Colombia & Peru: Deregulation, Illicit Financial  
Flows And Money Laundering, Commissioned by  GUE/NGL Group  (German Delegation), 
Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen (SOMO), Amsterdam, 2012, p. 8. 
428 Article 8.2 EU- Korea FTA. 
429 Article 170 TA. 
430 Article 171 TA. 
431 Notably article 296 TA. 
432 Article 154 TA. 
433 Article 155(5) TA. 
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like the one included in the EU- Korea Agreement.434 Both Colombia and Peru are members of 
the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, just like 
Mexico and South Africa (of the countries investigated in this study, only Serbia is not a 
member). As will be explained below, Peru recently joined and thus, no peer reviews are 
available yet for this country. As for Colombia, it was judged to be compliant with the 
internationally agreed standards of transparency and exchange of information in the tax area. 
A new standard on the automatic exchange of financial account information will be 
implemented by Colombia in 2017. The same holds true for 27 of the EU Member States (Austria 
will follow in 2018), Korea, Mexico and South Africa. 
 
The definition of ‘establishment’ explains that it means any type of business or professional 
establishment. This ‘includes the establishment in any productive economic activity, whether 
industrial or commercial, relating to the production of goods or supply of services’.435 ‘Service 
supplier’ is defined as any natural or juridical person that ‘seeks to supply and supplies a 
service’, but a ‘juridical person’ needs to have a real and continuous link with the host 
country.436 It has been noted that these definitions provide for some, but not full, guarantees 
that companies that establish themselves or operate in any of the signatory countries undertake 
real economic activities and not only transfer money or evade or avoid taxes. However, it is not 
certain whether the (ultimate) owners of foreign companies are known and can be easily 
traced.437 It can be noted that inside the EU, the newly adopted Directive against Money 
Laundering438 will oblige EU Member States to set up a central registry of beneficial owners of 
corporate and other legal entities incorporated within their territory by 26 June 2017 at the 
latest.439 Only a handful of other countries around the world have similar legislation in place.440 
 
Colombia and Peru both allow for the establishment and cross-border supply of tax advisory 
services from EU countries.441 Given the essential role of some tax advisory companies in 
designing and providing tax evasion and avoidance mechanisms, it has been stressed that 






434 Article 7.24 EU-Korea FTA. 
435 Article 110, footnote 19 TA. 
436 Article 108 TA. 
437 SOMO, 2012, p. 13. M. Vander Stichele, Free Trade Agreement EU– Colombia & Peru:  
Deregulation, Illicit Financial Flows And Money Laundering, Commissioned by GUE/NGL Group 
(German Delegation), Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen (SOMO), 
Amsterdam, 2012, p. 13. 
438  ‘Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the  
Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing’, OJ L 141 of 5.6.2015, p. 73. 
439 Article 30 Directive (EU) 2015/849. The UK already has such a system in place. 
440 Notably Norway, see http://www.access-info.org/frontpage/16968. 
441 Article 126(2) sub c and d TA. 
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from advising on tax dodging might increase tax evasion.442 For instance, it does not reduce the 
risks of tax advisers or clients in the EU to link up with tax advisers from Colombia and Peru, 
which could stimulate (new ways of) tax avoidance and evasion. 
 
2.5.2.5 Money laundering 
 
As explained above, the Trade Agreement deals with financial services in Chapter 5 section 5. 
One provision in this section deals specifically with money laundering.443 This provision 
demands that parties make their ‘best endeavours to ensure’ that international standards for 
regulation and supervision in the financial services sector and for the fight against money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism are implemented and applied in its territory.444 
 
If we compare this provision with similar ones in other EU FTAs, it can be noted that stricter 
formulations are used. In the EU-Korea FTA for instance, it is stated that ‘[e]ach party shall, to 
the extent practicable, ensure that internationally agreed standards (…) are implemented and 
applied in its territory’. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that: 
 Articles 167 and 170, 295, 297 of the FTA allow the signatory countries to take safeguard 
measures that could be useful for the prevention or halting of illicit financial flows; and 
 According to Article 154, countries may adopt measures and laws regarding financial 
services and capital flows for prudential reasons, such as for ensuring the integrity and 
stability of the financial system and protecting investors and clients of financial service 
suppliers. This could mean that measures regarding money laundering could be 
allowed to protect the integrity of the financial sector. These ‘prudential carve-out’ 
measures are not allowed to be ‘more burdensome than necessary to achieve their aim’. 
Also, these rules do not allow for discrimination between domestic financial services 
and their suppliers, and those from the other signatory countries. 
 
2.5.2.6 Data protection 
 
According to Article 157 of the FTA, each Party shall permit financial service suppliers to 
transfer information in electronic or other form into and out of its territory. However, adequate 






442 Notably by SOMO, 2012, p. 14. Notably by M. Vander Stichele, Free Trade Agreement EU–   
Colombia & Peru: Deregulation, Illicit Financial Flows And Money Laundering, GUE/NGL Group 
(German Delegation), 2012, p. 14. 
443 Article 155(4) TA. 
444 The international standards are identified in article 155 as the Core Principle for Effective 
Banking Supervision of the Basel Committee, the Insurance Core Principles and Methodology 
of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, the Forty 
Recommendations on Money Laundering, and the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist 
Financing of the Financial Action Task Force. 
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2.5.2.7 Transparency aspects 
 
Questions of transparency are covered in Title X and also in parts of Title III. Like most of the 
other Titles reviewed here, the Title X lays down a framework within which willing 
governments can ensure certain minimum standards and, if agreeable, advance these over time. 
It establishes the basic requirements for the provision of trade-related information. 
 
While Article 155 Trade Agreement aims at ‘effective and transparent regulation’ it also 
provides that the countries shall endeavour that all interested persons have an opportunity to 
comment before a measure of general application is adopted. In practice, the interested persons 
who have the capacity to monitor and give comments on measures that are proposed for 
adoption mostly consist of lobbyists from the financial industry, not in the least those from the 
foreign financial industry. This article in practice provides a legal basis through which lobbyists 
have a right to request to comment before a financial regulation is adopted, and thus influence 
its final outcome. 
 
The choice of words employed could allow an unwilling government to keep certain matters 
opaque. Article 289 excludes from its purview confidential information defined in various ways, 
including cases where a government deems that publication would ‘be contrary to the public 
interest’. 
 
All in all, the EU-Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement offers a framework for liberalising trade in 
goods and services and offers some possibilities to prevent illicit capital flows like money 
laundering, tax evasion and terrorist financing. The Agreement does not seem to offer strong 
incentives to ensure that illicit flows are investigated and prosecuted. 
 
2.5.3 Assessment of Colombian and Peruvian Legislation on Financial 
Services, Money Laundering, and Tax Evasion and Elusion 
 
2.5.3.1 Money laundering 
 
Money laundering in Colombia 
 
According to reports, the laws on money laundering have been modestly effective.445 In 1985, 
money laundering constituted 10% of Colombia’s GDP, while by the end of the millennium this 
had grown to 14%. From 2000 to 2013, the illicit share of the GDP decreased. Notably, this drop 
is assigned to the implementation of the Plan Colombia - a U.S.-backed security package aimed 
at increasing Colombia's military strength and fighting drug trafficking – and anti-money 
laundering efforts by the Financial Intelligence Unit of Colombia (Unidad de Información y 
Análisis Financiero, UIAF). The UIAF is in charge of conducting operations related to unusual 
financial operations reported by (i) certain sectors of the economy who are obligated to make 
such reports, or (ii) any person or entity, voluntarily.446 
 
 
445 See http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/money-laundering-two-percent-of- 
colombia-gdp. 
446 Law 526 of 1999. 
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Relevant legislation includes: 
 Decree 663 of 1993. Sets out general ‘know your customer’ rules applicable to financial 
institutions, as well as general patterns in agreement with which the Superintendence 
of Finance has to set forth specific rules for money laundering prevention. 
 Regulation 007 of 1996, as amended by Regulation 022 of 2007 with annexes and 
Regulation 062 of 2007 with annexes, issued by the Superintendence of Finance. 
Regulation 007 sets out the specific obligations that financial institutions have to comply 
with and Regulation 062 sets out the specific obligations for securities issuers. 
 Law 599 of 2000. This law defines the scope of the crime of money laundering. In 
particular, Article 323 of this law defines money laundering as the acquisition, 
investment, transportation, custody or administration of funds with the purpose of 
concealing their illegal source.447 
 
A recent U.S. report finds that ‘despite the Government of Colombia’s fairly strict AML/CFT 
regime, the laundering of money primarily from Colombia’s illicit drug trade continues to 
penetrate its economy and affect its financial institutions’. The report mentions many financial 
services related to ways to repatriate illicit proceeds to Colombia, including the postal money 
order market, wire transfers, the securities markets and remittances in the USA, and, in 
Colombia, prepaid debit cards and electronic currency.448 
 
It also highlights that criminal organisations with connections to financial institutions in other 
countries smuggle merchandise to launder money through the formal financial system using 
trade and the non-bank financial systems. In the black market peso exchange, goods are bought 
with drug dollars from abroad and are either smuggled into Colombia via Panama or brought 
directly into Colombia’s customs warehouses, thus avoiding various taxes, tariffs, and customs 
duties. In other trade-based money laundering schemes, goods are over- or under-invoiced to 
transfer value.449 
 
Evasion of the normal customs charges is said to be frequently facilitated through the corruption 
of Colombian oversight authorities. In 2013, 67 prosecutions and 8 convictions related to money 






448 The use of bulk cash smuggling, trade of counterfeit items and illegal mining are also 
mentioned, as is the gaming industry which includes casinos and regionally-run lotteries called 
‘Chance’. ‘Chance’ has more transactions per day than all other financial transactions in the 
country combined, and indications are that much money laundering activity has moved here. 
449 Making the WTO cases about Colombia’s efforts to get a grip on trade with Panama all the 
more relevant. 
450 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2014 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report. 
451 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2015 International Narcotics  
Control Strategy Report. 
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Money laundering in Peru 
 
The recently introduced improvements of national laws regarding money laundering were 
described as rather rudimentary steps in October 2015.452 The existence of major challenges had 
been confirmed by Peru’s Justice Minister in 2012, when he revealed that the country had no 
standing convictions for money laundering. Of the roughly 120 cases investigated by the 
competent authorities, only four had resulted in judicial proceedings at this stage. A 
commission had been set up within the Justice Ministry to work on new laws to combat the 
crime.453 These efforts seem to have paid off a little bit. In 2013, 238 money laundering 
prosecutions were reported (though no convictions), and by 2014 there were 158 ongoing 
criminal prosecutions and two convictions for money laundering.454 Nevertheless, the latest 
GAFILAT progress report notes that a number of key FATF recommendations were only 
partially complied with, and some were not complied with at all.455 
 
In May 2015, it was announced that the Peruvian government was planning to step up the fight 
against money laundering further by bringing more transactions into the financial system. 
Peru’s Financial Intelligence Unit, the ‘Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera del Perú’ (UIF-Peru), 
was to present a bill to congress in June 2015 that aims to make it mandatory that purchases of 
properties above a set value are made via banks. Inspired by similar rules in Mexico, UIF is 
proposing that all transactions above $40,000 be made via bank deposit. Such legislation would 
also help to reduce the large amount of cash that is still used in Peru.456 
 
The UIF-Peru is a specialised unit of the Peruvian Regulator for Banks, Insurance Companies 
and Pension Funds (SBS). It is responsible for receiving, analysing, processing, and transmitting 
relevant information in order to detect money-laundering and/or the financing of terrorism. It 
also contributes to the implementation of specialised systems by the individuals or 
organisations covered by the AML and/or counter terrorist financing legislation in order to 
detect operations of money laundering and/or financing of terrorism. The main national 
legislation and rules are: 
 
 
452 See http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/peru-tackles-money-laundering-currency-  
exchange. 
453 See http://www.andina.com.pe/agencia/noticia-estado-dara-fuertes-golpes-contra-   
lavado-activos-este-ano-anuncia-ministro-jimenez-398125.aspx. 
454 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2015 International Narcotics  
Control Strategy Report, Volume II Country Database. 
p. 354. The low number of convictions might have to do with the fact registrations are done 
under a different predicate crime; there exists no common database tracking money laundering 
convictions (Ibid., p. 355). 
455 GAFILAT, Informe de Avance de la Evalución del Perú. Seguimento Intensificado, GAFILAT 15 I 
GTEM 4.5, 2015. The report notes that 44% of reported suspicious transactions stem from banks, 
and 30% from notaries, p. 10. 
456 Until now, it is possible to buy a house for $1 million without the transaction going through 
the financial system, UIF-Peru’s deputy director Sergio Espinosa told state news agency 
Andina. 
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 Resolution CONASEV No. 033-2011-EF of 9 May 2011, amended by Resolution SMV 
No. 007-2013-SMV-01: Regulation relating prevention of money laundering and 
terrorism financing; 
 Supreme Decree No. 057-2011-PCM of 30 June 2011: National Plan to Combat Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and the Creation of the Executive Multi- 
sectoral Commission against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing; 
 Legislative Decree No. 1106 of 19 April 2012: Legislation to Fight against Money 
Laundering and other crimes linked with Illegal Mining and Organised Crime. This 
decree empowers the FIU and SBS to freeze bank accounts in cases suspected of links 
with money laundering or terrorist financing within 24 hours of a request made by a 
judge, regardless of whether a criminal case was filed and allowing for the enforcement 
of UN sanctions. The FIU successfully requested a complementary bill that provides 
more legal clarity in the implementation of this authority. 
 Supreme Decree No. 093-2012-PCM: Regulation of Legislative Decree No. 1104; 
 Resolution SBS No. 8930-2012 of 28 November 2012: Regulation of Infractions and 
Sanctions relating to the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism; 
 Resolution SBS No. 5709-2012 of 10 August 2012, amended by Resolution SBS No 4034- 
2013: Special regulation relating to prevention of money laundering and terrorism 
financing applies to notaries; 
 Law No. 30077 of 20 August 2013: Law against Organised Crime. It reflects international 
standards and allows police to seize assets linked to organised crime without the prior 
approval of a prosecutor, which reduces the likelihood of pre-emptive criminal asset 
removal.457 On 1 July 2014, implementing regulations were put into effect, removing 
obstacles that had impeded investigations to prosecute organised crime and money 
laundering. The new regulations allow for heavier sentencing, they establish modern 
investigative techniques, and redirect all cases involving organised crime to the 
National Superior Criminal Court.458 
 Resolution SBS No. 6729-2014 of 13 October 2014 expands the list of entities and persons 
that must now report to the UIF.459 In the 2015 GAFILAT progress report, it is noted 
that UIF has a lack of human and logistical resources appropriate to adequately perform 





457 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2014 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report. 
458 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2015 International Narcotics  
Control Strategy Report, p. 354. 
459 Activities to be reported: the trade and/or rental of machinery and equipment that can be 
used for illegal mining and/or logging, the production and/or trade of chemicals and 
controlled substances/goods, agencies and non-governmental organisations that receive 
donations, and the sale and/or trade of vehicles, currency, construction, jewellery, art, real 
estate, and pawned goods. 
460 GAFILAT, Informe de Avance de la Evalución del Perú. Seguimento Intensificado, GAFILAT 15 I 
GTEM 4.5, 2015, p. 3. 
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 Resolution SBS No. 2660-2015 of 18 May 2015 approving the ‘Regulation of Risk 
Management of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism’, which took effect on 
1 July 2015. This Regulation incorporates rules for financial companies supervised by 
the SBS, representing the most important sector among remittance of funds, and 
includes rules on beneficial ownership. 
 
The Latin American Debt, Development, and Rights Network (LATINADD) estimates that the 
$9.1 billion that left Peru between 2002 and 2011 can be attributed to the illegal activities. From 
these statistics, an average rate of $910 million can be attributed to the amount “lost” to the 
nation’s GDP annually. Taking into account Peru’s annual GDP of $368 billion, the average 
amount lost equates to 0.25% of the GDP. According to LATINADD’s study, illegal 
transnational movements (bribes, drug trade, and tax evasion by large companies) in Peru 
amounted to $5.9 trillion during the cited decade.461 
 
Peru’s bank secrecy law remains a primary obstacle to effective investigation and enforcement. 
The National Plan emphasises the importance of adopting legislation that allows the SBS and 
FIU to have greater access to bank and tax records. In 2013, the Peruvian Congress rejected a 
bill intended to reduce banking secrecy and provide authorities with greater access to bank and 
tax records; bank secrecy continues to be a highly-sensitive issue. In August 2013, new 
implementing regulations were passed that allow the Peruvian Customs and Tax Authority 
(SUNAT) to seize cash holdings above $30,000 from individuals crossing the border. SUNAT is 
required to immediately inform the FIU of the seizure, and the owners of the seized currency 
have 72 hours to submit evidence to the FIU that the cash is of licit origin. The FIU can now 
initiate investigations on suspicious electronic transactions over $10,000. 
 
A U.S. report from 2015 summarises the situation as follows: Peru should recognise the 
‘growing threat of money laundering and associated crimes’ and allocate sufficient resources to 
its existing AML/CFT infrastructure. The report concludes that, ‘[m]ost importantly, the 
political will must be developed to aggressively recognize, investigate, and prosecute money 
launderers’.462 
 
2.5.3.2 Tax evasion and elusion 
 
Tax evasion and elusion in Colombia 
 
Colombia’s tax system has been criticised for its ‘low efficiency, inequality, and an inefficient 
tax collection system, with high levels of tax evasion’. The intake was described as ‘poor, which 
suggests that few people or companies pay taxes’.463 The OECD has recommended 
strengthening the tax administration and increasing penalties in order to reduce tax evasion in 
 
 
461 A. Rivera , 'Over US$ 9 Million Leaves Peru Illegally Each Year', Peru this week (website), 12 
October 2014. 
462 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2015 International Narcotics  
Control Strategy Report, Volume II Country Database, p. 356. 
463 OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Colombia 2012, Paris, 2012, p. 64. 
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January 2015.464 Unlike other jurisdictions, Colombian tax law ‘did not provide for general tax- 
avoidance rules; rather, it has adopted a limited number of anti-avoidance provisions, whose 
main purpose  is  to address specific situations  concerning the  shift  of  income  to foreign 
jurisdictions (especially tax havens) (…) and the transfer of assets for less than their fair market 
value’.465 Regulatory reforms to improve the system are ongoing. Colombia is a member of the 
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, and was peer 
reviewed twice. In the latest report from 2015, the country was assigned the rating ‘compliant’ 
for nine out of ten elements, and ‘largely compliant’ for the remaining element.466 
 
As of 1 January 2013, a general anti-avoidance rule applies which introduces the substance over 
form principle. This rule allows the Colombian tax authorities to disregard or re-characterise a 
transaction in cases where an abuse is present. Other main aspects include: 
 Colombia’s transfer pricing rules require that taxpayers follow the arm’s length 
principle in transactions between Colombian taxpayers and foreign related parties. 
Such transactions must be valued according to reasonable prices in normal market 
conditions, such as between independent parties. In controlled transactions, Colombian 
law specifies that when the tax authorities conclude that the pricing is not set at arm’s 
length, adjustments can be made. 
 Parties are deemed to be related if there is any subordination of control, or if they are 
members of the same economic group within the meaning of the Tax and Commercial 
Codes. Control can be individual or joint, without any participation in stocks or by a 
principal head office established abroad. 
 Taxpayers are obligated to maintain records of all transactions involving non-resident 
related parties for five years. They annually must report to the tax authorities all 
transactions with such parties that meet certain thresholds. 
 
In December 2014, a new tax bill proposed to introduce administrative sanctions instead of 















464 OECD, Economic Survey of Colombia 2015, Paris, 2015. 
465 Ibid., p. 66. 
466 OECD, Peer Reviews: Colombia 2015: Phase 2: Implementation of the Standard in Practice, OECD 
Publishing, Paris, 2015. 
467 KPMG, ‘Investment in Peru 2015’, p. 26 explains that punishment for fraudulent tax evasion can involve 
up to 12 years imprisonment. 
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Tax evasion and elusion in Peru 
 
The effectiveness of the national laws of Peru on tax evasion and elusion has been described as 
uncertain.468 The Peruvian Customs and Tax Authority (SUNAT) reported that $105 million in 
taxes went unpaid in 2013. International transfers are expected to be responsible for much of 
the manipulation, as international funds are able to enter tax free or with low rates.469 
 
Decree Legislative 1121 of 18 July 2012 introduced, through provision XVI of the Tax Code’s 
preliminary title, a regulation against tax evasion in Peru. In this regard, the national Tax 
Administration of Peru has been granted authority to claim a tax debt or reduce the amount of 
deductions or credits in favour of the taxpayer, in the event the administration detects tax 
evasion. 
 
Transfer pricing rules are based on the arm’s length principle as interpreted by the OECD. 
However, in Peru these rules not only apply to transactions between related parties (both 
domestic and cross-border) but also to transactions with companies resident in tax havens. 
Moreover, they must be considered only for income tax purposes, not for Value Added Tax 
purposes. Taxpayers must carry out an independent transfer pricing study to support the value 
of their transactions with related parties. Moreover, the taxpayers are obliged to submit a 
Transfer Pricing Return informing the type of transactions performed with related parties or 
companies resident in tax havens. 
 
The following situations, among others, are not considered as permanent establishments in 
Peru: (i) using facilities destined solely to store or display goods or merchandise which belongs 




468 See http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/the-americas/peru 
/show-all.aspx. 
469 A. Rivera, ‘Over US$ 9 million leaves Peru illegally each year’, Peru this week (website), 12 
October 2014. 
 
 The lack of convictions for money laundering and tax evasion in both Colombia and Peru 
and the size of drugs related crimes demonstrate that there are large challenges in these 
countries. 
 The first two money laundering crime convictions ever to be handed down in Peru stem 
from 2014. 
 Instead of general  tax-avoidance rules, until  recently Colombia  only had a limited 
number of anti-avoidance provisions addressing specific situations. 
 The drop in money laundering as percentage of Colombia’s GDP in the period 2000-2013 
is said to be due to a U.S. backed security package. 
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to the purchase of goods or merchandise to supply a foreign entity; and (iii) maintaining of a 
place or location destined solely to the conduction of activities of a preparatory or ancillary 
nature. 
 
Like Colombia, Peru is a member of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes. As the country only joined recently, it has not yet been peer- 
reviewed. 
 
2.5.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The scope of the services provisions in the EU-Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement is broad. 
Services in general are broadly defined, and so are financial services. Virtually all services are 
included with a few selected exceptions, such as services provided by public entities. It was 
noted that in some aspects, more services are liberalised in this agreement than in some other 
EU agreements with trade partners, notably with Korea. This is because of the fact that the latter 
agreement only liberalises financial transfers related to trade, loans and investments, whereas 
the EU-Colombia/Peru Agreement liberalises all current account transfers. Given the 
challenges related to effectively implementing FATF recommendations in Colombia and Peru, 
and the low number of convictions for money laundering in these countries, a more prudent 
approach to liberalisation and/or more safeguards or measures aimed at encouraging 
cooperation between the parties to the agreement would seem necessary. 
 
Where tax evasion and elusion are concerned, the Trade Agreement contains a clause allowing 
parties not to disclose information about customers in the financial sectors. This does not seem 
supportive of actions to tackle money laundering, tax evasion and avoidance, for which 
(automatic) information exchange across borders is essential. It also seems to run counter to 
what is recommended in several of the international standards for regulation and supervision 
in the financial services sector that the parties promised to implement and apply. The latter 
promise is worded in a rather weak manner. Parties are merely required to ‘take note’ of the 
relevant international principles and standards of the G7, G20 and OECD. This wording is even 
weaker than a ‘best endeavour’ clause like the one included in other agreements. Article 155 
does demand that parties make their ‘best endeavours to ensure’ that international standards 
for regulation and supervision in the financial services sector and for the fight against money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism are implemented and applied in its territory. 
 
Furthermore, Colombia and Peru both allow for the establishment and cross-border supply of 
tax advisory services from EU countries. In Colombia, the tax law seems to have deficiencies, 
notably where it concerns the absence of general tax-avoidance rules and the reliance on a 
limited number of anti-avoidance provisions addressing specific situations. Furthermore, a 
systemic lack of effectiveness seems to be at hand. Reforms to remedy these deficiencies are 
ongoing. In Peru, tax law probably could also be improved and similarly seems to suffer from 
a systematic lack of effectiveness. 
 
Despite the willingness of Colombia’s government to fight AML/CFT, the law seems to 
experience a lack of effectiveness. The challenges are still acute, although slightly decreasing 
since 2000, through, inter alia, the help of U.S. support. The 2010-2013 numbers of prosecutions 
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and convictions for money laundering crimes in Colombia showed a declining number of 
convictions: 2010 – 115 prosecutions, 95 convictions; 2012 - 97 prosecutions, 80 convictions; and 
2013 - 67 prosecutions, 8 convictions. Convictions picked up in 2014 - 46 prosecutions, 57 
convictions. 
 
In Peru, the situation seems even more challenging. While the AML/CFT infrastructure is 
taking shape, it lacks resources, knowledge and the political will to recognise, investigate and 
prosecute money launderers. As a result, prior to 2012 there had been no convictions for money 
laundering crimes in Peru. The situation has improved only slightly since then. In 2013, 238 
money laundering prosecutions were reported (though no convictions), while in 2014 the first 
two money laundering convictions were reported, in addition to 158 prosecutions. The issues 
of effectiveness and enforcement are dealt with in more detail in the empirical part of this study. 
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2.6 Key Findings of the Comparative Legal Analysis 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the legal provisions relevant to financial services included 
in the five FTAs that the EU has concluded with Mexico, South Africa, Serbia, Korea and 
Colombia/Peru. The domestic legislation of these countries in the relevant fields has also been 
examined, and some preliminary facts were added regarding the enforcement or lack thereof in 
practice, including the number of convictions for money laundering. In light of this 
examination, the following key findings from the comparative analysis can be presented. 
 
2.6.1 Key findings concerning the legal frameworks of EU FTAs 
 
 The EU-Serbia Agreement seems to lay down the most far-reaching obligations in all 
sectors analysed. This is perhaps unsurprising given that Serbia is an EU candidate 
country on its way to accession. The strong wording of the Agreement – mirrored by 
the relatively advanced stage of Serbian legislation – is therefore inextricably 
intertwined with the specific situation of Serbia in its relations with the EU. However, 
as we shall see in the conclusions of this study, this does not necessarily exclude that 
some features of the EU-Serbia Agreement cannot be replicated in Agreements 
concluded with non-candidate countries. 
 The degree of sophistication of the Agreements in question is inversely proportional to 
their lifespan. The older the Agreement, the weaker the obligations contained therein. 
Older Agreements like the one between the EU and Mexico and the EU and South 
Africa lay down only very weak and vague obligations in virtually all parts relevant to 
this study. Newer agreements contain in principle more detailed language. One notable 
exception seems to be the EU-Colombia/Peru Agreement, which, despite its recent 
conclusion, only contains vague obligations. 
 The scope of the Agreements is quite broad. All of them contain broad definitions of 
financial services and financial services suppliers, covering virtually all the major 
existing financial services, including banking and insurance. The scope of the EU-South 
Africa Agreement appears somewhat more limited. 
 Despite the previous point, all Agreements also contain prudential carve-outs, leaving 
the supply of some services outside the scope of the Agreements, at least under certain 
circumstances. Typically, such carve-outs are connected with public policy 
considerations, as in the case of monetary or balance of payments difficulties. 
 Taxation measures are generally excluded from the scope of the Agreements. 
 All Agreements establish one or more governing bodies responsible for the supervision 
and implementation of their respective Agreement. All of them, on the EU side, include 
representatives of the Council and the European Commission. The European 
Parliament is not directly involved. 
 There is no direct correspondence between the degree of sophistication of the 
Agreements and the degree of advancement of the domestic legislation of the countries 
involved. For example, while the EU-Mexico Agreement is relatively rudimentary, 
Mexican legislation appears to be quite advanced in many of the fields examined. 
 All countries analysed have undertaken – although to a different extent significant 
efforts in recent years in the attempt to improve their legislation and create a legal 
environment more amenable to business and investment while tackling illicit capital 
Ex-Post Impact Assessment 






flows. However, there is no clear relation, or at least no evidence thereof, between such 
efforts and the conclusion of the Agreements with the EU. 
 Serbia stands as an exception to the above. As far as this country is concerned, the 
Agreement with the EU and EU action in general has directly occasioned the reforms 
undertaken by this country. 
 When it comes to transparency, tax evasion and money laundering, the EU- 
Colombia/Peru, EU-South Africa and EU-Mexico Agreements contain only minimal 
obligations, mostly in the form of ‘best endeavours’ obligations or, even worse, 
‘willingness’ obligations, which use vague language such as ‘the Parties take note of’ 
internationally agreed standards. 
 The EU-Korea and EU-Serbia Agreements are quite detailed and far-reaching in 
prescribing observance of international standards. 
 In line with the need for consistency in its external action as set out in Article 21(3) TEU, 
the new role of the European Parliament regarding international trade and investment 
agreements and the new Trade for All strategy, the Commission should submit annual 
reports to the European Parliament and the Council not only on the implementation of 
the EU-Colombia/Peru and EU-Korea trade agreements, but also on the older trade 
agreements with South Africa and Mexico. In the same vein, the European Parliament 
should have an opportunity to hold an ad hoc meeting of its responsible committee with 
the European Commission within 1 month from it publishing these reports in order for 
the European Commission to explain any issues related to the implementation of these 
agreements. 
 The existing annual reports from the Commission lack information on the 
implementation of the provisions on financial services, money laundering and tax 
evasion. Such reports should provide detailed information on these issues using the 
example of assessments of the trade and sustainable development chapters in the 
existing annual reports on the EU-Colombia/Peru and EU-Korea trade agreements. 
 
2.6.2 Key findings concerning third-country implementation of EU 
FTAs 
 
 All country reports reveal a certain level of compliance with international and 
European standards in the area of AML and tax evasion. 
 South Africa has made significant progress in in improving its AML/CFT legal and 
institutional framework. However, significant shortcomings remain, such as legal 
requirements pertaining to the identification of beneficial owners and the lack of 
application of enhanced due diligence to high risk situations. 
 Recently introduced amendments of Peru’s national laws regarding money laundering 
have been described as rather rudimentary steps. More resources are needed to 
improve the existing AML/CFT infrastructure, as is real political commitment to 
investigate and prosecute money launderers. 
 Korea is committed to continuous improvement of its AML legislation within the 
framework of FATF review. 
 Almost all domestic jurisdictions analysed – with the notable exception of Korea – are 
considerably affected by poor implementation of the law, albeit to a different extent and 
for different reasons. While in Mexico, for example, a low level of law enforcement 
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seems mainly connected with endemic levels of corruption, in Serbia the main cause 
seems to be the weak capacity of the Serbian administration. This issue is further 
elaborated in the empirical part of this study. 
 Among the countries examined, Peru, Colombia and Serbia are neither members nor 
observers of FATF, which is the key international body that sets AML/CFT standards 
and reviews how its members implement them. However, Peru and Colombia are 
members of GAFILAT, whose activities fall under the auspices of FATF. Serbia is 
engaged in other forms of international cooperation in the field of money laundering, 
such as the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism – MONEYVAL. 
 South Africa was in majority ‘compliant’ or ‘largely compliant’ with the Basel Core 
Principles. With regard to supervision of the insurance sector, considerable room for 
improvement still exists. A major reform of the supervisory system of the financial 
sector is expected to further address shortcomings in both banking and insurance 
supervision by the end of 2016 or early 2017. 
 Serbia’s main problem seems to be its tax legislation and administration. In particular, 
it seems that the country suffers from structural systemic inefficiencies in this sector, 
which is mirrored by its  relatively scarce involvement in international initiatives 
concerning tax evasion and avoidance. 
 Although Korea has scored high on its compliance level with the Basel Core Principles, 
important challenges remain. These include: mitigating the risks of politicisation of the 
leadership positions of the FSC and FSS; and deepening the engagement in cross-border 
cooperation activities by exploring exchange of understanding of supervisory issues at 
operational levels and contingency planning. 
 Unlike other jurisdictions, Colombian tax law did not provide for general tax-avoidance 
rules. Rather, it consisted of a limited number of anti-avoidance provisions, addressing 
specific situations, notably concerning the shift of income to foreign jurisdictions. 
Regulatory reforms to improve the system are ongoing. 
 Mexico has the lowest tax revenue to GDP among the 34 OECD Member States, way 
below the OECD average. Korea is also low on the OECD list. As non-OECD countries, 
Colombia and Peru are not represented in the OECD lists, but it seems that challenges 
with tax revenues also exist there. 
 Peruvian bank secrecy law constitutes a serious obstacle for information exchange and, 
as a result, the fight against illicit capital flows. 
 Human resources of the Korean supervisory authorities need to be strengthened in 
view of the increase of STRs and law enforcement activities. More contextual details 
about and systematic retrieval of  law enforcement activities would improve 
understanding of the AML activities in Korea. 
 
2.6.3 Concluding remarks 
 
As the findings outlined above demonstrate, all Agreements possess deficiencies and could 
benefit from improvements. This is especially true for the older ones, such as the EU-Mexico 
and EU-South Africa Agreements. The examination of the domestic jurisdictions of all the third 
countries examined has also brought into the open structural weaknesses that ought to be 
corrected. It is true that the EU’s power to influence third countries is limited for obvious 
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reasons, not least because of the international law obligation not to interfere with their 
sovereignty. It is also clear, however, that at least some degree of influence can (lawfully) be 
exercised through the conclusion of trade instruments. The EU-Serbia Agreement has clearly 
demonstrated this. Elements of the EU’s approach taken in this agreement could also be useful 
elsewhere. The concluding part of this study will provide some policy recommendations 
focused on how to improve EU external trade instruments in order to combat money 
laundering, tax evasion and elusion. It will also build on the findings of the empirical part of 
this study. 
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Part 3: Empirical Analysis – Effects of Liberalisation of Financial 
Services between the EU and Third Countries on 




After having looked at the selected EU Free Trade and Association Agreements (FTAs) from a 
comparative legal perspective, we now turn to the empirical analysis of the effects of the 
liberalisation of trade, particularly in financial services, envisaged by these agreements on 
money laundering, tax evasion and elusion in third countries. Given that financial services are 
the focus of the present study, the empirical investigation concentrated on money laundering, 
due to its close connection with the use of the international financial system with a view to 
concealing the proceeds of crime.  Notably, tax evasion has been considered insofar as it 
constitutes an aspect of money laundering.470 
 
In the course of the empirical study, the research team examined whether the conclusion of the 
EU FTAs has increased the threat of money laundering facing, respectively, Mexico, South 
Africa, Serbia, Korea and Colombia/Peru. In particular, the team focused on the effects of the 
liberalisation of financial services under the EU FTAs in this area. In light of the findings 
concerning a similar impact of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which 
liberalised trade in goods and services between Canada, Mexico, and the United States,471 the 
study started from the hypothesis that the conclusion of the EU FTAs has increased the risk of 
money-laundering facing the above-mentioned third countries. 
 
The chosen methodology, as elaborated in the introduction to this study, allowed the research 
team to: (a) establish to what extent the existing data concerning the impact of the liberalisation 
of financial services under the selected EU FTAs on money laundering between the EU and 
third countries are comprehensive and identify gaps in evidence; and (b) determine whether 





470 The interplay between money laundering and tax evasion has been largely unexplored. According to 
Unger, for example, the relationship between the two is precarious: ‘Tax evasion can be part of fiscal or 
financial fraud, which constitutes a predicate crime for money laundering in most countries. However, 
when looking at legal definitions of money laundering and at law enforcement in different countries, one 
can see that a large part of tax evasion is often excluded from the money laundering definitions or from 
enforcement.’ See B. Unger, ‘The gravity model for measuring money laundering and tax evasion.’ Paper 
prepared for the Workshop on Macroeconomic and Policy Implication of Underground Economy and Tax 
Evasion, February 5-6, 2009 at Bocconi University, Milan Italy, available at: 
http://www2.econ.uu.nl/.../       unger/.../Unger%20for%20BUSATOconference.doc. 
471 D. Kar, Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground 
Economy, Global Financial Integrity, 2012, available at: 
http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/gfi_mexico_report_english-   
web.pdf,  points  to  a  substantial  increase  in  illicit  financial  flows  from  Mexico  after  the 
implementation of NAFTA. 
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It should be noted from the outset that the study has revealed a lack of statistical data pointing 
to a causal link between the conclusion of the EU FTAs and an (increase in) illicit financial flows 
between the EU and third countries. This finding emerged from the analysis of the existing data 
concerning the illicit financial flows and it was also confirmed by all the respondents involved 
in the study. At present, there are no exact statistical estimates of illicit financial flows affecting 
each developing country in general either. In view of the complexity involved in calculating 
how much money is being laundered and a lack of consensus as to how this should be done, 
such estimates vary and are heavily debated. 
 
The hypothesis that the conclusion of the EU FTAs has increased the threat of money laundering 
facing the third countries in question cannot therefore be verified by precise statistical estimates. 
However, this does not mean that the hypothesis is false as far as the five developing countries 
in question (i.e. Mexico, South Africa, Serbia, Colombia, and Peru) are concerned. In fact, as will 
be shown below, the available data provide a strong indication that the liberalisation of trade 
in goods and services, including financial services, between the EU and developing countries 
increases the threat of money laundering faced by these countries. At the same time, the 
available data does not support this conclusion with regard to Korea. 
 
In order to present our argument in the context of the major findings from the empirical study, 
this part of the report will be structured as follows. First, it will discuss the concept of illicit 
financial flows, which is key to studying the impact of the EU FTAs on money laundering and 
their potential scale as well as the complexity involved in defining and estimating such flows 
(sections 3.2 and 3.3). Particular attention will be given to the role of the EU FTAs in fostering 
illicit financial flows from developing countries. Subsequently, the analysis will turn to the 
impact of illicit financial flows on developing countries (section 3.4) and the causes of such flows 
(section 3.5). This part of the report will conclude with a summary of the key points concerning 
the effects of the liberalisation of trade envisaged by the selected EU FTAs on money laundering 
in the developing countries in question (section 3.6). 
 
3.2 Defining Illicit Financial Flows 
 
3.2.1 Illegal or illicit? 
 
The concept ‘illicit financial flows’ (IFFs) is central to the study into the effects of the EU FTAs 
on money laundering in the developing countries parties thereto. After all, in order to be able 
to estimate such flows and establish a possible link with the EU FTAs, they first need to be 
defined. The concept of ‘IFFs’ has emerged relatively recently, reflecting a growing concern 
about the apparent abuse of the international financial system by money launderers from 
developing countries.472 The IFFs are most commonly defined as money (understood as funds 
or assets) illegally earned, transferred, or used. However, while the term ‘IFFs’ is increasingly 
used, at present there is no general consensus on its precise meaning. The ongoing international 




472 See, in particular, R.W. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew 
the Free Market System, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2005. 
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According to a legal conception of IFFs, the latter are flows that are illegal under formal law. The 
focus on activities that have a clear connection with illegality is reflected, for example, in the 
definition of IFFs provided by Kar and Cartwright-Smith from the GFI – a leading international 
non-profit organisation in the field of research into IFFs from developing countries: 
 
‘Illicit financial flows involve the transfer of money earned through activities such as 
corruption, transactions involving contraband goods, criminal activities to shelter wealth from 
a country’s tax authorities. Such flows may involve funds from a country’s tax authorities. Such 
flows may also involve funds that were earned through legitimate means. It is in transferring 
earned funds in direct contravention of applicable capital controls that the transfer becomes an 
illicit flow, regardless of the fact that the funds were earned in a legitimate activity.’473 
 
A similar definition of IFFs has been advocated by the World Bank Group and the High Level 
Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa that also place emphasis on activities that are illegal 
under national laws.474 This implies that what constitutes ‘illicit financial flows’ will vary from 
country to country, given the differences in national legal frameworks. 
 
The legal definition of IFFs generally covers the illegal practices of money laundering, focusing 
on two major sources of such flows: 1) proceeds of criminal activities (for example, corruption 
or organised crime); and 2) legally generated revenue and income that become illegal either 
because of their transfer (for example, tax evasion in breach of tax laws) or use (for example, for 
terrorism financing). 
 
An alternative view advocated by a number of academics and non-governmental organisations 
in the context of IFFs affecting developing countries is that the IFFs should be understood in a 
broader sense, covering not only formally illegal but also immoral activities. The proponents of 
this conception of IFFs criticise the legal definition for being too restrictive, given its emphasis 
on the formal law, regardless of whether the regime enacting the law is socially legitimate. 
According to Everest-Phillips, for example: 
 
‘International capital transfers become illicit if they originate from an illegal source (evasion, 
corruption, or criminality) or are illegal by bypassing capital controls, but also immoral in 
undermining the state’s willingness and capacity to deliver better lives for its citizens.’475 
 
In the same vein, recognising that the term ‘illicit’ has strong moral undertones, Blankenburg 




473 D. Car and D. Cartwright-Smith. 2008, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries, 2002-  
2006. 
474 See respectively: World Bank Group, Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) and High Level Panel on 
Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, Illicit Financial Flows: Track It! Stop It! Get It!. 
475 M. Everest-Phillips, The Political Economy of Controlling Tax Evasion and Illicit Flows, in P. 
Reuter (ed.), Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries, 
Washington, World Bank, 2012 (emphasis added). 
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developmental damage that particular capital flows can inflict. In this context, they provide the 
following extensive definition: 
 
‘[A]n illicit capital flow (…) [is] a flow that has a negative impact on an economy if all direct and 
indirect effects in the context of the specific political economy of the society are taken into account. 
Direct effects refer to the immediate impact of a particular illicit capital flow on a country’s 
economic growth performance, for example, through reduced private domestic investment or 
adverse effects on tax revenue and public investment. Indirect effects are feedback effects on 
economic growth that arise from the role played by illicit capital flows in the sustainability of 
the social and political structure and dynamics of a country.’476 
 
Obviously, by extending its scope, the morality-focused definition of IFFs could include not 
only business practices related to money laundering and tax evasion, but also practices 
associated with tax elusion which do not fall under the legal definition of IFFs. Such practices 
may include, for instance, those aimed at reducing tax liability and diminishing country 
revenue – such as tax holidays or transfer pricing – which are legal as such, but may nevertheless 
be economically damaging for developing countries. 
 
3.2.2 Money laundering 
 
Given the focus of the present study on the relationship between the liberalisation of financial 
services between the EU and third countries, on the one hand, and the IFFs, on the other, money 
laundering deserves particular attention in this context. This is due to its close connection with 
the use of the international financial system with a view to concealing the proceeds of crime and 
making illegal money appear legal. Traditionally, money laundering involves the following 





















476 S. Blankenburg and M. Khan, ‘Governance and Illicit Flows’, in P. Reuter (ed.), Draining 
Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries, Washington, World 
Bank, 2012. 
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Box 11 Traditional money laundering process 
 
 
Source: B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar, 
2007, p. 89. 
 
As this description of the money laundering process shows, the financial sector can play a major 
role in all three phases involved therein. In fact, each phase knows its own money laundering 
techniques, ranging from the use of wire transfers or electronic banking to move funds into the 
banking system to the purchase of securities or insurance policies to facilitate fund transfers.477 
 
Corresponding banking has proved to be particularly vulnerable for the misuse by money 
launderers in the international context.478 Such banking implies that one bank (the 
‘correspondent bank’) carries out financial transactions for the clients of another bank (the 
‘respondent bank’). By establishing corresponding banking networks at the international level, 
banks are able to provide financial services in countries where they do not have offices. 
However, when doing so, correspondent banks have to rely on the respondent banks to perform 
all the necessary client checks. This can pose serious problems with regard to ‘know your 
customer’ rules, given that in some jurisdictions such rules or their application in practice can 








477  B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward 
Elgar, 2007, p. 89 et seq. 
478  B. Unger, The Scale and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward 
Elgar, 2007, p. 93 et seq. 
 
Phase 1: Placement 
In the first phase the criminal money that was collected, for example through drug sales on the street,
is placed in a financial institution. This first phase, of bringing cash to some financial institution, is
called the placement phase (or the pre-wash phase). 
 
Phase 2: Layering 
After the ‘dirty money’ is integrated into the financial system, the second phase, the layering or main
wash, starts. The money gets transferred to the bank account of company X, is then sent via a wire
transfer to an offshore centre corresponding bank at, say, the Seychelles. The Seychelles bank gives
company Y a loan, which pays for a false invoice from company X. So now the origin of this money,
namely company X itself, is not easily traceable anymore. The more often the money gets transferred
around the globe in the layering phase, the less traceable its criminal origins are. 
 
Phase 3: Integration 
The third phase consists of integrating the now clean money. This after wash phase includes the
purchase of luxury commodities, assets, making financial investments or buying companies. 
Ex-Post Impact Assessment 






Money laundering by making use of the official financial sector, which is central to this study, 
is also known as ‘money laundering through the front door’.479 However, it should be noted 
that money laundering increasingly takes place ‘through the back door’, i.e. by mispricing 
internationally traded goods and services.480 Trade-based money laundering was defined by the 
FATF as ‘the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of 
trade transactions in an attempt to legitimise their illicit origins’.481 By fraudulently 
manipulating the price, quantity, or quality of a good or service on an invoice, criminals can 
transfer significant amounts of money across international borders. Mispricing occurs in two 
major forms: (1) overvaluing imports; and (2) undervaluing exports – both of which also allow 
taxes to be evaded. How this works is further illustrated in Box 12. 
 
Box 12 Trade-based money laundering 
 
 
Source: Global Financial Integrity, Trade Misinvoicing. 
 
As will be shown in section 3.3 below, money laundering through the international financial 
system and money laundering through the mispricing of trade transactions constitute two 







479 J. Zdankovich, ‘Detecting Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing via Data Mining’, 47 
Communications of the ACM (2004), p. 53. 
480 J. Zdankovich, ‘Detecting Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing via Data Mining’, 47 
Communications of the ACM (2004), p. 53. 
481 Financial Action Task Force, Trade Based Money Laundering, Paris, France, Financial Action 















In this case of import over-invoicing, the Indian importer illegally moves $500,000 out of India. Although
he is only buying $1 million worth of used cars from the U.S. exporter, he uses a Mauritius intermediary
to re-invoice the amount up to $1,500,000. The U.S. exporter gets paid $1 million. The $500,000 that is
left over is then diverted to an offshore bank account owned by the Indian importer. 
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3.2.3 Outflows and inflows of illicit money 
 
It is important to bear in mind that IFFs can manifest themselves as outflows and inflows. The 
term ‘illicit financial outflow’ refers to a situation when the laundered money is transferred out 
of a country by its recipient. This term implies that there is not only a source of illicit money but 
also a destination where it is going to. 
 
Illicit money coming out of developing countries generally flows into developed countries, 
particularly in North America and Europe. Thus, for example, according to the GFI’s case study 
on Mexico – the associated EU FTA became operational concerning trade in services in 2001 – 
over a 41-year period from 1970 to 2010, the cross-border holdings of bank deposits reported to 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) show that the United States, offshore financial 
centres or tax havens in the Caribbean, and tax havens in Europe listed as such by the 
International Monetary Fund (among which are Luxembourg and Switzerland) are the three 
top destinations for Mexican private sector deposits.482 What is more, the next most favoured 
destination for such deposits is the group of banks in developed European countries (among 
them are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).483 
Deposits in these banks more than doubled from $1.2 billion in 2002 to $3.0 billion in 2010.484 In 
fact, as the recent study into the economic and legal effectiveness of AML and combating 
terrorist financing policy for the European Commission has found:485 
 
‘[T]he threat of money laundering is greatest in the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and other 
west-European countries, as a result of their relatively sophisticated financial markets, their 
relatively high GDP per capita levels, their trade, as well as cultural links to a wide range of 
proceeds of crime-generating countries. Hot money will generally flow from eastern Europe to 
the west, and from the rest of the world to Europe’s financial centres, in search of safer havens 
for investment.’ 
 
The case study in Box 13 provides a good illustration of an illicit financial outflow from Mexico 
to Europe in the context of high-level corruption during the presidency of Carlos Salinas de 







482 D. Kar, Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy, 
(Global Financial Integrity, January 2012), available at:, p. 45. 
483 D. Kar, Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy, 
(Global Financial Integrity, January 2012), available at: Box 13. Groupings of Deposits from 
Non-Bank Private Sector in Mexico to Developed Country Banks and Offshore Financial 
Centers 1. 
484 D. Kar, Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground Economy, 
(Global Financial Integrity, January 2012), available at:, p. 45. 
485 Project ‘ECOLEF’ The Economic and Legal Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering and Combating  
Terrorist Financing Policy’ (led by B. Unger): Final Report, Utrecht, 2013, p. 13. 
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Box 13 Case study ‘Illicit Financial Outflows’ 
 
 
‘Upon the election of his brother as president of Mexico, Raul Salinas was appointed to several positions, 
one of which was to manage Conasupo, a store set up to sell basic goods to the underprivileged at 
subsidized prices. Raul Salinas used this position to create disguised proﬁts that he diverted to himself, 
often by reporting prices for Conasupo’s purchases that were higher than the sums actually paid or by 
selling subsidized products at market rates. In one case, at an extremely low price, Conasupo imported 
39,000 tons of powdered milk contaminated at Chernobyl and then sold the milk to the poor at a proﬁt. 
In another case, corn provided by the United States for distribution to the poor was sold by Conasupo at 
market rates; the corn was made into tortillas and sold back to the United States. The hidden proﬁts 
were then transferred to personal accounts in Mexican banks. Raul may also have proﬁted by ﬁnancing 
winning bids during privatisation. An example of this was the government sale of Azteca Television to 
Ricardo Salinas Pliego through Salinas Associates. Proﬁts from Azteca were used to make payments to 
Raul, which Pliego claimed were repayments on a loan Raul had made to him to ﬁnance the acquisition. 
The loan was provided at a suspiciously low interest rate. To show that there had been a loan and that 
the payments were not kickbacks, Raul made payments from his account to ﬁnance the loan, in effect 
showing he was only an intermediary. Raul would deposit the funds into Mexican banks. Then his wife, 
Paulina, acting under the alias of Patricia Rios, would withdraw the funds and transport them to a 
Mexican branch of Citibank. This money would be transferred into a mass concentration account used 
by Citibank to transmit internal funds. A vice-president at the Mexican Division of Citibank would then 
extract these funds from the concentration account and transfer them to London and Switzerland to 
Citibank accounts of Trocca, a shell corporation formed by Cititrust in Cayman Islands and controlled by 
Raul through nominees. 
 
Raul Salinas may have used his inﬂuence over two banking groups, Grupo Financiero Probursa and Grupo 
Finaciero Serﬁn, both purchased from the Salinas government during privatization, to convince them not 
to apply extended (or indeed any) due diligence to accounts controlled by him and his confederates (…)’ 
 
Source: M. Levi, ‘How Well Do Anti-Money Laundering Controls Work in Developing Countries?’, in P. 
Reuter (ed.), Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries, Washington, 
World Bank, 2012, p. 373, at 394-395. 
 
Conversely, the term ‘illicit financial inflow’ describes a case when the foreign revenues from 
illicit activities, such as drug trafficking, are laundered and brought back to a country of their 
recipient. The following paradigmatic case presented by the Egmont Group of Financial 
Intelligence Units illustrates how drug traffickers use the international financial system to carry 
out their activities (see Box 14). 
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Box 14 Case study ‘Illicit Financial Inflows’ 
 
 
‘Rick, an American citizen who claimed to be a European, was the key organiser of a group of individuals 
that used to belong to a larger drug cartel. The majority of the original cartel had been arrested and 
imprisoned by law enforcement several years previously. Since the destruction of the cartel, Rick had 
continued to control a significant part of the money raised from the cartels drug trafficking activity, and 
had used the funds to restart his own drugs trafficking operation on a smaller scale. Furthermore, during 
his involvement with the original group, Rick had learned several laundering techniques, which were to 
prove extremely helpful to his plans for his own gang. 
 
The drug money entered the American country in cash shipments by boat or plane. Rick’s group received 
the money in sealed cash bundles, and sought to launder the drug money through a series of layering 
transactions in several different countries. Following initial cash deposits into a range of bank accounts, 
Rick facilitated the laundering by authorising an agent abroad to transfer funds from the initial accounts 
to the personal accounts of a number of intermediaries overseas. The intermediary arranged a back-to- 
back transfer of the funds back into the country to accounts at the National Central Bank, and obtained 
authorisation for the fund transfers from that institution. Before the money was transferred back, Rick 
always called the intermediary again to request a cancellation of the transfer. The intermediary was left 
with the funds in his or her account. The funds were then withdrawn in cash and wired back into the 
country to yet other accounts, with the authorisation documentation from the National Central Bank as 
a prepared explanation of the origin of the funds. The National Central Bank was being used unwittingly 
to give additional probity to the drugs funds. 
 
Once the funds had been moved through several layering processes, Rick was able to use the monies to 
purchase real estate. In order to do so, he utilised lawyers, bank managers, and other professionals, 
paying a commission of between 3 to 5 percent of the value of the transferred money in order to 
minimise questions. The commission rates were slightly above normal market rates, in order to ensure 
that the firms concerned welcomed the business. Lastly, Rick did not want the real estate to be registered 
in his own name, and used a number of other individuals and companies as nominal owners in order to 
further confuse the money trail – whilst some of these individuals were aware of the criminal source of 
the funds, a number of other firms were used unwittingly. The use of such financial professionals gave 
additional probity to the fund movements. 
 
To implement his laundering scheme, Rick used more than half a dozen banks and a wide range of 
accounts at each institution (…) [I]t was estimated that Rick’s scheme had involved a turnover of about 
US$720,000,000 over a number of years.” 
 
Source: FIU’s in action: 10 0 cases from th e Eg mont Group , 2000, case No. 25. 
 
As will be demonstrated in section 3.4 below, both outflows and inflows of illicit capital can 
have a profoundly negative impact on developing countries and are contrary to the EU Treaty 
obligation to promote sustainable development and fight poverty in developing countries. 
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3.3 Estimating Illicit Financial Flows 
 
3.3.1 The complexity of estimating illicit financial flows 
 
While the issue of IFFs is at the forefront of the current international agenda, the exact scale of 
the problem is unknown. This is not surprising, given a lack of agreement on the meaning of 
the term ‘IFFs’ and, even more importantly, because of a great deal of intricacy involved in 
estimating precisely what is, by definition, a hidden activity. As one of our respondents 
observed: ‘It is true that it is really difficult to monitor illicit flows of money because they tend 
to be either very difficult to detect or not obviously illicit.’ 
 
In order to measure illicit financial flows, and thus the extent of money laundering, several 
methods have been proposed in the literature. While some methods build upon the economic 
analysis of statistical discrepancies in official data, others are based on field and case studies.486 
 
For example, one method in the former category is to analyse the net errors and omissions in a 
country’s external accounts (‘hot money narrow’ method or HMN). The net errors and 
omissions figure balances credits and debits in a country’s balance-of-payments account and is 
supposed to reflect unrecorded capital flows and statistical errors in measurement. A 
persistently large and negative net errors and omission figure is considered to be an indication 
of IFFs. 
 
An alternative economic method of estimating IFFs is the World Bank Residual Mode which 
measures a country’s source of funds (inflows of capital) against its recorded use (outflows of 
capital). Source of funds includes increases in net external indebtedness of the public sector and 
the net inflow of foreign direct investment. Use of funds includes the country’s current account 
deficit. Under this model, an excess source of funds over the recorded use points to a loss of 
unaccounted-for capital, and hence, to an IFF. 
 
Yet another important economic method of estimating trade-related IFFs is the Trade 
Misinvoicing model. This approach involves a double comparison. First, a country’s exports to 
the world are compared to what the world reports as having imported from that country. In 
addition, a country’s imports from the world are compared to what the world reports as having 
exported to that country. Discrepancies in country-partner trade data, which show over- 
invoicing of imports and/or under-invoicing of exports, are an indication of IFFs. 
 
These and other economic models that have been developed so far for estimating IFFs have their 
own serious shortcomings and are generally viewed to be unable to provide precise scientific 
estimates of IFFs. To use the words of Reuter and Truman, ‘[t]he review of the (…) methods 
 
 
486 For an overview, see, for example, B. Unger, ‘Money Laundering – A Newly Emerging Topic 
on the International Agenda’, 5 Review of Law and Economics (2009), p. 807; B. Unger, The Scale 
and Impacts of Money Laundering, Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2007, ch. 3; P. 
Reuter and E.M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money – The Fight against Money Laundering, 
Washington, Institute for International Economics, 2004, ch 2. 
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comes to a simple conclusion: neither yields estimates of the volume of laundered money that 
can be considered as anything more than an indicative order of magnitude’.487 While this 
conclusion was reached in 2004, it still very much holds true today. It is notable that in 2015 
Reuter even spoke about ‘the failure of the economics profession to engage with such an 
important and interesting phenomenon [as IFFs]’.488 
 
In addition to economic models, several approaches have emerged that attempt to estimate the 
IFFs based on field and case studies. One such approach is to analyse criminal cases, wherein 
the proceeds of money laundering have been confiscated, focusing on the amounts of money 
involved.489 The main problem with such an approach, however, is that it is unclear to what 
extent they represent the total money laundering activities in a certain country. After all, many 
such activities may never result in a criminal conviction. 
 
Another method worth mentioning in this context is to examine unusual or suspicious 
transactions reported to financial intelligence units (FIUs) established in most countries to 
monitor and control money laundering. However, this approach is also unable to produce 
accurate data on the extent of IFFs. Being dependent on the financial and other sectors for 
information, the FIUs may simply not avail themselves of comprehensive and reliable data. In 
particular, financial institutions may not only under-report unusual or suspicious transactions, 
but also over-report such transactions in order to avoid accusations of not having informed the 
authorities. 
 
In addition, it should be borne in mind that transactions reported as unusual or suspicious to 
the FIUs may not necessarily involve illegal activity. Whether or not a person will be convicted 
for money laundering normally depends on whether the public prosecutor brings the case to 
court and is ultimately for the court to determine. However, together with other data obtained 
from economic analyses and/or criminal case studies, the FIUs reports may give an indication 
of the extent to which a certain country is affected by money laundering. 
 
3.3.2 The potential scale of the problem 
 
In view of the complexity involved in calculating how much money is being laundered and a 
lack of general consensus as to how this should be done, it thus does not come as a surprise that 
the estimates of IFFs affecting developing countries vary and are heavily debated. However, 
this does not mean that the problem of IFFs does not exist or that it is only of minor importance. 
On the  contrary,  there  is  a  general agreement  that  IFFs  from  the  developing  world  are 
 
 
487 P. Reuter and E.M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money – The Fight against Money Laundering, 
Washington, Institute for International Economics, 2004, p. 12. 
488 P. Reuter, Illicit Financial Flows, Perspective Paper for the Project Benefits and Costs of the IFF 
Targets for the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Post-2015 Consensus, p. 1. 
489 Such an approach was used, for example, to estimate money laundering in the Netherlands. 
See, for example, J. Meloen , R. Landman, H. de Miranda, J. van Eekelen J. and S. van Soest, Buit 
en Bestendig: Een empirisch onderzoek naar de omvang, de kenmerken en de besteding van misdaadgeld, 
Den Haag, Reed Business Information, 2003. 
Ex-Post Impact Assessment 






substantial.490 In fact, each year huge sums of money are transferred out of developing countries 
illegally. The most authoritative and up-to-date data on IFFs from developing countries 
available so far come from the GFI.491 Even though the data presented below may not be precise, 
it does give an indication of the scale and dynamics of IFFs affecting such countries. 
 
According to the latest study published by the GFI in December 2015, from 2004 to 2013 the 
developing world as a whole lost $7.8 trillion on IFFs, averaging 4 percent of developing 
countries’ GDP over the ten-year period.492 What is more, these flows increased at 6.5% per 
annum. In 2013, IFFs from developing and emerging economies hit $1.1 trillion, marking a 
dramatic increase from 2004, when illicit outflows totalled just $465.3 billion. 
 
These figures are based on two sources: (1) deliberate goods trade misinvoicing; and (2) 
leakages in the country’s external accounts. According to the GFI, an average of 83.4% of illicit 
financial flows was due to the misinvoicing of trade in goods alone. While services are not 
included in the studies by the GFI,493, they may nevertheless also significantly contribute to IFFs 
as they constitute a growing component of international trade, meaning that the estimates 
produced by the GFI may rather be understated than overstated. The increasing misinvoicing 
of services and intangibles, such as intra-group loans, intellectual property and management 
fees, has been signalled, for example, by the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from 
Africa which argues that such practices increasingly contribute to IFFs from Africa.494 
 
This may indicate that nowadays trade-based money laundering (or ‘money-laundering 
through the back door’) serves as an important (if not the major) means for transferring funds 
out of developing countries illicitly. Money laundering by making use of the financial sector (or 
‘money laundering through the front door’) may thus no longer be the main channel for the 
IFFs. At the same time, the GFI’s study shows that there is also a noticeable growth in the HMN 
estimate of balance of payment leakages over 2003-2014. While initially only accounting for 6.9% 
of illicit outflows in 2004, the hot money narrow estimate rose to 19.4% of illicit flows by 2013. 
 
It is also striking that, while, as mentioned above, $1.1 trillion flowed illicitly out of developing 




490 P. Reuter, ‘Policy and Research Implications of Illicit Flows’, in P. Reuter (ed.), Draining 
Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries, Washington, World 
Bank, 2012, p. 483, at 484. 
491 Though  its methodology for estimating IFFs has also been criticised in the academic 
literature. See, for example, P. Reuter, Illicit Financial Flows, Perspective Paper for the Project 
Benefits and Costs of the IFF Targets for the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Post-2015 Consensus, p. 
1. 
492 D. Kar and J. Spanjers, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004-2013, Global 
Financial Integrity, December 2015, p. 23. 
493 This is due to a lack of bilateral trade data on services. 
494 High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, Illicit Financial Flows: Track It! Stop It!  
Get It!, p. 28. 
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aid. This means that ‘[f]or every development-targeted dollar entering the developing world in 
2013, over $10 exited illicitly’.495 
 
What is particularly notable in the context of the present study is that, according to the GFI, 
Mexico and South Africa, with which the EU has concluded free trade agreements, are in the 
top ten of 149 developing countries with largest average illicit financial flows in the period 
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Table 5 Illicit Financial Outflows from the top ten source economies, 2004-2013 (in millions of nominal U.S. dollars) 
 








46,064 53,322 66,333 81,237 107,756 125,062 136,622 183,501 129,545 120,331 1,049,772 104,977 
3 Mexico 34,239 35,352 40,421 46,443 51,505 38,438 67,450 63,299 73,709 77,583 528,439 52,844 
4 India 19,447 20,253 27,791 34,513 47,221 29,247 70,337 85,584 92,879 83,014 510,286 51,029 
5 Malaysia 26,591 35,255 36,554 36,525 40,779 34,416 62,154 50,211 47,804 48,251 418,542 41,854 
6 Brazil 15,741 17,171 10,599 16,430 21,926 22,061 30,770 31,057 32,727 28,185 226,667 22,667 
7 South Africa 12,137 13,599 12,864 27,292 22,539 29,589 24,613 23,028 26,138 17,421 209,219 20,922 
8 Thailand 7,113 11,920 11,429 10,348 20,486 14,687 24,100 27,442 31,271 32,971 191,768 19,177 
9 Indonesia 18,466 13,290 15,995 18,354 27,237 20,547 14,646 18,292 19,248 14,633 180,710 18,071 
10 Nigeria 1,680 17,867 19,160 19,335 24,192 26,377 19,376 18,321 4,998 26,735 178,040 17,804 
 
Source: D. Kar and J. Spanjers, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004-2013, Global Financial Integrity, December 2015, p. 8. 
201 
PE 579.326 
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According to this data, Mexico occupies the 3rd position after China and Russian 
Federation in the list of the top ten developing countries most affected by IFFs, having lost 
$528,439 million between 2004 and 2013.652 What is also striking is that the amount of IFFs 
from this country in 2013 – estimated at $77,583 million – almost doubled compared to that 
in 2002 when it stood at $34,239 million. South Africa comes in 7th in the top ten group, 
having lost $209,219 million over the period from 2004 to 2013. A sharp increase in the IFFs 
out of this country took place between 2006 and 2007, averaging at $20,922 million per 
annum. 
 
The study by the GFI also contains some relevant data on the other three developing 
countries in question with which the EU also concluded the EU FTAs, i.e. Peru, Colombia 
and Serbia.653 Peru occupies the 33rd position in the ranking of 149 countries by the largest 
average illicit financial flow, with $4,284 million on average having left the country 
between 2004 and 2013. It is closely followed by Serbia, which has been placed on the 35th 
position with $4,083 million of IFFs on average in the same period. Colombia comes in 63rd 
with an average of $1,495 million per annum.654 
 
Given that several developing countries in question – Mexico, Colombia and Peru – are 
associated with the illegal drug industry and cross-border criminal activities, the recent 
findings of the UNODC concerning the magnitude of illicit funds generated by drug 
trafficking and other transnational organised crime also deserve mentioning in the present 
context.655 Based on a meta-analysis of the results from various studies, the UNDOC 
estimated that all criminal proceeds in 2009 are likely to amount to some 3.6% of global 
GDP, equivalent to about $2.1 trillion. It also emerged from this analysis that the best 
estimate for laundering through the financial systems would be equivalent to 2.7% of 
global GDP or $1.6 trillion. What is more, the results of the study suggest that ‘[e]xpressed 
as a proportion of national GDP, all crime proceeds appear to be generally higher in 









652 See also D. Kar, Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the  
Underground Economy, Global Financial Integrity, January 2012. 
653 D. Kar and J. Spanjers, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004-2013, Global 
Financial Integrity, December 2015, available at:, Appendix Table 2. Country Rankings by 
Largest Average Illicit Financial Flows, 2004-2013 (HMN+GER). 
654 As discussed in section 3.4 below, the major problem for Colombia is not outflows but 
inflows of illicit capital. 
655 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting  
from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime: Research Report, UNODC, 
2011. 
656 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting  
from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime: Research Report, UNODC, 
2011, p. 7. 
Ex-Post Impact Assessment 






3.3.3 A causal link between illicit financial flows and the EU 
FTAs? 
 
While there is no doubt that developing countries, in particular Mexico and South Africa, 
are substantially affected by IFFs, the statistical data discussed above does not provide any 
direct evidence of a causal link between (an increase in) the IFFs from these countries and 
the liberalisation of trade in goods and services, in particular financial services, with the 
EU. For example, the statistics on Mexico generally show a steady increase in IFFs in the 
period from 2003 to 2014 when the free trade agreement between this country and the EU 
was fully operational.657 Such an increase, however, might be (chiefly) caused by other 
factors, such as the parallel operation of NAFTA with the United States and Canada which 
also liberalised trade in goods and services, including financial services. In fact, an increase 
in IFFs from Mexico has been largely attributed to the conclusion of NAFTA by the GFI. 
The study published by this organisation in 2012 shows that, as a percentage of GDP, IFFs 
from Mexico increased from an average of 4.5% of the GDP in the period before NAFTA 
came into effect in January 1994 to an average of 6.3% of the GDP in the 17 years that 
followed.658 According to Kar who authored this study:659 
 
‘While entering into NAFTA had many advantages for Mexico, it also provided incentives 
for many to transfer illicit capital abroad. Between 1994 and 2010, NAFTA seems to have 
facilitated illicit outflows totalling at least US$561 billion through export under-invoicing 
and import over-invoicing.’ 
 
In addition, while trade-based money laundering appears to be the largest source of IFFs 
from developing countries, it is important to remember that the data on misinvoicing 
presented by the GFI only covers goods and not (financial) services. This data, therefore, 
does not tell us anything about the extent of money laundering by mispricing (financial) 
services, let alone about a possible role of the EU FTAs in this context. 
 
Likewise, no conclusive statistical evidence of a causal link between the EU FTAs and IFFs 
can be found in the data produced by the FIUs. For instance, while the free trade agreement 
between the EU and Peru became operational on 1 March 2013, the data obtained from the 
FIU of Peru show a noteworthy development – compared to the two previous years, in 
2014 the financial institutions’ reporting of suspicious transactions from Peru to a number 
of the EU countries almost doubled (see Box 16). Although this increase in the reported 
suspicious transactions may point to an increase in IFFs between Peru and the EU (in 
particular Spain which figures most prominently in the FIU Peru’s report) after the trade 
agreement came into effect, it may equally result from the improvement in reporting by 




657 The EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation 
Agreement signed in December 1997 entered into force in October 2000 for the part related 
to goods and in March 2001 for the part related to services. 
658 D. Kar, Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic Imbalances, and the Underground  
Economy, Global Financial Integrity, January 2012, p. 61. 
659 D. Kar,  Mexico: Illicit Financial Flows, Macroeconomic  Imbalances, and  the  
Underground Economy, Global Financial Integrity, January 2012, p. 33. 
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investigations and convictions for money laundering, the reported suspicious transactions 
as such cannot be seen as hard proof of illegality. 
 
Table 6 Suspicious transactions between Peru and the EU as reported by financial 
institutions to the Peru FIU over 2010-2015 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total EU Country Number 




mention any EU 
country 






Total of STR 932 1199 1843 2425 3097 2830 12326 Belgium 2 
Annual 
participation % 
















   
involving EU 
countries 

































Source: Peru FIU, unpublished data on file with the authors. 
 
Despite the lack of conclusive statistical evidence of a causal link between the EU FTAs and 
(an increase in) IFFs, the data available at present provides a strong indication that the 
liberalisation of trade between the EU and developing countries increases the threat of 
money laundering in such countries and is therefore likely to contribute to an increase in 
IFFs. Given the far-reaching commitments under the EU FTAs in question of both the EU 
and developing countries regarding access to each other’s markets for goods and services, 
including in the financial services sector, such agreements significantly increase trade 
openness. Hence, they also increase the threat of money laundering facing developing 
countries, considering that the IFFs from such jurisdictions are not only already substantial 
but are also on the rise, and that some countries in the EU are an attractive destination for 
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money launderers from the developing world. The operation of the EU FTAs is therefore 
likely to contribute to an increase in IFFs from the developing countries to the EU. 
 
A similar argument has been made, for example, with regard to the free trade agreement 
between the EU and Colombia/Peru.660 In light of the susceptibility of Colombia and Peru 
to IFFs, the far-reaching liberalisation of financial services between the EU and these 
countries and their weak obligations under the free trade agreement to fight money 
laundering and tax evasion, the author concludes that the risk of the mentioned 
malpractices will increase. 
 
Several respondents in this study also shared this assumption, in particular with regard to 
trade-based money laundering. In the words of three different respondents: 
 
‘You could say that as soon as trade flows increase, the ability to hide in a bigger flow 
becomes greater.’ 
 
‘There is always a claim that there is a lot of trade-based money laundering. And to the 
extent that the free trade agreement increases Mexico/EU-trade, you can say almost 
mechanically that there will be an increase in illicit financial flows between Mexico and the 
EU, just as the result of the expansion of the trade.’ 
 
‘What we find in our econometric studies … is the relationship between trade openness 
(i.e. exports plus imports over GDP) [and trade misinvoicing]. So, as trade openness 
increases, misinvoicing increases. We find that link, i.e. the larger volume of trade in goods 
(…) causes more misinvoicing, other things remaining the same [like weak governance in 
developing countries]… In fact, services are easier to misinvoice [than goods] (…) You can 
always make the case that your services are somehow distinct. Services are intangibles. 
They don’t go through customs (…) It is settled through payments.’ 
 
An important caveat should be made here. As has been noted above, this study has 
primarily focused on the effects of the liberalisation of financial services on money 
laundering. However, the findings concerning trade-based money laundering presented 
above, point to the fact that financial services may not necessarily be the only (or even the 
major factor) contributing to an increase in IFFs from developing countries. While the trade 
in financial services is certainly likely to lead to such an increase, the operation of the EU 
FTAs considerably increases the risk of mispricing of goods and services in general – an 





660 M. Vander Stichele, Free Trade Agreement EU– Colombia & Peru: Deregulation, Illicit  
Financial Flows And Money Laundering, Commissioned by GUE/NGL Group (German 
Delegation), Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen (SOMO), Amsterdam, 
2012. 
661 In fact, as the WTO dispute between Panama and Colombia shows, similar problems 
can also occur when trade between developing countries is liberalised. For more 
information on this case see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/   
cases_e/ds461_e.htm .. 
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Therefore, it can be concluded that the increasing volume of trade in goods and services in 
general, and in financial services in particular, between the EU and the developing 
countries in question is likely to facilitate IFFs, further aggravating the problem. 
 
Finally, it should also be emphasised that this conclusion applies only with respect to the 
developing countries considered in this study, i.e. South Africa, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, 
and Serbia. This means that the arguments developed above are not applicable with regard 
to Korea. The research team has not found any statistical evidence concerning the negative 
effects of the EU FTAs on money laundering in this country. No conceptual argument 
supporting such a conclusion can, in our view, be made either, in particular given the 
absence of data concerning the IFFs between Korea and the EU. 
 
3.4 The Impact of Illicit Financial Flows 
 
3.4.1 The effects of illicit financial outflows 
 
As has been demonstrated above, each year substantial sums of money are transferred out 
of developing countries illegally. There is a general agreement that these illicit financial 
outflows have a profoundly negative impact on the development potential of such 
countries. Recently, concern about the adverse effects of such outflows has been expressed 
by a variety of important international actors, such as the UNODC,662 the High Level Panel 
on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa,663 the OECD,664 the World Bank665 and the GFI.666 In 
addition, the devastating consequences of IFFs on developing countries have also been 
highlighted in the academic literature.667 From the countries in question in this study, 
Mexico and South Africa are particularly heavily affected by the outflows of illicit money. 
 
In general, substantial outflows of illicit money from developing countries severely 
undermine domestic resource mobilisation and can, as a result, seriously imperil 




662 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting  
from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime: Research Report, (UNODC, 
2011), p. 99 et seq. 
663 High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, Illicit Financial Flows: Track It!  
Stop It! Get It!, p. 52 et seq. 
664  OECD, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: Measuring OECD Responses, 
(OECD, 2014), p. 15 et seq. 
665 See, for example, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 
The World Bank in the Global Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 2003, p. 
4 et seq. 
666 See, for example, Global Financial Integrity, Illicit Financial Flows: The Most Damaging  
Economic Condition Facing the Developing World, Global Financial Integrity, September 2015. 
667 See, in particular, P. Reuter (ed.), Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit 
Funds from Developing Countries, Washington, World Bank, 2012. 
668  OECD, Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: Measuring OECD Responses, 
OECD, 2014, p. 15. 
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‘These illicit financial flows strip resources from developing countries that could be used 
to finance much-needed public services, from security and justice to basic social services 
such as health and education, weakening their financial systems and economic potential. 
While such practices occur in all countries – and are damaging everywhere – the social and 
economic impact on developing countries is more severe given their smaller resource base 
and markets. Estimates vary greatly and are heavily debated, but there is a general 
consensus that illicit financial flows likely exceed aid flows and investment in volume.’ 
 
In particular, illicit financial outflows may have the following detrimental effects on 
developing countries: 
 Reducing domestic expenditure, both public and private; 
 Reducing foreign private investment; 
 Damaging the reputation of financial institutions and the functioning of the 
financial sector more generally; 
 Discouraging structural transformation and transparency of economies 
(continually relying, for example, on natural resources extraction); 
 Weakening the rule of law, in particular by increasing crime and corruption; 
 Threatening political and economic security; and 
 Undermining international development cooperation. 
 
3.4.2 The effects of illicit financial inflows 
 
While many developing countries are primarily troubled by illicit financial outflows, in 
some illicit financial inflows resulting from the entry of the foreign revenues of the drug 
industry present much greater problems. This is the case, for example, in Colombia. As 
Thoumi and Anzola explain:669 
 
‘In Colombia, money laundering has mainly been associated with the illegal drug industry, 
in which criminal activities cross borders, and payments are commonly made abroad. The 
main concern for the recipients of these funds is not only to launder the money, but also to 
bring the money to their countries, including back to Colombia. In the case of kleptocrats, 
guerrillas, and common organised criminals, even though the illegal funds are, in some 
cases, sent abroad, they are invested or spent directly in Colombia in most cases. The 
amounts of funds that these actors wish to send abroad likely pale in comparison with the 
amounts that trafﬁckers wish to bring back in.’ 
 
Substantial inflows of illicit money in developing countries generate their own problems 
for such countries. Obviously, such inflows strengthen organised crime and allow it to 








669 F.E. Thoumi and M. Anzola, ‘Illicit Capital Flows and Money Laundering in Colombia’, 
in P. Reuter (ed.), Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing 
Countries, Washington, World Bank, 2012, pp. 145-146. 
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negative socio-economic effects on developing countries. According to the UNODC, these 
include in particular:670 
 Distorting the resource allocation from high-yielding investments to investments 
that run a low risk of detection; 
 Distorting prices, notably in the real estate sector; 
 Distorting consumption and imports; 
 Distorting exports and potential problems with investment and economic growth; 
 Unfair competition; 
 Risks  of  crowding  out  licit  activities  and  negative  impact  on  direct  foreign 
investment; 
 Facilitating corruption; 
 Risks of real sector volatility; 
 Strengthening skewed income and wealth distributions; 
 Distorting  economic  statistics  and  thus  potential  errors  in  economic  policy 
decision-making; and 
 Undermining the credibility of legal institutions. 
 
In Colombia, the revenues from the illicit drugs industry have created a particularly grave 
problem in rural and urban real estate, aggravating rural land concentration.671 As drug 
money could not be easily invested in the modern economy, drug trafﬁckers purchased 
large amounts of rural land. For this purpose, paramilitary groups within the country 
forced the large-scale displacements of peasants. As a result, today, except for Syria, 
Colombia has the largest number of internally displaced citizens in the world. The Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates the number of displaced Colombians, as of 
December 2014, at more than 6 million672 in a total population of 48.3 million. 
 




The above analysis has shown that IFFs affecting developing countries are substantial and 
that they  have  a profoundly negative  impact on the  development potential of  such 
countries. From a policy point of view, however, it may be more important to focus not on 




670 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting  
from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime: Research Report, UNODC, 
2011, 
p. 109 et seq. 
671 Thoumi and Anzola, pp. 145-152. 
672 Internal Displacement Monitor, Colombia IDP Figures Analysis, available at: 
http://www.internal-displacement.org/americas/colombia/figures-analysis. 
673 Cf. P. Reuter, ‘Policy and Research Implications of Illicit Financial Flows’, in P. Reuter 
(ed.), Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries, 
(Washington: World Bank, 2012), pp. 483-484. 
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While this study explores the effects of the EU FTAs on money laundering and tax evasion 
with a focus on third countries, there is an important caveat which needs to be considered 
when discussing the causes of IFFs affecting such countries. IFFs are not only the problem 
of the developing countries, but also of the developed countries, in particular in the EU. 
 
For many years, western financial institutions have both intentionally and unintentionally 
facilitated the absorption of illicit money from the developing world. For example, in 2012 
an EU based bank, HSBC (headquartered in the UK), was caught laundering hundreds of 
millions of U.S. dollars for two drug cartels – one each in Mexico and Colombia – and had 
to pay at least $1.92 billion in a settlement with U.S. authorities. According to the U.S. 
prosecutors:674 
 
‘So rampant was the practice that on some days drug traffickers deposited hundreds of 
thousands of dollars at HSBC Mexico accounts. To speed things along, the criminals even 
designed “specially shaped boxes” that fit the size of teller windows at HSBC branches, 
according to the documents.’ 
 
In response to this scandal, the UK Financial Services Authority,675 as lead regulator for the 
HSBC Group globally, took action in respect of HSBC’s compliance with AML 
legislation.676 However, as one of our respondents observed when talking about the role of 
the developed world in generating IFFs: 
 
‘We have also been complicit in absorbing [the illicit financial flows]. From time to time 
you hear all these stories in the media (…) HSBC has been caught in this money laundering 
exercise (…) The HSBC and Mexico scandal (...) So from time to time, we get these media 
flashes that certain such banks have been fined (…) But, of course, nobody goes to jail. So 
business continues as usual. They just pay the fine and carry on as usual. So there is much 
to be said that we have all these instruments that are very hard to track (…) like financial 
derivatives (…) We don’t have information on beneficial ownership: you don’t know who 
the ultimate owner of the account is. We have shell companies. We have trust funds. We 
have all these tax havens that house hundreds of thousands of corporations in one building 
(…) And all of this is going on (…) Nobody seems to be willing to tackle these things.’ 
 
Effective AML controls are key to stopping IFFs. Designing and operationalising such 
controls, however, is the major challenge facing not only the developing world but also the 
developed world, including the EU. 
 
Given the focus of this study, the authors will next explore the effectiveness of the AML 
system in the developing countries in question. The comparative legal analysis of the 




674 C. Mollenkamp, ‘HSBC Became Bank to Drug Cartels, Pays Big for Lapses’, Reuters, 11 
December 2012. 
675  In 2013, the Financial Services Authority was succeeded by the Financial Conduct 
Authority. 
676 FCA, ‘FSA requires action of the HSBC Group’, March 2013. 
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countries with the international standards produced by the global standard-setter in the 
fight against money laundering – the FATF. 
 
The major problem faced by the developing countries is a significant discrepancy between 
the AML law on the books and the AML law in action. Large IFFs affecting such countries 
are a striking manifestation of the extent of this problem. Moreover, according to the 
UNODC, it appears that globally much less than 1% (probably around 0,2%) of the 
proceeds of drug trafficking and other transnational organised crime laundered via the 
financial system are seized and frozen.677 
 
Prior to analysing the major structural and functional weaknesses that undermine the well- 
functioning of the AML systems in developing countries, it should be emphasised that the 
effectiveness of such systems ultimately depends on the efforts of all actors involved 
therein. These include governments, FIUs, the police, public prosecutors, judges, reporting 
entities like banks, dealers in high value goods, notaries, accountants, lawyers and other 
groups in the private sector.678 In the context of money laundering through the financial 
system, the proper functioning of the ‘financial AML chain’ at national level, as illustrated 
in Box 17, is particularly important. 
 






677 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting  
from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crime: Research Report, UNODC, 
2011, p. 7. 
678 Cf. Project ‘ECOLEF’ The Economic and Legal Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering and  







Although there are many modalities, the ‘financial AML chain’ at national level generally works as 
follows. 
 
In the first place, financial institutions are supposed to track and report unusual or suspicious
transactions to FIUs. 
 
The FIUs in turn receive and analyse the reported transactions and decide which cases to forward
to criminal law enforcement authorities (public prosecutor, police department or judges depending
on the specific characteristics of the country in question). 
 
At the next stage when the suspect has been identified, an important role is normally played by the
public prosecutor. The latter decides whether or not to start a criminal investigation into a particular
suspicious transaction and eventually submit a criminal case to the judge. 
 
Finally, the judge decides whether a person concerned should be convicted of money laundering. 
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3.5.2 Structural weaknesses of developing countries 
 
The well-functioning of the ‘financial AML chain’ described above in any country depends 
on the willingness and ability of all the actors involved therein to fight money laundering. 
The problem in one of the links may severally impair the effectiveness of the chain as a 
whole. In the case of developing countries, structural weaknesses caused by the weak rule 
of law and poor governance may severely distort incentives for some actors to do their 
work properly. Structural weaknesses that generally trouble developing countries include 
the following: 
 Undue political influence, in particular on public prosecutors and judges either 
to prosecute regime opponents and ﬁnancial institutions or not; 
 Bribery; 
 Corruption; 
 Large-scale organised crime; 
 Substantial informal economy; and 
 Insufficient co-operation between various institutions involved in combating 
crime, in particular between anti-corruption and AML bodies. 
 
The case of Mexico, for example, is particularly illustrative in this context. According to the 
2015 U.S. government report:679 
 
‘Mexico is a major drug producing and transit country. Proceeds from the illicit drug trade 
leaving the United States are the principal source of funds laundered through the Mexican 
financial system. Other significant sources of laundered funds include corruption, 
kidnapping, extortion, intellectual property  rights violations, human trafficking, and 
trafficking in firearms. Sophisticated and well-organised drug trafficking organisations 
based in Mexico take advantage of the extensive U.S.-Mexico border, the large flow of 
legitimate remittances, Mexico’s proximity to Central American countries, and the high 
volume of legal commerce to conceal illicit transfers to Mexico (…) The combination of a 
sophisticated financial sector and a large cash-based informal sector complicates money 
laundering countermeasures (…) Corruption is the enabler of money laundering and its 
predicate offences. Corruption is endemic at all levels of Mexican society and government. 
The Government of Mexico should combat corruption.’ 
 
In general, the independence of the key actors involved in the ‘financial AML chain’ is 
crucial to its well-functioning. As Levi explains:680 
 
‘Unless the national ﬁnancial intelligence unit (FIU) is believed to be both discreet and 
independent of the government, potential whistle-blowers might be afraid of exposure as 
sources of information. If suspicions are communicated to the FIU, what could the FIU 
plausibly do with the report [if investigators and prosecutors are not truly independent]? 
 
 
679 Unites States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: Country Database, June 2015, 
p. 297 et seq. 
680 M. Levi, ‘How Well do Anti-Money Laundering Controls Work in Developing 
Countries?’, in P. Reuter (ed.), Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from 
Developing Countries, (Washington: World Bank, 2012), pp. 373-374. 
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This highlights the importance of the relationship between FIUs and effectively 
independent investigation and prosecutorial bodies, which may be needed if AML regimes 
in developing countries are to have a signiﬁcant impact on domestic grand corruption.’ 
 
A first essential step in tackling structural weaknesses is to identify them. In this context, 
it is notable that some developing countries have been proactive and have come up with 
national money laundering risk assessments or national plans for combating money 
laundering in which structural weaknesses affecting them have been explicitly 
acknowledged. For example, the national plan for combating money laundering in Peru 
has identified the following structural problems affecting the effectiveness of its AML 
system:681 
 A   lack   of   mechanisms   for   inter-institutional   coordination   between   the 
constituent components of the AML system; 
 Corruption; 
 Economic informality; 
 Insufficient control over borders; and 
 Underdevelopment of statistical databases affecting the entire AML system. 
 
Indeed, as noted in the 2015 U.S. government report:682 
 
‘Peru’s cash-based and heavily-dollarised economy, large informal sector (estimated to be 
70% of GDP), and deficient regulatory supervision of designated non-financial businesses 
and professions (DNFBPs), such as informal money exchanges and wire transfer services, 
make the economy vulnerable to money laundering and other financial crimes.’ 
 
What struck us in the course of the empirical study is that the respondents from those 
developing countries that have publicly acknowledged their structural problems in 
fighting money laundering were more willing to cooperate with the research team and 
openly discuss such sensitive issues as compared to the (potential) respondents from those 
countries that have not done so (yet). The explicit recognition of fundamental domestic 
problems and the willingness to talk about them may be an indicator of whether or not 
there is a political will in a particular country to move away from purely formal compliance 
with the AML law towards substantive compliance. 
 
A welcome development in this context is the adoption of the new approach to assessing 
compliance with its recommendations by the FATF. While in the past technical compliance 
with the black-letter rules was sufficient, the new methodology also includes the 
effectiveness test. According to the FATF:683 
 
‘The effectiveness assessment differs fundamentally from the assessment of technical 
compliance.  It  seeks  to  assess  the  adequacy  of  the  implementation  of  the  FATF 
 
 
681 Superintendent of Banking, Insurance and Private Pension Funds of Peru, National Plan 
for Fighting Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, May 2011 (on file with authors), p. 20 
et seq. 
682 U.S. Department of State, Peru Investment Climate Statement 2015, May 2015, p. 8. 
683 FATF, Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and 
the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems, FATF, February 2015, updated October 2015, p. 5. 
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recommendations, and identifies the extent to which a country achieves a defined set of 
outcomes that are central to a robust AML/CFT [counter-terrorism financing] system. The 
focus of the effectiveness assessment is therefore on the extent to which the legal and 
institutional framework is producing the expected results.’ 
 
Such an outcome-focused approach has the potential to reduce the gap between the AML 
law on the books and the AML law in action in developing countries. The evaluations of 
the developing countries in question based on the new methodology are expected in the 
coming years. Thus, Serbia will be evaluated in 2016, followed by Mexico, Colombia and 
Peru in 2017, and South Africa in 2019.684 The new evaluation reports drawn as a result 
could throw new light on the effectiveness of the AML legislation in these countries and 
ultimately prompt real improvements in their AML systems. 
 
3.5.3 Functional  weaknesses  of  the  anti-money  laundering 
systems in developing countries 
 
In addition to structural weaknesses, the effectiveness of the AML systems in developing 
countries is also seriously undermined by the functional weaknesses of such systems 
themselves. As confirmed by our respondents, the functional problems affecting the AML 
systems in developing countries generally have to do with the capacity of the actors 
involved in the ‘financial AML chain’, as well as public authorities supervising compliance 
with the AML law, to properly identify, assess, and address money laundering risks. The 
three main capacity-related weaknesses affecting the ‘financial AML chain’ include: 
 Shortage of resources; 
 Insufficient knowledge and experience; and 
 Little coordination between different actors. 
 
These key problems are reflected, for example, in the above mentioned Peruvian plan for 
combating money laundering, which specifically mentions, inter alia, the following 
functional vulnerabilities: 
 Problems with identification of beneficial ownership in the banking and securities 
sector; 
 Overburdening of the supervisory capacity of the FIU; 
 Poor quality of the strategic analysis of long term money laundering trends; 
 Lack  of  experts  with  specialised  skills  needed  to  conduct  complex  money 
laundering investigations; 
 No effective coordination between the FIUs, police and public prosecutor office; 
and 











684 FATF, Global Assessment Calender-July 2015. 
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These weaknesses seriously undermine the effectiveness of the Peruvian AML system. For 
example, according to the 2015 U.S. government report,685 only 64 Financial Intelligence 
Reports totalling $214 million were submitted to the Public Ministry from January to 
September 2013, although 3,265 STRs, with a total value of $4.91 billion, were filed during 
the same period. Most STRs originate in Lima (59%); as of October 2013, there were 238 
cases at various stages within the judicial system and approximately 797 cases in the 
investigative phase. According to the same U.S. report,686 Peru made significant strides to 
continue the implementation of the national plan for combating money laundering. Both 
the appointed Prime Minister and the Superintendent of Banks, Insurance, and Pension 
Funds (SBS) expressed commitments to fully implement the National Plan. However, 
many problems still remain. In particular, the Peruvian FIU needs additional resources to 
deal with its expanded monitoring responsibilities. 
 
Peru would also benefit from capacity building efforts in the prosecutorial system, 
including in: the conduct of investigations; the presentation and the use of clearer language 
when writing investigative reports for prosecutors; and the improvement of prosecutorial 
capacity. Prosecutors complain they cannot understand the format or language of many of 
the FIU’s investigative results. In addition, the lack of financial experts to decode the FIU’s 
reports makes it difficult for prosecutors to investigate the results within the required 120- 
day time frame. Compounding the problem, many judges lack adequate training to 
manage the technical elements of money laundering cases, and banks often delay 
providing information to judges and prosecutors. Convictions tend to be for lesser offences 
or predicate crimes, such as tax evasion or drug trafficking, which are easier offences to 
prosecute successfully. 
 
The capacity-related problems also figure prominently in the national risk assessment on 
money laundering in Serbia:687 
 
‘One reason for the small number of judgments is (…) the insufficient level of education 
and information of prosecutors engaged in investigating [money laundering] offences and 
judges. Better coordination among all government authorities participating in this battle 
against money laundering is necessary in addition to training. Strengthening the 
prosecutor’s role in all of these mechanisms is essential. The prosecutor should assume the 
role of coordinator and leader in the proceedings.’ 
 
In addition, the Serbian central financial intelligence unit – Money Laundering Prevention 
Administration (MLPA) – and the Tax Administration are understaffed, undertrained and 





685  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: Country Database, June 2015, p. 340. 
686  U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: Country Database, June 2015, p. 338 et seq. 
687  E. Pantelić, National Risk  Assessment of Money Laundering in the Republic of Serbia, 
Belgrade, April 2012. 
Ex-Post Impact Assessment 




In the same vein, in its 2015 South Africa financial sector assessment, the IMF stresses that 
structural capacity weaknesses frustrate the overall effectiveness of the efforts made by the 
South African law enforcement, and particularly prosecutorial authorities, to pursue 
complex money laundering cases, including those that involve foreign proceeds of 
crime.688 
 
All in all, increasing the capacity of the AML systems in developing countries is key to 
ensuring the effectiveness of their AML legislation in practice. Several international actors, 
in particular the World Bank, have been involved in assisting developing countries in 
building such capacity. Regional actors may also play an important role in this area. In the 
case of Serbia, for example, support by the EU and the Council of Europe has proven 
essential for developing its capacity in the AML field. Similar efforts could also be made in 
relation to other developing countries. 
 
3.6 Key Findings 
 
 The concept of IFFs is central to the study into the effects of the EU FTAs on money 
laundering in the  developing countries parties thereto. Such  flows are most 
commonly defined as money (understood as funds or assets) illegally earned, 
transferred, or used. However, at present there is no general consensus on the 
precise meaning of this concept. Where to draw the line between legal and illicit 
flows has proved particularly controversial. 
 Given the complexity involved in calculating how much money is being laundered 
and a lack of general consensus as to how this should be done, at present, there are 
no (exact) statistical estimates of IFFs from developing countries, in general, and 
IFFs resulting from the conclusion of the EU FTAs with such countries, in 
particular. At the same time, there is a general agreement that IFFs from the 
developing world are substantial and that they are on the increase. In particular, 
Mexico and South Africa are among the 10 biggest exporters of illicit money. The 
developing countries concerned thus face a significant threat of money laundering. 
In addition, it is widely acknowledged that IFFs are often going to developed 
countries, including those in the EU. 
 Despite the lack of conclusive statistical evidence of a causal link between the 
operation of the EU FTAs and (an increase in) IFFs, the available data provides a 
strong indication that such a link is present as far as developing countries are 
concerned. Given (a) the significant degree of trade openness envisaged by the EU 
FTAs, (b) the already substantial and constantly rising IFFs from developing 
countries, and (c) the attractiveness of the EU as a destination for money 
launderers from such countries, the liberalisation of trade in goods and services, 
including financial services, between the EU and developing countries increases 
the threat of money laundering. The operation of the EU FTAs is therefore likely 
to contribute to an increase in IFFs from developing countries to the EU. 
 An increase in illicit financial flows may not only (or even primarily) be due to the 
liberalisation  of  financial  services.  While  traditionally illicit  money  has  been 
 
 
688 IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program, Anti-money Laundering and  
Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) - Technical Note, IMF Country Report No. 
15/51, February 2015, p. 22. 
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laundered by making use of the international financial system, nowadays trade- 
based money laundering has  become increasingly important as  a means for 
transferring funds out of developing countries illicitly. By fraudulently 
manipulating the price, quantity, or quality of a good or service on an invoice, 
criminals can transfer significant amounts of money across international borders. 
Trade-based money laundering could therefore be an important (if not a major) 
source of illicit financial flows from the developing countries to the EU. 
 IFFs can have a profoundly negative impact on developing countries. Such an 
impact can be caused not only by outflows of illicit money from developing 
countries but also by inflows of illicit money in such countries. Substantial 
outflows of illicit funds severely undermine domestic resource mobilisation, 
imperilling sustainable development and economic growth. Significant inflows of 
illicit funds in turn strengthen organised crime and have major and adverse socio- 
economic consequences. 
 In view of a great deal of complexity presently involved in calculating IFFs, 
particularly as a result of the operation of the EU free trade agreements, no precise 
estimates of such flows can be expected in the near future. However, this fact 
should not undermine the efforts of the international community aimed at 
reducing IFFs from the developing world. Such efforts should primarily focus on 
studying and addressing the causes of such flows. 
 The key problem faced by developing countries in combating IFFs is a significant 
discrepancy between the anti-money laundering (AML) law on the books and the 
AML law in action. The effectiveness of AML systems in such countries is 
undermined by: (a) structural weaknesses caused by poor implementation of good 
governance principles and deficiencies in the enforcement of the rule of law (e.g. 
corruption, large-scale organised crime, and a substantial informal economy); and 
(b) major functional weaknesses related to the insufficient capacity of the 
authorities in fighting money laundering (e.g. shortage of financial and human 
resources, insufficient knowledge and experience, and a lack of coordination 
between the competent authorities). 
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Part 4: Policy Recommendations 
 
4.1 Objectives of Policy Recommendations 
 
Since eliminating illicit financial flows contributes to the stability and credibility of the 
international financial system at large as well as to the sustainable development of the EU’s 
trade partners, implementing the recommendations outlined below would help reduce the 
space for non-compliance and deviation from the intended goals of cooperation envisaged 
under EU FTAs. This would in turn create a better and more reliable environment for the 
fight against money laundering, tax evasion and tax elusion in EU external relations. 
 
From this perspective, it is instructive for the EU to utilise its trade power as leverage to 
seek to establish closer working relationships with its trade partners. This could reduce 
friction and incentivise a smoother domestic implementation of the EU’s FTAs. Hence, the 
new trade and investment strategy Trade for All should mention not only tax avoidance and 
the fight against corruption, but also illicit financial flows and AML efforts. 
 
For greater clarity, our policy recommendations have been grouped into four categories 
that correspond to the four key queries of this study. 
 
4.2 Groups of Policy Recommendations 
 
Group A: Recommendations on the Extent of Coverage of Financial Services Provisions 
 Although there is a significant degree of coherence concerning the definition and 
scope of financial services covered by EU FTAs, the discrepancies that exist with 
respect to the detail of specification of what financial services are covered by these 
FTAs make it necessary for the EU to ensure greater coherence across FTAs regarding 
these two elements. The EU could do so by striving to liberalise the same financial 
services with all trading partners. This is required in order to avoid gaps in the 
domestic implementation of international and European AML/CFT standards – 
such as those laid down in FATF recommendations and the EU’s 4th AML Directive 
– in the financial sector. This would further contribute to preventing regional and 
global fragmentation that might arise from variable harmonisation. 
 Notwithstanding this, the EU should consider limiting the definition and/or scope of 
financial services to be liberalised where compelling reasons exist in relation to the EU 
trading partner’s failure to implement and enforce the application of the said 
international and European AML/CFT standards (e.g. EU-Colombia/Peru FTA). 
 While most EU FTAs contain such provisions, the EU should ensure that all FTAs 
contain provisions on tax cooperation and that such provisions guarantee cooperation at 
the bilateral level in addition to any regional or international instruments or 
arrangements (e.g. this is missing in the EU FTA with South Africa). This 
recommendation should be in line with that under Group C below. 
 Because illicit financial flows are to a great extent rooted in trade in both goods 
and services, the EU should seek to include provisions combating the mispricing of 
internationally traded goods and services. 
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Group B: Recommendations on the Effectiveness and Deficiencies of Safeguards on 
anti-money laundering/combatting the financing of terrorism 
 Due to the sometimes rather general nature of FATF recommendations, it is 
necessary for the EU to strive to reduce the room for discretion of administrative bodies 
– such as central banks, financial intelligence units, tax administrations and 
financial inspectorates – when they exercise their powers in the process of 
applying and enforcing AML/CFT and tax law. This concerns notably 
administrative decisions on granting or revoking financial service providers’ 
licences in case of linkages with AML/CFT activities or with the provision of 
mutual legal assistance and exchange of information. This is required in order to 
enable otherwise well-drafted legal rules to attain the AML/CFT objectives sought 
by the EU. 
 To increase tax transparency and promote the reduction in tax evasion and elusion 
in its FTAs, the EU should seek to include provisions on country-by-country reporting 
of corporate tax and the establishment of public registers of beneficial owners. To facilitate 
this, the EU should also increase the responsibility of EU companies for its foreign 
activities. 
 Given that a significant obstacle to the effectiveness of AML/CFT safeguards 
contained in EU FTAs lies in the deficient enforcement and insufficient operational 
capacity of the  competent administrative bodies of the EU’s trading partner 
countries, it is necessary for the EU to provide further support to trading partners in 
terms of training and technical assistance. The EU should therefore strive to transfer 
sector-specific expertise through person-to-person instruction and provide an 
adequate level of financial assistance to its trading partners. This is of particular 
importance in the case of FTAs with developing countries, which typically lack 
human, financial and technical resources to enforce domestic law and which may 
otherwise be compliant with international and European standards. These goals 
could be incorporated within the EU’s Development Cooperation Instrument 
(DCI), particularly its focus area of good governance, rule of law and the fight 
against corruption. This recommendation is based on the EU’s moral and legal 
duty (notably laid down in art. 3(5) and 21(2)(d) TEU) to exercise leadership in 
preventing money laundering and tax evasion from hindering the potential of 
developing countries to pursue and achieve sustainable development. 
 In pursuing these goals and in order to achieve maximum impact, the EU is 
advised to continue joint capacity-building actions in the AML/CFT field, such as 
partnering with the Council of Europe or other FATF-Style Regional Bodies. Such 
projects have thus far yielded positive results in terms of raising the recipient 
country’s capacity to act. However, the EU needs to make sure that any such 
assistance continues even after the completion of the project in order to sustain the 
momentum of reform. 
 Because there is a high risk of some developing countries being disconnected from 
global initiatives, there is a need for the EU to insist on the involvement of its trading 
partners in the work of international AML/CFT and anti-tax evasion networks, such as 
those operating under the auspices of the FATF, the Basel Committee, the IMF and 
the OECD. Failing to do so is likely to reduce the transparency and effectiveness 
of the efforts of domestic and EU authorities in combating illicit financial flows 
and financial crimes. Where EU trading partners are already connected to such 
networks, we recommend building on the work of these networks further so as to 
improve the former’s enforcement capacities. 
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 The EU should insist on the establishment of well-functioning channels of information 
exchange between domestic AML/CFT and tax authorities; the lack of such channels 
seriously impedes the fight against money laundering and tax evasion. 
 
Group  C:  Recommendations  on  Drafting  and  Implementing  Financial  Services 
Provisions 
 The EU should avoid agreeing on overly general, imprecise and vague commitments and 
reduce the use of ‘best endeavour’ clauses in the AML/CFT and anti-tax evasion 
area. Such provisions are more likely to be ignored and neglected, and less likely 
to induce legal reform and effective enforcement because they leave a wide margin 
for interpretation to the authorities of the trading partner. This can dilute both the 
legal and the actual effect of the FTA. Therefore, the EU should strive for a greater 
degree of specification of the AML/CFT and tax-related requirements in its FTAs, 
for instance by specifying what ‘cooperation’ amounts to and by laying down 
concrete procedures for its operationalisation. 
 The EU should analyse the effects of liberalisation of financial services (and of trade in 
goods and services in general) on money laundering, tax evasion and tax elusion in Trade 
Sustainability Impact Assessments (Trade SIAs) and in general Impact Assessments (IAs). 
The tendency to produce Trade SIAs when negotiations are almost finalised 
should be reversed because the purpose of these SIAs is to influence the outcome 
of negotiations, and this is only possible if the expected effects and options are 
debated – including with the European Parliament – at a stage when the 
negotiations can still be influenced. 
 
Group D: Recommendations on the ‘Fitness’ and Effectiveness of Existing Compliance 
Monitoring Mechanisms 
 In future FTAs, the EU should seek to include provisions on the establishment of 
mechanisms for monitoring the trading partner’s compliance with the commitments 
undertaken in FTAs. This can be done through regular or periodic follow-ups of 
the implementation of FTAs’ AML/CFT and tax provisions. This is in line with EU 
Treaty obligations and the new EU strategy Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible 
Trade and Investment Policy (see point 2.2.2 thereof, p. 15). 
 Taking a step further, the EU should also consider including provisions that would  
make FTAs conditional on sufficient progress in the implementation and enforcement of 
the AML/CFT duties, notably in line with FATF standards. The FATF country 
evaluations based on the new outcome-based approach that combines the 
assessment of technical compliance (the law on the books) with the assessment of 
effectiveness of the application of the law in practice may provide a useful 
benchmark. 
 The EU should adopt a systemic approach to devising its trade strategy because the 
realisation of its trade goals is often jeopardised, not by legal shortcomings, but by 
the trade partner’s poor adherence to the principles of good governance and 
insufficient enforcement of the rule of law, both of which are unrelated to whether 
financial services provisions are well-formulated in FTAs. Through a systemic 
approach, countries experiencing problems with enforcing the rule of law will be 
required to provide guarantees or submit plans to tackle these problems in at least 
the medium term. 
 To this end, the EU should pursue the strategy of imposing a measure of conditionality 
during trade negotiations where structural weaknesses in the enforcement of the 
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rule of law, mainly due to corruption, organised crime and shadow economy, 
undermine the EU’s trade goals and the trading partner’s legislative and 
administrative endeavours in combating money laundering and tax evasion. The 
conditionality policy that the EU applies towards the states that are candidates for 
EU membership can be used as a basis on which to shape such a mechanism of 
conditionality. The mechanism would seek to strike a balance between giving 
trade benefits to the trading partner and effecting systemic domestic reforms. 
 With respect to conditionality and monitoring, it should be recalled that following 
the enhancement of the European Parliament’s foreign affairs powers after the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament, led by the INTA 
Committee, is well placed to request concrete arrangements to be set up in EU FTAs 
and may use its right of consent to affect them. 
 Correspondingly, where this is not foreseen, the EU should seek to ensure the 
participation of MEPs in the bodies set up by EU FTAs in order to enable the European 
Parliament to have direct access to the policy discussions and negotiations within 
these bodies. This could also reduce the information asymmetry that arises from 
executive dominance in diplomatic negotiations, which is crucial for the success of 
AML/CFT and anti-tax evasion efforts. 
 The European Parliament should use its delegations for relations with third countries, 
regions and international organisations (e.g. with South Africa or MERCOSUR) as 
vehicles for discussing legal and political problems encountered in the area of AML/CFT 
and tax law. This can be done by establishing working groups or appointing EU 
and regional rapporteurs on AML/CFT and tax matters within the bodies in which 
these delegations operate, such as joint parliamentary committees (e.g. with 
Mexico) or international parliamentary assemblies (e.g. Euro-Latin American 
Parliamentary Assembly). This would help the European Parliament bolster the 
achievement of the EU’s AML/CFT and tax goals through the use of existing 
institutional capacities. 
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Annex 1: Comparative Overview of Financial Services Provisions in EU FTAs, FATF Membership 
and Selected Statistics 
 



















Decision No 2/2001 of 
the EU-Mexico Joint 
Council 
All insurance and 
insurance-related 








The Parties agree to foster 
cooperation in the services 
sector in general and in the 
area of banking, insurance 
and other financial services in 
particular, through, inter alia: 
(a) ) encouraging trade 
in services; 
(b) ) exchanging, where 
appropriate, information on 
rules, laws and regulations 
governing the services sector 
in the Parties; 
(c) improving accounting, 
auditing, supervision and 
regulation of financial services 
and financial monitoring, for 
example through the 





All insurance and insurance- 
related services; Banking 
and other financial services 
(excluding insurance) 
Article 7.37 
Scope and definitions 
Banking and other 
financial services 
(excluding insurance); 




Insurance and insurance- 
related services; banking 
and other financial services 
(excluding insurance); 
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Mex ico South-Africa Serbia Korea Peru/Colombia 
Article 18 
Regulatory carve-out 
Each Party may 
regulate the supply of 
financial services, in so 
far as regulations do not 
discriminate against 
financial service or 
financial service 
suppliers of the other 
Party in comparison 
3. If a Party enters into 
an agreement of the 
type referred to its own 
Exceptions/ like financial services 





1. Nothing in this 
Chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a 
Party from adopting or 
maintaining reasonable 
measures for prudential 
reasons, such as: 






(a) Activities carried out by 
central banks or by any 
other public institution in 
pursuit of monetary and 
exchange rate policies; 
(b) activities conducted by 
central banks, government 
agencies or departments, or 
public institutions, for the 
account or with the 
guarantee of the 
government, except when 
those activities may be 
carried out by financial 
service providers in 
competition with such 
public entities; 
(c) activities forming part of 
a statutory system of social 
security or public retirement 
plans, except when those 
activities may be carried by 
financial service providers in 
competition with public 




Each Party may adopt or 
maintain measures for 
prudential reasons, 
including: 
(a) the protection of 
investors, depositors, 
policy-holders or persons 
to whom a fiduciary duty 
is owed by a financial 
service supplier; and; 
(b) ) ensuring the integrity 





Nothing in this Chapter 
shall be construed to 
prevent a Party, including 
its public entities, from 
exclusively conducting or 
providing in its territory 
activities or services 
forming part of a public 
retirement plan or 
statutory system of social 
security, except when 
those activities may be 
Article 159 
Specific Exceptions 
1. Nothing in this Title shall 
be construed to prevent a 
Party, including its public 
entities, from exclusively 
conducting or providing, in 
its territory, activities or 
services forming part of a 
public retirement plan or 
statutory system of social 
security, except when those 
activities may be carried 
out, as provided by the 
domestic regulation of that 
Party, by financial service 
suppliers in competition 
with public entities or 
private institutions. 
2. Nothing in this 
Agreement applies to 
activities or measures 
conducted or adopted by a 
central bank or monetary, 
exchange rate or credit 
authority or by any other 
public entity in pursuit of 
monetary and related credit 
or exchange rate policies. 
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Mexico South-Africa Serbia Korea Peru/Colombia 
participants, policy- 
holders, policy- 
claimants, or persons to 
whom a fiduciary duty 
is owed by a financial 
service 
(b) the maintenance of 
the safety, soundness, 




(c) ) ensuring the 
integrity and stability of 





1. Nothing in this 
Chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a 
Party, including its 
public entities, from 
exclusively conducting 
of a public retirement 
plan or statutory system 
of social security, except 
when those activities 
may be carried out by 
  carried out, as provided by 
its domestic regulations, by 
financial service suppliers 
in competition with public 
entities or private 
institutions. 
2. Nothing in this 
Agreement shall apply to 
activities conducted by a 
central bank or monetary 
authority or by any other 
public entity in pursuit of 
monetary or exchange rate 
policies. 
3. Nothing in this Chapter 
shall be construed to 
prevent a Party, including 
its public entities, from 
exclusively conducting or 
providing in its territory 
activities or services for the 
account or with the 
guarantee or using the 
financial resources of the 
Party, including its public 
entities except when those 
activities may be carried 
out, as provided by its 
domestic regulations, by 
financial service suppliers 
3. Nothing in this Title shall 
be construed to prevent a 
Party, including its public 
entities, from exclusively 
conducting or providing in 
its territory activities or 
services for the account or 
with the guarantee or using 
the financial resources of the 




1. Notwithstanding other 
provisions of this Title or 
Title V (Current Payments 
and Movements of Capital), 
a Party may adopt or 
maintain for prudential 
reasons, measures such as: 
(a) the protection of 
investors, depositors, 
policy-holders or persons to 
whom a fiduciary duty is 
owed by a financial service 
supplier; 
(b) ) ensuring the integrity 
and stability of its financial 
system. 
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financial service 
suppliers in competition 
with public entities or 
private institutions. 
2. Nothing in this 
Chapter applies to 
activities conducted by 
a central bank or 
monetary authority or 
by any other public 
entity in pursuit of 
monetary or exchange 
rate policies. 
3. Nothing in this 
Chapter shall be 
construed to prevent a 
Party, including its 
public entities, from 
exclusively conducting 
Consultations or 
providing in its 
territory activities or 
services for the account 
or with the guarantee or 
using the financial 
resources of the Party, 
or its public entities. 
  in competition with public 
entities or private 
institutions. 
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Article 29  
Payments related to 
investment 
1. Without prejudice to 
Articles 30 and 31, 
restrictions on 
payments related to 
investment between the 
Parties shall be Balance 
of payments difficulties 
progressively 
eliminated. The Parties 
undertake not to 
introduce any new 
restrictions on 
payments related to 
direct investment from 




1. Subject to the provisions of 
Article 34, the Parties 
undertake to allow all 
payments for current 
transactions between 
residents of the Community 
and of South Africa to be 
made in freely convertible 
currency. 
2. South Africa may take the 
necessary measures to ensure 
that the provisions of 
paragraph 1, which liberalise 
current payments, are not 
used by its residents to make 
unauthorised capital outflows. 




The Parties undertake to 
authorise, in freely 
convertible currency, in 
accordance with the 
provisions of Article VIII of 
the Articles of the 
Agreement of the 
International Monetary 
Fund, any payments and 
transfers on the current 
account of balance of 
payments between the 
Community and Serbia. 
Article 8.1 
Current payments 
The Parties undertake to 
impose no restrictions on, 
and to allow, all payments 
and transfers on the 
current account of balance 
of payments between 
residents of the Parties to 
be made in freely 
convertible currency, in 
accordance with the 
Articles of Agreement of 




The Parties shall authorise, 
in freely convertible 
currency and in accordance 
with the provisions of 
Article VIII of the Articles of 
Agreement of the 
International Monetary 
Fund, any payments and 
transfers on the current 
account of balance of 












The objective of this 





of capital movements 
Article 33 
Capital movements 
1. With regard to transactions 
on the capital account of 
balance of payments, the 
Community and South Africa 
shall ensure, from the entry 
into force of this Agreement, 
that capital relating to direct 
investments in South Africa in 




1. With regard to 
transactions on the capital 
and financial account of 
balance of payments, from 
the entry into force of this 
Agreement, the Parties shall 
Article 8.2 
Capital movements 
1. With regard to 
transactions on the capital 
and financial account of 
balance of payments, the 
Parties undertake to 
impose no restrictions on 
the free movement of 
capital relating to direct 
Article 169 
Capital Account 
With regard to transactions 
on the capital and financial 
account of balance of 
payments, following the 
entry into force of this 
Agreement, the Parties shall 
ensure the free movement of 
capital relating to direct 
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Mexico South-Africa Serbia Korea Peru/Colombia 
and payments between 
Mexico and the 
Community, without 
prejudice to other 
provisions in this 
Agreement and further 
obligations under other 
international 
agreements that are 
applicable between the 
Parties. 
companies formed in 
accordance with current laws 
can move freely, and that such 
investment and any profit 
stemming therefrom can be 
liquidated and repatriated. 
2. The Parties shall consult 
each other with a view to 
facilitating and eventually 
achieving full liberalisation of 
the movement of capital 
between the Community and 
South Africa. 
ensure the free movement of 
capital relating to direct 
investments made in 
companies formed in 
accordance with the laws of 
the host country and 
investments made in 
accordance with the 
provisions of Chapter II of 
Title V, and the liquidation 
or repatriation of these 
investments and of any 
profit stemming there from. 
2. With regard to 
transactions on the capital 
and financial account of 
balance of payments, from 
the entry into force of this 
Agreement, the Parties shall 
ensure the free movement of 
capital relating to credits 
related to commercial 
transactions or to the 
provision of services in 
which a resident of one of 
the Parties is participating, 
and to financial loans and 
credits, with maturity longer 
than a year. 
investments made in 
accordance with the laws 
of the host country, to 
investments and other 
transactions liberalised in 
accordance with Chapter 
Seven (Trade in Services, 
Establishment and 
Electronic Commerce) and 
to the liquidation and 
repatriation of such 
invested capital and of any 
profit generated therefrom. 
investments56 made in 
juridical persons constituted 
in accordance with the laws 
of the host country and 
investments and other 
transactions made in 
accordance with the 
provisions of Title IV (Trade 
in Services, Establishment, 
and Electronic Commerce), 
as well as the liquidation 
and repatriation of these 
investments and of any 
profit stemming therefrom. 
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1. The Parties shall take 
the appropriate 
measures for 
cooperation and liaison, 
that they consider 
appropriate, to intensify 




and illegal consumption 
of drugs, in conformity 
with their respective 
internal legal 
regulations. 
2. Relying on the 
competent bodies in 
this field, such 
cooperation shall 
involve in particular: 
[…] 
(c) exchange of 
information regarding 
Article 90 
Fight against drugs and 
money laundering 
The Parties undertake to 
cooperate in the fight against 
drugs and money laundering 
by: 
(a) ) promoting the South 
African drugs control master 
plan and enhancing the 
effectiveness of South African 
and southern African regional 
programmes to counter the 
illegal abuse of narcotic drugs 
and psychotropic substances 
as well as the production, 
supply and trafficking of these 
substances, based on the 
relevant international UN 
Drugs Control Conventions; 
(b) ) preventing the use of 
their financial institutions to 
launder capital arising from 
criminal activities in general 
and from drugs trafficking in 
particular on the basis of 
standards equivalent to those 
adopted by international 
bodies, in particular the 
Article 84 
Money laundering and 
financing of terrorism 
1. The Parties shall cooperate 
in order to prevent the use of 
their financial systems and 
relevant non-financial 
sectors for laundering of 
proceeds from criminal 
activities in general and drug 
offences in particular,          
as well as for the purpose of 
financing terrorism. 
2. Cooperation in this area 
may include administrative 
and technical assistance with 
the purpose of developing 
the implementation of 
regulations and efficient 
functioning of the suitable 
standards and mechanisms 
to combat money laundering 
and financing of terrorism 
equivalent to those adopted 
by the Community and 
international fora in this 
field, in particular the 




Each Party shall, to the 
extent practicable, ensure 
that internationally agreed 
standards for regulation 
and supervision in the 
financial services sector 
and for the fight against 
tax evasion and avoidance 
are implemented and 
applied in its territory. 
Such internationally 
agreed standards are, inter 
alia, the Core Principle for 
Effective Banking 
Supervision of the Basel 
Committee on Banking 
Supervision, the Insurance 
Core Principles and 
Methodology, approved in 
Singapore on 3 October 
2003 of the International 
Association of Insurance 
Supervisors, the Objectives 
and Principles of Securities 
Regulation of the 
International Organisation 
of Securities Commissions, 
the Agreement on 
Article 155 
Effective and Transparent 
Regulation 
[…] 
4. Each Party shall make its 
best endeavours to ensure 
that international standards 
for regulation and 
supervision in the financial 
services sector and for the 
fight against money 
laundering and the 
financing of terrorism are 
implemented and applied in 
its territory. Such 
international standards are 
the Core Principle for 
Effective Banking 
Supervision of the Basel 
Committee, the Insurance 
Core Principles and 
Methodology of the 
International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors, the 
Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation of the 
International Organisation 
of Securities Commissions, 
the Forty Recommendations 
on Money Laundering, and 
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 Mexico South-Africa Serbia Korea Peru/Colombia 
 legislative and 
administrative 
treatment and the 
adoption of appropriate 
measures on the control 
of drugs and on 
combating money- 
laundering, including 
measures adopted by 
the Community and 
international bodies 
active in this field; […] 
Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), […] 
 Exchange of Information 
on Tax Matters of the 
Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and 
Development (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘OECD’), 
the Statement on 
Transparency and 
Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes of the 
G20, and the Forty 
recommendations on 
Money Laundering and 
Nine Special 
Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing of the 
Financial Action Task 
Force. 
the Nine Special 
Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing of the 
Financial Action Task Force. 
5. The Parties also take note 
of the "Ten Key Principles 
for Information Sharing" 
promulgated by the Finance 
Ministers of the G7 Nations 
and the Agreement on 
Exchange of Information on 
Tax Matters of the 
Organisation on Economic 
Cooperation and 
Development's (hereinafter 
referred to as (“OECD“) and 
the Statement on 
Transparency and exchange 
of information for tax 










162 (Sep 2009-Jul 2010); 
54 (Jan-Oct 2011); 
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2010-2014689 
84 (2013)690 37 (2013)691  350 (2013)692  
Peru: 











17 (Sep 2009-Jul 
2010);693 
13 (Jan-Jul 2011); 

























689   Unless  otherwise  provided,  information  based  on  the  U.S.  Department  of  State’s  Narcotic  Control  Reports  2011-2015,  available  at:  
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm. 
690  Figures over 2013 based on the FATF’s 7th  Follow-up Report, Mutual Evaluation of Mexico, February 2014, available at: http://www.fatf-   
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/Follow-up-report-Mexico-2014.pdf. complete the reference and add link in the title 
691 Figures of South Africa based on: IMF, South Africa Financial Sector Assessment Program, Anti-money Laundering and Combating the Financing of  
Terrorism (AML/CFT) - Technical Note, IMF Country Report No. 15/51, February 2015, p. 19. 
692 Figures of Korea based on: FATF, 8th Follow-up Report, Mutual Evaluation of Korea, June 2014. 
693 37 Individuals. 
694 Supra footnote 538. 
695 Supra footnote 691, p. 20. 
696 Supra footnote 692, p. 23. 
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34,511 (Jan-Sep 2010); 
36,040 (Jan-Sep 2011); 
44,591 (Jan-Oct 2012); 
117,731 (Oct 2012-Nov 
2013); 
86,293 (Jan- Sep 2014) 
36,990 (Apr 2010- Mar 2011); 
53,506 (Apr 2011-Mar 2012) ; 
147,744 (Apr 2012- Mar 2013); 
355,369 (Apr 2013-Mar 2014) 
3,854 (Jan-Oct 2010); 










4,904 (Jan-Aug 2011); 
4,842 (Jan-Aug 2012); 
5,224 (Jan-Sep 2013); 




1,650 (Jan-Sep 2011); 
2,605 (Jan-Sep 2012); 
3,265 (Jan-Sep 2013); 















697 Supra footnote 6920, p. 16. 
698 Note that these figures are different from those provided in Box 16, which draws from the Peruvian Financial Intelligence Unit and moreover 
covers a different timeframe. 
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Annex 2: Provisions relevant to Financial Services, Money 
Laundering and Tax Evasion in selected EU FTAs 
 
EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and 
Cooperation Agreement 
 
Article 28 - Cooperation on combating drug trafficking, money- laundering and 
chemical precursors 
1. The Parties shall take the appropriate measures for cooperation and liaison, that they 
consider appropriate, to intensify their actions for the prevention and reduction of 
production, distribution  and illegal consumption  of drugs, in  conformity with  their 
respective internal legal regulations. 
2. Relying on the competent bodies in this field, such cooperation shall involve in 
particular: 
a) developing coordinated programmes and measures regarding the prevention of drug 
abuse and the treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts, including technical assistance 
programmes. These efforts may also include research and measures designed to reduce 
drug production by means of regional development of areas inclined to be used to produce 
illegal crops; 
b) developing coordinated research programmes and projects on drug control; 
c) exchange of information regarding legislative and administrative treatment and the 
adoption of appropriate measures on the control of drugs and on combating money- 
laundering, including measures adopted by the Community and international bodies 
active in this field; 
d) preventing the diversion of chemical precursors and other substances used in the illegal 
production of drugs and psychotropic substances, in accordance with the ‘Agreement on 
the Control of Drugs Precursors and Chemical Substances’ signed by the Parties on 13 
December 1996, and in the 1988 United Nations Vienna Convention. 
 
Article 54 (does not have a title) 
2. Nothing in this Agreement, or in any arrangements adopted under this Agreement, may 
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by the Member States or Mexico of 
any measure aimed at preventing the avoidance or evasion of taxes pursuant to the tax 




'Provisions of implementing Decision (2001/152/EC) no. 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint 
Council of 27 February 2001', OJ L70/7 relevant to financial services, money laundering 
and tax evasion. 
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Article 12 – Establishment of financial service suppliers 
1. Each party shall allow the financial service suppliers of the other party to establish a 
commercial presence in its territory. 
2. Each Party may require a financial service supplier of the other Party to incorporate 
under its own law or impose terms and conditions on establishment that are consistent 
with the other provisions of this Chapter. 
3. No Party may adopt new measures as regards to the establishment and operation of 
financial service suppliers of the other Party, which are more discriminatory than those 
applied on the date of entry into force of this Decision. 
4. No Party shall maintain or adopt the following measures: 
a) limitations on the number of financial service suppliers whether in the form of numerical 
quotas, monopolies, exclusive financial service suppliers or the requirements of an 
economic needs test; 
b) limitations on the total value of financial service trans- actions or assets in the form of 
numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic test; 
c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service 
output expressed in the terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the 
requirement of an economic needs test; 
d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular 
financial service sector or that a financial service supplier may employ and who are 
necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a specific financial service in the form 
of numerical quotas or a requirement of an economic needs test; and 
e) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in the terms of maximum percentage 
limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign 
investment. 
 
Article 13 – Cross border provision of financial services 
1. Each party shall allow the cross-border provision of financial services. 
2. No Party may adopt new measures as regards to the cross-border provision of financial 
services by financial service suppliers of the other Party which are more discriminatory as 
compared to those applied on the date of entry into force of this Decision. 
3. Without prejudice to other means of prudential regulation of the cross-border provision 
of financial services, a Party may require the registration of cross-border financial service 
suppliers of the other Party. 
4. Each Party shall permit persons located in its territory to purchase financial services from 
financial service suppliers of the other Party located in the territory of that other Party. This 
obligation does not require a Party to permit such suppliers to do business or carry on 
commercial operations; or to solicit, market or advertise their activities in its territory. Each 
Party may define the meaning of ‘doing business’, ‘carry on commercial operations’, 
‘solicit’, ‘market’ and ‘advertise’ for purposes of this obligation. 
 
Article 14 - National treatment 
1. Each Party shall grant to the financial service suppliers of the other Party, including those 
already established in its territory on the date of entry into force of this Decision, treatment 
no less favourable than that it accords to its own like financial service suppliers with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and 
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sale or other disposition of commercial operations of financial service suppliers in its 
territory. 
2. Where a Party permits the cross-border provision of a financial service it shall accord to 
the financial service suppliers of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords to its own like financial service suppliers with respect to the provision of such a 
service. 
 
Article 15 – Most favoured nation treatment 
1. Each Party shall accord to financial service suppliers of the other Party treatment no less 
favourable than it accords to the like financial service suppliers of a non-Party. 
2. Treatment granted under other agreements concluded by one of the Parties with a third 
country which have been notified under Article V of GATS shall be excluded from this 
provision. 
3. If a Party enters into an agreement of the type referred to in paragraph 2, it shall afford 
adequate opportunity to the other Party to negotiate the benefits granted therein. 
Article 20 – Effective and transparent regulation 
4. Each Party shall make its best endeavours to ensure that the Basle Committee’s ‘Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’, the International Association of Insurance 
Super- visors’ ‘Key Standards for Insurance Supervision’ and the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions’ ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation’ are implemented and applied in its territory. 
5. The Parties also take note of the ‘Ten Key Principles for Information Exchange’ 
promulgated by the Finance Ministers of the G7 Nations, and undertake to consider to 
what extent they may be applied in bilateral contacts. 
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EU-South Africa Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement 
 
Article 29 
Reconfirmation of GATS obligations 
1. In recognition of the growing importance of services for the development of their 
economies, the Parties underline  the importance of strict  observance of the  General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), in particular its principle on most-favoured- 
nation treatment, and including its applicable protocols with annexed commitments. 
2. In accordance with the GATS, this treatment shall not apply to: 
(a) advantages accorded by either Party under the provisions of an agreement as defined 
in Article V of the GATS or under measures adopted on the basis of such an agreement; 
(b) other advantages accorded pursuant to the list of most-favoured-nation exemptions 
annexed by either Party to the GATS. 
3. The Parties reaffirm their respective commitments as annexed to the fourth Protocol to 
the GATS concerning basic telecoms and the fifth Protocol concerning financial services. 
 
Article 30 
Further liberalisation of supply of services 
1. The Parties will endeavour to extend the scope of the Agreement with a view to further 
liberalising trade in services between the Parties. In the event of such an extension, the 
liberalisation process shall provide for the absence or elimination of substantially all 
discrimination between the Parties in the services sectors covered and should cover all 
modes of supply including the supply of a service: 
(a) from the territory of one Party into the territory of the other; 
(b) in the territory of one Party to the service consumer of the other; 
(c) by a service supplier of one Party, through commercial presence in the territory of the 
other; 
(d) by a service supplier of one Party, through presence of natural persons of that Party in 
the territory of the other. 
2. The Cooperation Council shall make the necessary recommendations for the 
implementation of the objective set out in paragraph 1. 
3. When formulating these recommendations, the Cooperation Council shall take into 
account the experience gained by the implementation of the obligations of each Party 
under the GATS, with particular reference to Article V generally and especially paragraph 
3(a) thereof covering the participation of developing countries in liberalization agreements. 
4. The objective set out in paragraph 1 shall be subject to a first examination by the 




1. Subject to the provisions of Article 34, the Parties undertake to allow all payments for 
current transactions between residents of the Community and of South Africa to be made 
in freely convertible currency. 
2. South Africa may take the necessary measures to ensure that the provisions of paragraph 
1, which liberalise current payments, are not used by its residents to make unauthorised 
capital outflows. 
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1. With regard to transactions on the capital account of balance of payments, the 
Community and South Africa shall ensure, from the entry into force of this Agreement, 
that capital relating to direct investments in South Africa in companies formed in 
accordance with current laws can move freely, and that such investment and any profit 
stemming therefrom can be liquidated and repatriated. 
2. The Parties shall consult each other with a view to facilitating and eventually achieving 
full liberalisation of the movement of capital between the Community and South Africa. 
 
Article 52 
Investment promotion and protection 
Cooperation between the Parties shall aim to establish a climate which favours and 
promotes mutually beneficial investment, both domestic and foreign, especially through 
improved conditions for investment protection, investment promotion, the transfer of 
capital and the exchange of information on investment opportunities. The aims of 
cooperation shall be, inter alia, to facilitate and encourage: 
(a) the conclusion, where appropriate, between the Member States and South Africa of 
agreements for the promotion and protection of investment; 
(b) the conclusion, where appropriate, between the Member States and South Africa of 
agreements to avoid double taxation; 
(c) the exchange of information on investment opportunities; 
(d) work towards harmonised and simplified procedures and administrative practices in 
the field of investment; 
(e) support, through appropriate instruments, the  promotion and  encouragement  of 




The Parties agree to foster cooperation in the services sector in general and in the area of 
banking, insurance and other financial services in particular, through, inter alia: 
(a) encouraging trade in services; 
(b) exchanging, where appropriate, information on rules, laws and regulations governing 
the services sector in the Parties; 
(c) improving accounting, auditing, supervision and regulation of financial services and 
financial monitoring, for example through the facilitation of training schemes. 
 
Article 90 
Fight against drugs and money laundering 
The Parties undertake to cooperate in the fight against drugs and money laundering by: 
(a) promoting the South African drugs control master plan and enhancing the effectiveness 
of South African and southern African regional programmes to counter the illegal abuse of 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances as well as the production, supply and 
trafficking of these substances, based on the relevant international UN Drugs Control 
Conventions; 
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(b) preventing the use of their financial institutions to launder capital arising from criminal 
activities in general and from drugs trafficking in particular on the basis of standards 
equivalent to those adopted by international bodies, in particular the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), and 
(c) preventing the diversion of precursor chemicals and other essential substances used for 
the illicit production of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances on the basis of the 
standards adopted by international authorities concerned, notably those of the Chemical 




1. The Parties shall cooperate to improve the level of protection to the processing of 
personal data, taking into account international standards. 
2. Cooperation on personal data protection may include technical assistance in the form of 
exchanges of information and experts and the establishment of joint programmes and 
projects. 




1. The Parties agree on the establishment of a Cooperation Council which will perform the 
following functions: 
(a) to ensure the proper functioning and implementation of the Agreement and the 
dialogue between the Parties; 
(b) to study the development of trade and cooperation between the Parties; 
(c) to seek appropriate methods of forestalling problems which might arise in areas covered 
by the Agreement; 
(d) to exchange opinions and make suggestions on any issue of mutual interest relating to 
trade and cooperation, including future action and the resources available to carry it out. 
2. The composition, frequency, agenda and venue of Cooperation Council meetings shall 
be agreed on through consultation between the Parties. 
3. The Cooperation Council referred to above shall have the power to take decisions in 
respect of all matters covered by this Agreement. 
4. The Parties agree to encourage and facilitate regular contacts between their respective 
Parliaments on the various areas of cooperation covered by the Agreement. 
5. The Parties will also encourage contacts between other similar and relevant institutions 
in South Africa and the European Union such as the Economic and Social Committee of 
the European Community and the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC) of South Africa. 
 
Article 98 
Tax carve-out clause 
2. Nothing in this Agreement, or in any arrangements adopted under this Agreement, may 
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of any measure aimed at preventing 
the avoidance or evasion of taxes pursuant to the tax provisions of agreements to avoid 
double taxation or other tax arrangements, or domestic fiscal legislation. 
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EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
Chapter II : Establishment 
Article 53 
1. Serbia shall facilitate the setting-up of operations on its territory by Community 
companies and nationals. To that end, Serbia shall grant, upon entry into force of this 
Agreement: 
(a) as regards the establishment of Community companies on the territory of Serbia, 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to its own companies or to any third 
country company, whichever is the better; 
(b) as regards the operation of subsidiaries and branches of Community companies on the 
territory of Serbia once established, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to its 
own companies and branches or to any subsidiary and branch of any third country 
company, whichever is the better. 
2. The Community and its Member States shall grant, from the entry into force of this 
Agreement: 
(a) as regards the establishment of Serbian companies treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded by Member States to their own companies or to any company of any third 
country, whichever is the better; 
(b) as regards the operation of subsidiaries and branches of Serbian companies, established 
in its territory, treatment no less favourable than that accorded by Member States to their 
own companies and branches, or to any subsidiary and branch of any third country 
company, established in their territory, whichever is the better. 
3. The Parties shall not adopt any new regulations or measures which introduce 
discrimination as regards the establishment of any other Party’s companies on their 
territory or in respect of their operation, once established, by comparison with their own 
companies. 
4. Four years after the entry into force of this Agreement, the Stabilisation and Association 
Council shall establish the detailed arrangements to extend the above provisions to the 
establishment of Community nationals and nationals of  Serbia to take up economic 
activities as self-employed persons. 
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Article: 
(a) Subsidiaries and branches of Community companies shall have, from the entry into 
force of this Agreement, the right to use and rent real property in Serbia; 
(b) Subsidiaries of Community companies shall, from the entry into force of this 
Agreement, have the right to acquire and enjoy ownership rights over real property as 
Serbian companies and as regards public goods/goods of common interest, the same rights 
as enjoyed by Serbian companies respectively where these rights are necessary for the 
conduct of the economic activities for which they are established. 
(c) Four years after the entry into force of this Agreement, the Stabilisation and Association 
Council shall examine the possibility of extending the rights mentioned under point (b) to 
branches of the Community companies. 
 
Article 54 
1. Subject to the provisions of Article 56, with the exception of financial services described 
in Annex VI, the Parties may regulate the establishment and operation of companies and 
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nationals on their territory, insofar as these regulations do not discriminate against 
companies and nationals of the other Parties in comparison with its own companies and 
nationals. 
2. In respect of financial services, notwithstanding any other provisions of this Agreement, 
a Party shall not be prevented from taking measures for prudential reasons, including for 
the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty 
is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity and stability of the 
financial system. Such measures shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Party’s 
obligations under this Agreement. 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to require a Party to disclose information 
relating to the affairs and accounts of individual customers or any confidential or 
proprietary information in the possession of public entities. 
 
Article 58 
1. A Community company established in the territory of Serbia or a Serbian company 
established in the Community shall be entitled to employ, or have employed by one of its 
subsidiaries or branches, in accordance with the legislation in force in the host territory of 
establishment, in the territory of the Republic of Serbia and the Community respectively, 
employees who are nationals of the Member States or nationals from Serbia respectively, 
provided that such employees are key personnel as defined in paragraph 2 and that they 
are employed exclusively by companies, subsidiaries or branches. The residence and work 
permits of such employees shall cover only the period of such employment. (...) 
 
Chapter III: Supply of Services 
Article 60 
1. The Parties shall not take any measures or actions which render the conditions for the 
supply of services by Community and Serbia nationals or companies which are established 
in a Party other than that of the person for whom the services are intended significantly 
more restrictive as compared to the situation existing on the day preceding the day of entry 
into force of this Agreement. 
2. If one Party is of the view that measures introduced by the other Party since the entry 
into force of this Agreement result in a situation which is significantly more restrictive in 
respect of supply of services as compared with the situation existing at the date of entry 
into force of this Agreement, such first Party may request the other Party to enter into 
consultations. 
 
Chapter IV: Current Payments and Movement of Capital 
Article 62 
The Parties undertake to authorise, in freely convertible currency, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article VIII of the Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund, any payments and transfers on the current account of balance of payments between 
the Community and Serbia. 
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1. With regard to transactions on the capital and financial account of balance of payments, 
from the entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall ensure the free movement of 
capital relating to direct investments made in companies formed in accordance with the 
laws of the host country and investments made in accordance with the provisions of 
Chapter II of Title V, and the liquidation or repatriation of these investments and of any 
profit stemming there from. 
2. With regard to transactions on the capital and financial account of balance of payments, 
from the entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall ensure the free movement of 
capital relating to credits related to commercial transactions or to the provision of services 
in which a resident of one of the Parties is participating, and to financial loans and credits, 
with maturity longer than a year. 
3. As from the entry into force of this Agreement, Serbia shall authorise, by making full 
and expedient use of its existing procedures, the acquisition of real estate in Serbia by 
nationals of Member States of the European Union. Within four years from the entry into 
force of this Agreement, Serbia shall progressively adjust its legislation concerning the 
acquisition of real estate in its territory by nationals of the Member States of the European 
Union to ensure the same treatment as compared to its own nationals. 
4. The Community and Serbia shall also ensure, as from four years after the entry into force 
of this Agreement, free movement of capital relating to portfolio investment and financial 
loans and credits with maturity shorter than a year. 
5. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, the Parties shall not introduce any new restrictions on 
the movement of capital and current payments between residents of the Community and 
Serbia and shall not make the existing arrangements more restrictive. 
6. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 62 and of this Article, where, in exceptional 
circumstances, movements of capital between the Community and Serbia cause, or 
threaten to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of exchange rate policy or monetary 
policy in the Community or Serbia, the Community and Serbia, respectively, may take 
safeguard measures with regard to movements of capital between the Community and 
Serbia for a period not exceeding six months if such measures are strictly necessary. 
7. Nothing in the above provisions shall be taken to limit the rights of economic operators 
of the Parties from benefiting from any more favourable treatment that may be provided 
for in any existing bilateral or multilateral Agreement involving Parties to this Agreement. 
8. The Parties shall consult each other with a view to facilitating the movement of capital 
between the Community and Serbia in order to promote the objectives of this Agreement. 
 
Chapter V: General Provisions 
Article 68 
1. The Most-Favoured-Nation treatment granted in accordance with the provisions of this 
Title shall not apply to the tax advantages that the Parties are providing or will provide in 
the future on the basis of Agreements designed to avoid double taxation or other tax 
arrangements. 
2. None of the provisions of this Title shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by the Parties of any measure aimed at preventing the avoidance or evasion 
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of taxes pursuant to the tax provisions of Agreements to avoid double taxation and other 
tax arrangements or domestic fiscal legislation. 
3. None of the provisions of this Title shall be construed to prevent Member States or Serbia 
from applying the relevant provisions of their fiscal legislation, from distinguishing 




Protection of personal data 
Serbia shall harmonise its legislation concerning personal data protection with Community 
law and other European and inter• national legislation on privacy upon the entry into force 
of this Agreement. Serbia shall establish one or more independent supervisory bodies with 
sufficient financial and human resources in order to efficiently monitor and guarantee the 
enforcement of national personal data protection legislation. The Parties shall cooperate to 
achieve this goal. 
 
Article 84 
Money laundering and financing of terrorism 
1. The Parties shall cooperate in order to prevent the use of their financial systems and 
relevant non-financial sectors for laundering of proceeds from criminal activities in general 
and drug offences in particular, as well as for the purpose of financing terrorism. 
2. Cooperation in this area may include administrative and technical assistance with the 
purpose of developing the implementation of regulations and efficient functioning of the 
suitable standards and mechanisms to combat money laundering and financing of 
terrorism equivalent to those adopted by the Community and international fora in this 
field, in particular the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
 
Article 86 
Preventing and combating organised crime and other illegal activities 
The Parties shall cooperate on combating and preventing criminal and illegal activities, 
organised or otherwise, such as: 
(a) smuggling and trafficking in human beings; 
(b) illegal economic activities, and in particular counterfeiting of cash and non-cash means 
of payments, illegal transactions on products such as industrial waste, radioactive material 
and transactions involving illegal, counterfeit or pirated products; 
(c) corruption, both in the private and public sector, in particular linked to non-transparent 
administrative practices; 
(d) fiscal fraud; (e) identity theft; (f) illicit trafficking in drugs and psychotropic substances; 
(g) illicit arms trafficking; (h) forging documents; (i) smuggling and illicit trafficking of 
goods, including cars; (j) cyber-crime. 
Regional cooperation and compliance with recognised international standards in 
combating organised crime shall be promoted. 
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In compliance with the international conventions to which they are Party and their 
respective laws and regulations, the Parties agree to cooperate in order to prevent and 
suppress acts of terrorism and their financing: 
(a) in the framework of full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1373 (2001) and other relevant UN resolutions, international conventions and instruments; 
(b) by exchanging information on terrorist groups and their support networks in 
accordance with international and national law; 
(c) by exchanging experiences with regard to means and methods of combating terrorism 
and in technical areas and training, and by exchanging experience in respect of the 
prevention of terrorism. 
(this Article is of indirect relevance) 
 
Article 91 
Banking, insurance and other financial services 
Cooperation between Serbia and the Community shall focus on priority areas related to 
the Community acquis in the fields of banking, insurance and financial services. The Parties 
shall cooperate with the aim of establishing and developing a suitable framework for the 
encouragement of the banking, insurance and financial services sectors in Serbia based on 
fair competition practices and ensuring the necessary level playing field. 
 
Article 93 
Investment Promotion and Protection 
Cooperation between the Parties, within the scope of their respective competencies, in the 
field of investment promotion and protection shall aim to bring about a favourable climate 
for private investment, both domestic and foreign, which is essential to economic and 
industrial revitalisation in Serbia. The particular aims of cooperation shall be for Serbia to 




The Parties shall establish cooperation in the field of taxation including measures aiming 
at the further reform of Serbia’s fiscal system and the restructuring of tax administration 
with a view to ensuring effectiveness of tax collection and the fight against fiscal fraud. 
Cooperation shall take due account of priority areas related to the Community acquis in the 
field of taxation and in the fight against harmful tax competition. Elimination of harmful 
tax competition should be carried out on the basis of the principles of the Code of Conduct 
for business taxation agreed by the Council on 1 December 1997. 
Cooperation shall also be geared to enhancing transparency and fighting corruption, and 
to include exchange of information with the Member States in an effort to facilitate the 
enforcement of measures preventing tax fraud, evasion and avoidance. Serbia shall also 
complete the network of bilateral Agreements with Member States, along the lines of the 
latest update of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital as well as on 
the basis of the OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters, to 
the extent that the requesting Member State subscribes to these. 
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EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
 
Article 7.3 
The body supervising the implementation and application of the ‘services’-component is 
the Committee on Trade in Services, Establishment and Electronic Commerce. 
 
Article 1.1, Paragraph 2 
The objectives of this Agreement are: 
(b) to liberalise trade in services and investment between the Parties, in conformity with 
Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter referred to as ‘GATS’); 
(d) to further liberalise, on a mutual basis, the government procurement markets of the 
Parties; 
(f) to contribute, by removing barriers to trade and by developing an environment 
conducive to increased investment flows, to the harmonious development and expansion 
of world trade; 
(h) to promote foreign direct investment without lowering or reducing environmental, 
labour or occupational health and safety standards in the application and enforcement of 




1. With respect to market access through establishment, each Party shall accord to 
establishments and investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that 
provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in the 
specific commitments contained in Annex 7-A. 
2. In sectors where market access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a 
Party shall not adopt or maintain either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the 
basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in Annex 7-A, are defined as: (a) 
limitations on the number of establishments whether in the form of numerical quotas, 
monopolies, exclusive rights or other establishment requirements such as economic needs 
test;(b) limitations on the total value of transactions or assets in the form of numerical 
quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;(c) limitations on the total number of 
operations or on the total quantity of output expressed in terms of designated numerical 
units in the form of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test ( 18 );(d) 
limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on 
foreign shareholdings or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment;(e) 
measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint ventures through 
which an investor of the other Party may perform an economic activity; and (f) limitations 
on the total number of natural persons, other than key personnel and graduate trainees as 
defined in Article 7.17, that may be employed in a particular sector or that an investor may 
employ and who are necessary for, and directly related to, the performance of the economic 
activity in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test. 
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National treatment (19) 
1. In the sectors inscribed in Annex 7-A, and subject to any conditions and qualifications 
set out therein, with respect to all measures affecting establishment, each Party shall accord 
to establishments and investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords to its own like establishments and investors. 
2. A Party may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by according to establishments and 
investors of the other Party, either formally identical treatment or formally different 
treatment to that it accords to its own like establishments and investors. 
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less 
favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of establishments or 
investors of the Party compared to like establishments or investors of the other Party. 
4. Specific commitments assumed under this Article shall not be construed to require any 
Party to compensate for any inherent competitive disadvantages which result from the 
foreign character of the relevant establishments or investors. 
 
Article 7.14 
MFN treatment (20) 
1. With respect to any measures covered by this Section affecting establishment, unless 
otherwise provided for in this Article, each Party shall accord to establishments and 
investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like 
establishments and investors of any third country in the context of an economic integration 
agreement signed after the entry into force of this Agreement (21). 
2. Treatment arising from a regional economic integration agreement granted by either 
Party to establishments and investors of a third party shall be excluded from the obligation 
in paragraph 1, only if this treatment is granted under sectoral or horizontal commitments 
for which the regional economic integration agreement stipulates a significantly higher 
level of obligations than those undertaken in the context of this Section as set out in Annex 
7-B. 
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2, the obligations arising from paragraph 1 shall not apply 
to treatment granted: (a) under measures providing for recognition of qualifications, 
licences or prudential measures in accordance with Article VII of GATS or its Annex on 
Financial Services; (b) under any international agreement or arrangement relating wholly 




Review of the investment legal framework 
1. With a view to progressively liberalising investments, the Parties shall review the 
investment legal framework (22), the investment environment and the flow of investment 
between them consistently with their commitments in international agreements no later 
than three years after the entry into force of this Agreement and at regular intervals 
thereafter. 
2. In the context of the review referred to in paragraph 1,the Parties shall assess any 
obstacles to investment that have been encountered and shall undertake negotiations to 
address such obstacles, with a view to deepening the provisions of this Chapter, including 
with respect to general principles of investment protection. 
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Each Party shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that internationally agreed standards for 
regulation and supervision in the financial services sector and for the fight against tax 
evasion and avoidance are implemented and applied in its territory. Such internationally 
agreed standards are, inter alia, the Core Principle for Effective Banking Supervision of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Insurance Core Principles and Methodology, 
approved in Singapore on 3 October 2003 of the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors, the Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation of the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions, the Agreement on Exchange of Information on 
Tax Matters of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‘OECD’), the Statement on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes of the G20, and the Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and 
Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force. 
Sub-section E on Financial services 
Article 7.37 
Scope and definitions 
1. This Sub-section sets out the principles of the regulatory framework for all financial 
services liberalised pursuant to Sections B through D. 
2. For the purposes of this Sub-section: 
financial services means any service of a financial nature offered by a financial service 
supplier of a Party. Financial services include the following activities: 
(a) Insurance and insurance-related services: 
(i) direct insurance (including co-insurance): (A) life; (B) non-life; 
(ii) reinsurance and retrocession; 
(iii) insurance inter-mediation, such as  brokerage and agency; and 
(iv) services auxiliary to insurance, such as consultancy, actuarial, risk assessment 
and claim settlement services; and 
(b) Banking and other financial services (excluding insurance): 
(i) acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public; 
(ii) lending of all types, including consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring and 
financing of commercial transactions; 
(iii) financial leasing; 
(iv) all payment and money transmission services, including credit, charge and debit 
cards, travellers cheques and bankers drafts; 
(v) guarantees and commitments; 
(vi) trading for own account or for account of customers, whether on an exchange, 
in an over-the-counter market or otherwise, the following: 
(A) money market instruments (including cheques, bills and certificates of 
deposits); 
(B) foreign exchange; 
(C) derivative products including, but not limited to, futures and options; 
(D) exchange rate and interest rate instruments, including products such as 
swaps, forward rate agreements; 
(E) transferable securities; and 
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(F) other negotiable instruments and financial assets, including bullion; 
(vii) participation in issues of all kinds of securities, including underwriting and 
placement as agent (whether publicly or privately) and provision of services related 
to such issues; 
(viii) money broking; 
(ix) asset management, such as cash or portfolio management, all forms of collective 
investment management, pension fund management, custodial, depository and 
trust services; 
(x) settlement and clearing services for financial assets, including securities, 
derivative products and other negotiable instruments; 
(xi) provision and transfer of financial information, and financial data processing 
and related software; and 
(xii) advisory, intermediation and other auxiliary financial services on all the 
activities listed in subparagraphs (i) through (xi), including credit reference and 
analysis, investment and portfolio research and advice, advice on acquisitions and 
on corporate restructuring and strategy; 
financial service supplier means any natural person or juridical person of a Party that seeks 
to provide or provides financial services and does not include a public entity; public entity 
means: 
(a) a government, a central bank or a monetary authority of a Party or an entity owned or 
controlled by a Party, that is principally engaged in carrying out governmental functions 
or activities for governmental purposes, not including an entity principally engaged in 
supplying financial services on commercial terms; or 
(b) a private entity, performing functions normally performed by a central bank or 
monetary authority, when exercising those functions; new financial service means a service 
of a financial nature, including services related to existing and new products or the manner 
in which a product is delivered, that is not supplied by any financial service supplier in the 
territory of a Party but which is supplied in the territory of the other Party. 
 
Article 7.38 
Prudential carve-out (39) 
1. Each Party may adopt or maintain measures for prudential reasons ( 40 ), including: (a) 
the protection of investors, depositors, policy-holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty 
is owed by a financial service supplier; and (b) ensuring the integrity and stability of the 
Party’s financial system. 
2. These measures shall not be more burdensome than necessary to achieve their aim, and 
where they do not conform to the other provisions of this Agreement, they shall not be 
used as a means of avoiding each Party’s commitments or obligations under such 
provisions. 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to require a Party to disclose information 
relating to the affairs and accounts of individual consumers or any confidential or 
proprietary information in the possession of public entities. 
4. Without prejudice to other means of prudential regulation of cross-border trade in 
financial services, a Party may require the registration of cross-border financial service 
suppliers of the other Party and of financial instruments. 
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The Parties recognise that transparent regulations and policies governing the activities of 
financial service suppliers are important in facilitating access of foreign financial service 
suppliers to, and their operations in, each other’s markets. Each Party commits to 
promoting regulatory transparency in financial services. 
 
Article 7.42 
New financial services 
Each Party shall permit a financial service supplier of the other Party established in its 
territory to provide any new financial service that the Party would permit its own financial 
service suppliers to supply, in like circumstances, under its domestic law, provided that 
the introduction of the new financial service does not require a new law or modification of 
an existing law. A Party may determine the institutional and juridical form through which 
the service may be provided and may require authorisation for the provision of the service. 
Where such authorisation is required, a decision shall be made within a reasonable period 




No later than two years after the entry into force of this Agreement, and in no case later 
than the effective date of similar commitments stemming from other economic integration 
agreements: 
(a) each Party shall permit a financial service supplier of the other Party established in its 
territory to transfer information in electronic or other form, into and out of its territory, for 
data processing where such processing is required in the ordinary course of business of 
such financial service supplier; and 
(b) each Party, reaffirming its commitment (41) to protect fundamental rights and freedom 
of individuals, shall adopt adequate safeguards to the protection of privacy, in particular 




1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party, including its public 
entities, from exclusively conducting or providing in its territory activities or services 
forming part of a public retirement plan or statutory system of social security, except when 
those activities may be carried out, as provided by its domestic regulations, by financial 
service suppliers in competition with public entities or private institutions. 
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall apply to activities conducted by a central bank or 
monetary authority or by any other public entity in pursuit of monetary or exchange rate 
policies. 
3. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party, including its public 
entities, from exclusively conducting or providing in its territory activities or services for 
the account or with the guarantee or using the financial resources of the Party, including 
its public entities except when those activities may be carried out, as provided by its 
domestic regulations, by financial service suppliers in competition with public entities or 
private institutions. 
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1. Chapter Fourteen (Dispute Settlement) shall apply to the settlement of disputes on 
financial services arising exclusively under this Chapter, except as otherwise provided in 
this Article. 
2. The Trade Committee shall, no later than six months after the entry into force of this 
Agreement, establish a list of 15individuals. Each Party shall propose five individuals 
respectively and the Parties shall also select five individuals who are not nationals of either 
Party and who shall act as chairperson to the arbitration panel. Those individuals shall 
have expertise or experience in financial services law or practice, which may include the 
regulation of financial service suppliers, and shall comply with Annex 14-C (Code of 
Conduct for Members of Arbitration Panels and Mediators). 
3. When panellists are selected by lot pursuant to Article 14.5.3 (Establishment of the 
Arbitration Panel),Article 14.9.3 (The Reasonable Period of Time for Compliance),Article 
14.10.3 (Review of any Measure Taken to Comply with the Arbitration Panel Ruling), 
Article 14.11.4 (Temporary Remedies in case of Non-compliance), Article 14.12.3 (Review 
of any Measure Taken to Comply after the Suspension of Obligations),Articles 6.1, 6.3 and 
6.4 (Replacement) of Annex 14-B(Rules of Procedure for Arbitration), the selection shall be 
made in the list established pursuant to paragraph 2.4. Notwithstanding Article 14.11, 
where a panel finds a measure to be inconsistent with this Agreement and the measure 
under dispute affects the financial services sector and any other sector, the complaining 
Party may suspend benefits in the financial services sector that have an effect equivalent 
to the effect of the measure in its financial services sector. Where such measure affects only 
a sector other than the financial services sector, the complaining Party may not suspend 
benefits in the financial services sector. 
 
Annex 7 - The Additional Commitment on Financial Services 
7. Financial Services 
Headnotes: All financial services are subject to the following provisions. 
1. To clarify the commitment of Korea with respect to Article 7.11, juridical persons 
supplying financial services and constituted under the laws of Korea are subject to non- 
discriminatory limitations on juridical form (35). 
2. The commitments of Korea under Articles 7.11 and 7.12 are subject to the limitation that 
in order to establish or acquire a controlling interest in a financial service supplier in Korea, 
a foreign investor must  own or control a financial service supplier that engages in 
supplying financial services within the same financial services sub-sector in its home 
country. 
3. For greater certainty, nothing in this Agreement limits Korea’s ability to require the chief 
executive officer of a financial service supplier established under its laws to reside within 
its territory. 
4. Even if Korea permits persons located in its territory, and its nationals wherever located, 
to purchase financial services from cross-border financial service suppliers of the other 
Party located in the territory of the other Party, such permission will not mean that Korea 
is required to permit such suppliers to do business or engage in solicitation in the territory 
of Korea. Korea may define ‘doing business’ and ‘solicitation’ for purposes of this 
obligation, provided that those definitions are not inconsistent with the commitments 
regarding cross-border supply of financial services undertaken by Korea. 
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5. Without prejudice to other means of prudential regulation on cross-border supply of 
financial services, Korea may require the registration or authorisation of cross-border 
financial service suppliers of the other Party and of financial instruments. Korea may 
require a cross-border financial service supplier of the other Party to provide information, 
solely for informational or statistical purposes, on the financial services it has supplied 
within the territory of Korea. Korea will protect such business information that is 
confidential from any disclosure that would prejudice the competitive position of the 
supplier. 
6. The Parties confirm that the following entities, as currently structured, are covered by 
Chapter Seven,  but  that  they  shall not be  considered financial service suppliers  for 
purposes of that Chapter (36 ): Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC), Resolution 
and Finance Corporation, Export-Import Bank of Korea, Korea Export Insurance 
Corporation, Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund, Credit Guarantee Fund, Korea 
Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO), Korea Investment Corporation (KIC), the 
National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, and the National Federation of Fisheries 
Cooperatives (37 ). 
7. Korea may grant 
(a) to one or more of the following financial service suppliers (collectively, Government- 
Sponsored Institutions or GSIs): 
— The Korea Development Bank; 
— Industrial Bank of Korea; 
— Korea Housing Finance Corporation; 
— The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation; and 
— The National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives. 
(b) special treatment, including but not limited to the following: 
— Guarantees of loans to or bonds issued by the GSIs; 
— Permission to issue more bonds per capital than similarly-situated non-GSIs; 
— Reimbursement of losses incurred by GSIs; 
— Exemption from certain taxes on capital, surplus, profit, or assets. 
8. Chief and deputy executive officers and all members of the Board of Directors of the 
Korea Housing Finance Corporation, the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation of 
Fisheries Cooperatives must be Korean nationals. 
9. Korea reserves the right not to consider any ‘compulsory’ third-party insurance service 
supplied in the territory of a foreign country to a natural person in Korea or a juridical 
person established therein, in determining whether such a natural or juridical person has 
satisfied a legal obligation to purchase such ‘compulsory’ third party insurance service not 
listed in this Schedule. However, services supplied outside the territory of Korea may be 
considered in satisfaction of the legal obligation if the required insurance cannot be 
purchased from an insurer established in Korea. 
10. In the context of privatising government-owned or government-controlled entities that 
supply financial services, Korea reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure 
relating to the continued guarantee, or time-limited additional guarantee, of the 
obligations and liabilities of these entities. 
11. Korea reserves the right to limit ownership by foreign investors of the Korea Exchange 
and the Korea Securities Depository. In the event of public offering of shares of the Korea 
Exchange or the Korea Securities Depository, Korea reserves the right to limit shareholding 
by foreign persons in the relevant institution, provided that Korea shall ensure that: (a) any 
Ex-Post Impact Assessment 






shareholding interests held by foreign persons at the time of the public offering shall be 
preserved; and (b) following the public offering, the Korea Exchange or the Korea 
Securities Depository shall assure access for financial service suppliers of the EU Party 
which are established in Korea’s territory, and regulated or supervised under the laws of 
Korea. 
 
Annex 7 - D The Additional Commitment on Financial Services 
Transfer of information 
1. The Parties recognise the importance of the cross-border transfer of information by 
financial service suppliers. Korea has expressed its intent to undertake modification to its 
regulatory regime that will result in its adoption of approaches that will permit the transfer 
of financial information across borders while addressing such areas as the protection of 
sensitive information of consumers, prohibitions on unauthorised reuse of the sensitive 
information, the ability of financial regulators to have access to records of financial service 
suppliers relating to the handling of such information, and requirements for the location 
of technology facilities ( 1 ). 
Performance of functions 
2. The Parties recognise the benefits of allowing a financial service supplier in a Party’s 
territory to perform certain functions at its head office or affiliates located inside or outside 
the Party’s territory. To the extent practicable, each Party should allow such an office or 
affiliate to perform these functions which generally include, but are not limited to: (a) trade 
and transaction processing functions, including confirmation and statement production; 
(b) technology-related functions, such as data processing ( 2 ), programming and system 
development; (c) administrative services, including procurement, travel arrangements, 
mailing services, physical security, office space management and secretarial services; (d) 
human resource activities, including training and education; (e) accounting functions, 
including bank reconciliation, budgeting, payroll, tax, account reconciliation and customer 
and proprietary accounting; and (f) legal functions, including the provision of advice and 
litigation strategy. 
3. Nothing in paragraph 2 prevents a Party from requiring a financial service supplier 
located in its territory to retain certain functions. 
4. For greater certainty, a financial service supplier located in the territory of a Party retains 
ultimate responsibility for compliance with requirements applicable to those functions 
performed by its head office or affiliate. 
Supply of insurance by the postal services to the public 
5. The regulation of insurance services supplied by a Party’s postal service supplier to the 
public should not accord to the Party’s postal service supplier a competitive advantage 
over private service suppliers of like insurance services in the territory of the Party. 
6. To this end, Korea should, to the extent practicable, provide that the Financial Services 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the ‘FSC’) exercise regulatory oversight over the 
insurance underwriting services supplied by Korea Post to the public and that those 
services be subject to the same rules applicable to private suppliers supplying like 
insurance underwriting services in its territory ( 3 ). 
Sectoral cooperatives selling insurance 
7. The regulation of insurance services supplied by a sectoral cooperative should not 
provide the cooperative a competitive advantage over private suppliers of like insurance 
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services. To the extent practicable, a Party should apply the same rules to services supplied 
by such cooperatives that it applies to like services supplied by private insurers. 
8. To this end, the FSC should exercise regulatory oversight over services supplied by 
sectoral cooperatives. At a minimum, Korea shall provide that no later than three years 
after the entry into force of this Agreement, solvency matters related to the sale of insurance 
by the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, the National Federation of Fisheries 
Cooperatives, the Korea Federation of Community Credit Cooperatives and the National 
Credit Union Federation of Korea shall be subject to regulation by the FSC. 
Self - Regulatory Organisations 
9. The Korea Insurance Development Institute is subject to the discipline of Article 7.40. 
This confirmation is without prejudice to the status of any other organisation in this or any 
other financial services sub-sector. 
10. For greater certainty, if each Party’s financial regulatory authority delegates a function 
related to insurance to a self-regulatory organisation or other non-governmental body, the 
authority shall take reasonable steps to ensure compliance with Article 7.39 (Transparency) 
and Article 7.23.2 (Domestic Regulation) with regard to any actions taken by the 
organisation or other non-governmental body pursuant to the delegated function. 
 
Points of the comparative part to work out: scope of liberalisation and exceptions; wording 
of the provisions on money laundering (best efforts); introduce/refer to goods- 
related/trade-based money laundering (perhaps relate this phenomenon to definitions, 
hint at need for further study, need for full empirical study); compare with more stringent 
environmental clauses; membership of the FATF or Regional Group; national 
implementation (money laundering and tax evasion and elusion); look into number of 
convictions (money laundering and tax evasion and elusion); discretion whether or not (to 
report by financial institutions or to investigate/prosecute by authorities); key points and 
conclusions from the comparative part (to be included later in the fourth part); 
capacity/effectiveness/structural weakness considerations; 
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EU-Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement 
 
Article 107 Objective and Scope of Application 
1. The Parties, reaffirming their commitments under the WTO Agreement, and with a view 
to facilitating their economic integration, sustainable development and continuous 
integration into the  global economy,  and  considering the  differences  in the  level of 
development of the Parties, hereby establish the necessary provisions for the progressive 
liberalisation of establishment and trade in services and for cooperation on electronic 
commerce. 
2. Nothing in this Title shall be construed to require any Party to privatise public 
undertakings or to impose any obligation with respect to government procurement. 
3. The provisions of this Title shall not apply to subsidies granted by a Party […]. 
4. The provisions of this Title shall not apply to services supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority. 
5. Subject to the provisions of this Title, each Party retains the right to exercise its powers 
and to regulate and introduce new regulations in order to meet legitimate public policy 
objectives. 
6. This Title shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the 
employment market of a Party, nor shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, 
residence or employment on a permanent basis. 
7. Nothing in this Title shall prevent a Party from applying measures to regulate the entry 
of natural persons into, or their temporary stay in, its territory, including those measures 
necessary to protect the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly movement of natural persons 
across, its borders, provided that such measures are not applied in such a manner as to 
nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Party under the terms of a specific 
commitment in this Title and its Annexes [16]. 
 
Article 108 Definitions 
For the purposes of this Title: 
- "economic integration agreement" means an agreement substantially liberalising trade in 
services and establishment pursuant to WTO rules; 
- "juridical person of a Party" means a juridical person set up in accordance with the laws 
of that Party and having its registered office, central administration or principal place of 
business in the territory of that Party; in case a juridical person has only its registered office 
or central administration in the territory of a Party, it shall not be considered as a juridical 
person of that Party, unless its operations have a real and continuous link with the 
economy of that Party […]; 
- "measure" means any measure by a Party, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, 
procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form; 
- "measures adopted or maintained by a Party" means measures adopted or maintained by: 
(a) central, regional or local governments and authorities; and 
(b) non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional or 
local governments or authorities; 
- "natural person of a Party" means a natural person that has the nationality of a Member 
State of the European Union or of a signatory Andean Country according to their 
respective domestic legislation […]; 
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- "services" includes any service in any sector, except services supplied in the exercise of 
governmental authority; 
- "services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority" means any service which is 
supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service 
suppliers; 
- "service supplier of a Party" means any natural or juridical person of a Party that seeks to 
supply or supplies a service; 
- "supply of a service" includes the production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery 
of a service. 
 
Article 151 Scope of Application 
This Section establishes the principles of the regulatory framework for all financial services 
committed pursuant to Chapters 2 (Establishment), 3 (Cross-Border Supply of Services) 
and 4 (Temporary Presence of Natural Persons for Business Purposes) of this Title. This 
Section applies to measures affecting the supply of financial services.699 
 
Article 152 Definitions 
For the purposes of this Chapter and of Chapters 2 (Establishment), 3 (Cross-Border Supply 
of Services) and 4 (Temporary Presence of Natural Persons for Business Purposes) of this 
Title: 
- "financial service" means any service of a financial nature offered by a financial service 
supplier of a Party. Financial services include all insurance and insurance-related services, 
and all banking and other financial services (excluding insurance). Financial services 
include the following activities: 
(a) insurance and insurance-related services: 
(i) direct insurance (including co-insurance): 
(A) life; 
(B) non-life; 
(ii) reinsurance and retrocession; 
(iii) insurance inter-mediation, such as brokerage and agency; and 
(iv) services auxiliary to insurance, such as consultancy, actuarial, risk assessment and 
claim settlement services; 
(b) banking and other financial services (excluding insurance): 
(i) acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public; 
(ii) lending  of  all  types,  including  consumer  credit,  mortgage  credit,  factoring  and 
financing of commercial transactions; 
(iii) financial leasing; 
(iv) all payment and money transmission services, including credit, charge and debit cards, 
travellers cheques and bankers drafts; 
(v) guarantees and commitments; 
(vi) trading, for own account or for account of customers, whether on an exchange, in an 
over-the-counter market or otherwise, the following: 




699 Reference to the supply of a financial service in this Section shall mean the supply of a 
service as defined in Article 108. 
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(B) foreign exchange; 
(C) derivative products including, but not limited to, futures and options; 
(D) exchange rate and interest rate instruments, including products such as swaps, forward 
rate agreements; 
(E) transferable securities; and 
(F) other negotiable instruments and financial assets, including bullion; 
(vii) participation in issues of all kinds of securities, including underwriting and placement 
as agent (whether publicly or privately) and provision of services related to such issues; 
(viii) money broking; 
(ix) asset management, such as cash or portfolio management, all forms of collective 
investment management, pension fund  management, custodial, depository and trust 
services; 
(x) settlement and clearing services for financial assets, including securities, derivative 
products, and other negotiable instruments; 
(xi) provision and transfer of financial information, and financial data processing and 
related software; and 
(xii) advisory, intermediation and other auxiliary financial services on all the activities 
listed in subparagraphs (i) through (xi) above, including credit reference and analysis, 
investment and portfolio research and advice, and advice on acquisitions and on corporate 
restructuring and strategy; 
- "financial service supplier" means any natural or juridical person of a Party that seeks to 
supply or supplies financial services. The term "financial service supplier" does not include 
a public entity; 
- "new financial service" means a service of a financial nature, including services related to 
existing and new products or the manner in which a product is delivered, that is not 
supplied by any financial service supplier in the territory of a Party but which is supplied 
in the territory of another Party; 
- "public entity" means: 
(a) a government, a central bank or a monetary authority, of a Party, or an entity owned or 
controlled by a Party, that is principally engaged in carrying out governmental functions 
or activities for governmental purposes, not including an entity principally engaged in 
supplying financial services on commercial terms; or 
(b) a private entity, performing functions normally performed by a central bank or 
monetary authority, when exercising those functions; 
- "self-regulatory organisation" means any non-governmental body, including any 
securities or futures exchange or market, clearing agency or other organisation or 
association that exercises its own or delegated regulatory or supervisory authority over 
financial service suppliers; for greater certainty, a self-regulatory organisation shall not be 
considered a designated monopoly for purposes of Title VIII (Competition); 
- "services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority" for the purposes of Article 
108, also includes: 
(a) activities conducted by a central bank or a monetary authority or by any other public 
entity in pursuit of monetary or exchange rate policies; 
(b) activities forming part of a statutory system of social security or public retirement plans; 
and 
(c) other activities conducted by a public entity for the account or with the guarantee or 
using the financial resources of the Government; 
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for purposes  of  the  definition of  "services supplied in the  exercise  of governmental 
authority" in Article 108, if a Party allows any of the activities referred to in subparagraphs 
(b) or (c) above to be conducted by its financial service suppliers in competition with a 
public entity or a financial service supplier, the definition of "services" as established in 
Article 108 shall include such activities. 
 
Article 153 Clearing and Payment Systems 
1. Under terms and conditions that accord national treatment, each Party shall grant to 
financial service suppliers of another Party established in its territory access to payment 
and clearing systems operated by public entities and to official funding and refinancing 
facilities available in the  normal course of ordinary business. This paragraph is not 
intended to confer access to lender of last resort facilities of a Party. 
2. Where a Party: 
(a) requires, as a condition for financial service suppliers of another Party to supply 
financial services on an equal basis with domestic financial service suppliers, membership 
or participation in, or access to, any self-regulatory body, securities or futures exchange or 
market, clearing agency, or any other organisation or association; or 
(b) provides, directly or indirectly, such entities privileges or advantages in supplying 
financial services; 
such Party shall ensure that such entities accord national treatment to financial service 
suppliers of another Party resident in its territory. 
 
Article 154 Prudential Carve-Out 
1. Notwithstanding other provisions  of this  Title or Title  V (Current  Payments and 
Movements of Capital), a Party may adopt or maintain for prudential reasons, measures 
such as: 
(a) the protection of investors, depositors, policy-holders or persons to whom a fiduciary 
duty is owed by a financial service supplier; 
(b) ensuring the integrity and stability of its financial system. 
2. Measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be more burdensome than necessary to 
achieve their aim, and shall not discriminate against financial services or financial service 
suppliers of another Party in comparison to its own like financial services or like financial 
service suppliers. 
3. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to require a Party to disclose information 
relating to the affairs and accounts of individual customers or any confidential or 
proprietary information in the possession of public entities. 
4. Without prejudice to other means of prudential regulation of the cross-border supply of 
financial services, a Party may require the registration or authorisation of cross-border 
suppliers of financial services of another Party and of financial instruments. 
 
Article 155 Effective and Transparent Regulation 
1. Each Party shall make its best endeavours to provide in advance to all interested persons 
any measure of general application that that Party intends to adopt in order to give an 
opportunity for such persons to comment on the measure. Such measure shall be provided: 
(a) by means of an official publication; or 
(b) in other written or electronic form. 
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2. Each Party shall make available to interested persons its requirements for completing 
applications relating to the supply of financial services. 
3. Upon request of an applicant, the Party concerned shall inform the applicant of the status 
of his/her application. Where the Party concerned requires additional information from 
the applicant, it shall notify the applicant without undue delay. 
4. Each Party shall make its best endeavours to ensure that international standards for 
regulation and supervision in the financial services sector and for the fight against money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism are implemented and applied in its territory. 
Such international standards are the Core Principle for Effective Banking Supervision of 
the Basel Committee, the Insurance Core Principles and Methodology of the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors, the Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, the Forty 
Recommendations on Money Laundering, and the Nine Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing of the Financial Action Task Force. 
5. The Parties also take note of the "Ten Key Principles for Information Sharing" 
promulgated by the Finance Ministers of the G7 Nations and the Agreement on Exchange 
of Information on Tax Matters of the Organisation on Economic Cooperation and 
Development's (hereinafter referred to as "OECD") and the Statement on Transparency and 
exchange of information for tax purposes of the G20. 
 
Article 156 New Financial Services 
Each Party shall permit a financial service supplier of another Party established in its 
territory to supply any new financial service of a type similar to those services which that 
Party permits its own financial service suppliers to supply under its domestic law in like 
circumstances. A Party may determine the institutional and juridical form through which 
the new financial service may be supplied and may require authorisation for the supply of 
such service. Where such authorisation is required, a decision shall be made within a 
reasonable period of time and the authorisation may only be refused for prudential 
reasons. 
 
Article 157 Data Processing 
1. Each Party shall permit a financial service supplier of another Party to transfer 
information in electronic or other form, into and out of its territory, for data processing 
where such processing is required in the ordinary course of business of such financial 
service supplier. 
2. Each Party shall adopt adequate safeguards for the protection of the right to privacy and 
the freedom from interference with the privacy, family,  home or correspondence of 
individuals, in particular with regard to the transfer of personal data. 
 
Article 158 Recognition of Prudential Measures 
1. A Party may recognise prudential measures of any other country in determining how 
the measures relating to financial services of that Party shall be applied. Such recognition, 
which may be achieved through harmonisation or otherwise, may be based upon an 
agreement or arrangement with the country concerned, or may be granted autonomously. 
2. A Party that is a party to such an agreement or arrangement referred to in paragraph 1, 
whether future or existing, shall afford adequate opportunity for another Party to negotiate 
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its accession to such agreements or arrangements, or to negotiate comparable ones with 
such Party, under circumstances in which there would be equivalent regulation, oversight, 
implementation of such regulation and, if appropriate, procedures concerning the sharing 
of information between the Parties to the agreement or arrangement. Where a Party 
accords recognition autonomously, such Party shall afford adequate opportunity for 
another Party to demonstrate that those circumstances exist. 
 
Article 159 Specific Exceptions 
1. Nothing in this Title shall be construed to prevent a Party, including its public entities, 
from exclusively conducting or providing, in its territory, activities or services forming part 
of a public retirement plan or statutory system of social security, except when those 
activities may be carried out, as provided by the domestic regulation of that Party, by 
financial service suppliers in competition with public entities or private institutions. 
2. Nothing in this Agreement applies to activities or measures conducted or adopted by a 
central bank or monetary, exchange rate or credit authority or by any other public entity 
in pursuit of monetary and related credit or exchange rate policies. 
3. Nothing in this Title shall be construed to prevent a Party, including its public entities, 
from exclusively conducting or providing in its territory activities or services for the 
account or with the guarantee or using the financial resources of the Party, or its public 
entities. 
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Annex 3: GAFILAT-EU Cooperation 
 
GAFILAT (the Financial Action Task Force in Latin America) and the EU agreed on 
developing a project “Support to the fight against money laundering in the Latin America 
and the Caribbean countries” in December 2009. This project forms a part of the global 
action funded by the EU through its “Cocaine Route Programme: Combating 
Transnational Organised Crime.” 
 
The objective of the first stage of the EU-GAFILAT project was to support the fight against 
money laundering in the non-banking financial sector, in a 24 month term, later extended 
for 12 additional months. In 2011 a specific study a four sub-sectors was carried out: 
Exchange Market, Remittance, Transport of Securities and other Non-Banking Financial or 
Credit Agents. In 2012, the work was to focus on the Stock Market, credit cards, and new 
payment methods.700 
 
Much training has been carried out during these years (two regional typology seminars, 
two evaluator seminars, two advanced evaluator seminars, and one workshop on the 
prevention of money laundering in the transport of valuables sub-sector) and finally, it is 
expected to draft a regional risk analysis of money laundering through non-banking 
financial activities. 
 
The agreement for the development of a second stage was signed in December 2011. It 
consists of four convergent objectives: 
o To  strengthen  the  money  laundering  investigation  processes  in  GAFILAT 
member countries 
o To promote coordination amongst the national actors in the investigation and 
criminalisation of money laundering cases 
o To strengthen cooperation among GAFILAT countries at the administrative, 
police and legal level 
o To promote cooperation in those levels with other FATF style regional bodies 
















700 Like telephone and internet banking and prepaid cards. 
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Annex 4: Questionnaire for the Empirical Study 
 
1. Background and exact role within the [institution x]. 
 
2. Trade in financial services between the EU and Mexico, South Africa, Serbia, 
Korea, and Colombia/Peru following the conclusion of the EU free trade 
agreements: 
 
- in which legal forms are financial services provided? 
- how are the financial institutions involved supervised? 
- volumes of trade in financial services (from the EU to third countries 
and from third countries to the EU). 
 
3. Illicit financial flows resulting from money laundering, tax evasion and elusion: 
 
- the extent of / specific data on illicit financial flows between the EU 
and the above mentioned third countries (if available); 
- is there a causal link between (an increase in) such illicit financial flows 
and the liberalisation of financial services between the EU and third 
countries? 
- if the data on the illicit financial flows are too general or scarce, what 
are the main problems in obtaining them? 
- the role of the [institution X] and other relevant 
international/EU/national institutions involved in combating money- 
laundering, tax evasion and elusion; 
- major legal and regulatory difficulties involved in combating illicit 
financial flows between the EU and the above mentioned third 
countries. 
 
4. Room for improvement in international/EU/national legal frameworks: e.g. 
 
- Harder obligations of third countries in the area of anti-money 
laundering, tax evasion and elusion under the EU free trade 
agreements? 
- Better AML regulation at international level, EU level, EU Member 
State level and/or third country level? 
- Better implementation and enforcement of AML regulation at EU 
Member State level and/or third country level? 
- Better governance in third countries? 
 
5. Most important/relevant organisations/persons we should talk to. 
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Annex 5: List of Questionnaire and Interview Respondents 
 
Institution Name and position 
Bank of Italy (Banka d’Italia), Italy 
-  Pierpaolo  Fratangelo,  Deputy  Head  of  the  Money 
Laundering Unit 
 
Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandse Bank), the 
Netherlands 
- Juliëtte van Doorn, Head of the Department ‘Expert 
Centre Integrity Strategy’ 
- Maud Bökkering, Financial Supervisor (Anti-Money 
Laundering/ Counter Terrorist Financing), Department 
‘Expert Centre Integrity Strategy’ 
European Banking Authority - Carolin Gardner, Policy Expert (Anti-Money Laundering) 
European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Justice and Consumers 
- David Schwander, Policy Officer Anti-money Laundering 
Financial Action Task Force - Valerie Schilling, Senior Policy Analyst 
Financial Intelligence Centre, South Africa - Kathy Nicolaou-Manias, Senior Policy Analyst 
Financial Conduct Authority, United Kingdom 
- James London, Manager of Financial Crime Policy and 
Risk Unit 
Global Financial Integrity - Dev Kar, Chief Economist 
 
Financial Intelligence Unit of Peru (Unidad de 
Inteligencia Financiera del Perú), Peru 
- Gonzalo Alvarado, Coordinator for Liaison and 
Cooperation at the Department for Prevention, Liaison & 
Cooperation 
- Miguel Flores Valdivia, Senior Analyst at the Strategic 
Analysis Department 
Financial Intelligence Unit (Servicio Ejecutivo de 
la Comisión de Prevención del Blanqueo de 
Capitales e Infracciones Monetarias), Spain 
-   Rafael   Abad   Prieto,   Legal   Specialist   (Anti-Money 
Laundering) 
Korea Financial Intelligence Unit, Republic of 
Korea 
 
- Koh Chol Soo, Deputy Director 
Ministry  of  Finance  (Ministarstvo  finansija), 
Republic of Serbia 
- Milovan Milovanovic, Director of the Administration for 
the Prevention of Money Laundering 
National Banking and Securities Commission 
(Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores), 
Mexico 
- Sandro García Rojas Castillo, General Director of the 
Anti-Money Laundering Unit 
 
University of Maryland, United States 
- Peter Reuter, Professor in the School of Public Policy 
and in the Department of Criminology 
 
University of Saarland, Germany 
-  Marco  Mansdörfer,  Professor  of  Criminal  Law,  in 
particular Economic Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure 
 
World Bank 
- Emile van der Does de Willebois, Senior Financial Sector 
Specialist 
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